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To our heterogeneous most relevant ones.
An important scientific innovation rarely makes its way by gradually
winning over and converting its opponents: What does happen is that the




As Schumpeter pointed out long ago, conceptual frameworks, models and
policy prescriptions are embedded in the economist’s “preanalytic vision” of
the economy. And preanalitc visions have been and still are very different in
the profession.
Nowadays the majority of the profession embraces the Neoclassical ap-
proach to economic behavior according to which agents are endowed with
substantial rationality, adopt optimal rules, interact indirectly through the
price vector on markets which are continuously in equilibrium. This ap-
proach has been extraordinarily fruitful, as it has allowed to build models
that can be solved analytically and yield clearcut policy implications. The
obvious case in point is Walras’ theory of General Equilibrium, beautifully
outlined in his Elements d’Economie Politique and elegantly extended and
refined by Arrow and Debreu. Moreover, the approach has been remarkably
flexible. Appropriately designed variants of the Neoclassical approach have
been applied to economies characterized by imperfect competition, imperfect
information, strategic interaction, heterogeneous agents. The most insightful
of these theoretical developments have been incorporated in micro-founded
macroeconomic models of the New Neoclassical Synthesis that have been all
the rage during the years of the Great Moderation.
However, the capability of the Neoclassical approach to encompass and
v
explain all the complex details of economic life has reached a limit. For
instance it is now abundantly clear that the Neoclassical approach is not
well suited to describe the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession.
In models of the New Neoclassical Synthesis, in fact, a great recession may
be explained only by a large aggregate negative shock, whose probability is
extremely low (it is an extreme and rare event). This mechanism does not
clarify much of the crisis and does not help much in devising appropriate
remedies.
The current predicament, both in the real world and in the public debate,
resembles the early ’30s of last century. The way out of the Great Depression
in the ’30s required a new economic theory and the II World War. 1 Luckily,
in order to escape the current predicament we can dispense at least with the
latter. We still need, however, to reshape the way in which we think about
the economy.
For several years now, a Complexity approach has been developed which
conceives the economy as a complex system of heterogeneous interacting
agents characterized by limited information and bounded rationality. In this
view, a “crisis” is a macroscopic phenomenon which spontaneously emerges
from the web of microscopic interactions. Agent Based Models (ABMs) are
the analytical and computational tools necessary to explore the properties of
a complex economy.
Agent-based macroeconomics is still in its infancy but it is undoubtedly a
very promising line of research. So far only a small minority in the economic
profession has adopted this approach. This may be due to the“wait and
see” attitude of those who want to see the approach well established in the
1The unemployment rate, which peaked at 1/4 of the labour force during the Great
Depression, went back to the long run “normal” of around 1/20 only after the end of the
war. The huge increase in Government spending due to the war effort helped to absorb
the unemployment generated by the Great Depression.
vi
profession before embracing it. The hesitation, however, may also come
from methodological conservatism. For instance, while in other disciplines
the explanatory power of computer simulations is increasingly recognized,
most economists remain dismissive of any scientific work that is not based
on strict mathematical proof.2 With the passing of years, however, AB tools
have been refined. This book is a guide to the main issues which an interested
reader may encounter when approaching this field. We hope this will help in
nudging a new generation of curious minds to explore the fascinating field of
complexity.
Thanks to Leonardo Bargigli, Giovanni Dosi, Bruce Greenwald, Alan Kir-
man, Roberto Leombruni, Antonio Palestrini, Joe Stiglitz....
Our post docs.
This book benefited from funding from the European Community’s Sev-
enth Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013), grants agreements n. xxx
(CRISIS), n. xxx (NESS), n.xxx (MATHEMACS) and INET.
2A recent intriguing line of research aims at providing analytical solutions to multi-
agent systems adopting the apparatus of statistical mechanics, e.g. the Fokker-Planck
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Domenico Delli Gatti and Mauro Gallegati
1.1 Hard times for Dr. Pangloss
High and persistent unemployment, over-indebtedness and financial instabil-
ity, bankruptcies, domino effects and the spreading of systemic risk: These
phenomena have taken center stage in the light of the Global Financial Crisis.
By construction, the Neoclassical approach is much better suited to study
the features of the world of Dr Pangloss (Buiter, 1980) than the intricacies
of a complex, financially sophisticated economy. This point is well taken
in the introduction of a seminal paper by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
published well before the Global Financial Crisis: “How does one go about
incorporating financial distress and similar concepts into macroeconomics?
While it seems that there has always been an empirical case for including
credit-market factors in the mainstream model, early writers found it dif-
ficult to bring such apparently diverse and chaotic phenomena into their
formal analyses. As a result, advocacy of a role for these factors in aggre-
1
gate dynamics fell for the most part to economists outside the US academic
mainstream, such as Hyman Minsky, and to some forecasters and financial
market practitioners.” (Bernanke, 1999, p.1344).
This candid admission by three among the most distinguished macro-
economists (one of them destined to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve for
eight long and turbulent years) – which incidentally provides a long overdue
implicit tribute to Hyman Minsky – provides also the research question for
a model of the financial accelerator which has started a non-negligible body
of literature in contemporary macroeconomics.
In order to put this development in macroeconomic thinking into context,
it is necessary to recall that any mainstream macroeconomic model is based
on a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) skeleton, which can
support either a Real Business Cycle model or a New Keynesian (NK) model.
The latter differs from the former because of the presence of imperfections,
the most important being imperfect competition and nominal rigidity. The
structural form of the standard NK-DSGE framework boils down to a “three
equation” model consisting of an optimizing IS equation, a NK Phillips curve
and a monetary policy rule based on changes in the interest rate.
The NK-DSGE framework is of course too simple and therefore inade-
quate to analyze the emergence of a financial crisis and a major recession for
the very good reason that neither asset prices nor measures of agents’ finan-
cial fragility show up anywhere in the model. In order to make the model
operational from this viewpoint, financial frictions have been incorporated
into the basic model in one way or another.
In the last decade we have witnessed an explosion of models with this type
of frictions. The “story” that can be attached to this literature, however, can
be told in simple terms. A negative shock which triggers a recession yields
2
a reduction of firms’ internaly generated funds. Borrowers need more funds
but lenders are less willing to supply loans as the value of firms’ collateral is
also going down. Hence firms might be forced to scale activity down. This
in turn will lead to lower cash flow, and to a further deceleration of activity.
The financial accelerator provides a mechanism of amplification of an
aggregate shock (i.e. a positive feedback or a self-reinforcing mechanism)
based on financial factors. By construction, however, it cannot be a model
of the origin of a financial crisis and the ensuing recession.
As in all DSGE models, in fact, also in models characterized by financial
frictions a fluctuation is determined by an aggregate shock (an impulse)
and is channeled to the economy by a propagation mechanism. Moreover,
the stability of the steady state makes fluctuations persistent but relatively
short lived. Therefore, a great recession may be explained only by a sizable
aggregate negative shock and is bound to disappear relatively soon. Recent
models incorporating financial frictions trace back the great recession to a
major negative shock (possibly of a new type: an “investment shock”, a
“financial shock” instead of the usual Total Factor Productivity shock) which
spreads through the economy and becomes persistent because of the financial
amplification but is temporary so that the economy goes back to equilibrium
in due time.
This view of the Global Financial Crisis is not convincing. It does not pro-
vide a plausible theory of its origin, since the crisis was not the consequence
of a global shock but originated from a small segment of the US financial
system (the subprime loans market) and spread to the entire US financial
system and to the world economy. Moreover, it does not provide an appro-
priate characterization of the actual recovery, which has been unusually long
3
and painful.1 In fact, during the recession, quantitative forecasts of future
GDP growth (also at a very short time horizon) generated by these models
systematically overestimated actual GDP growth.
The financial accelerator story is intriguing but is not enough to charac-
terize a major crisis. Models with financial frictions yield interesting results
but their scope is necessarily limited because of the built in features of the
DSGE framework. This framework in fact abstracts from the complex web of
financial and real relationships among heterogeneous agents that characterize
modern financially sophisticated economies and are at the root of the spread-
ing of financial fragility economywide. Contemporary macroeconomics, in
other words, has assumed away most of the features of the economy which
are relevant today.
1.2 The Complexity View
For several years now, a different approach has been developed which con-
ceives the macro-economy as a complex system of heterogeneous agents char-
acterized by bounded rationality, endowed with a limited and incomplete
information set, interacting directly and indirectly with other agents and the
environment.
In a complex economy, an idiosyncratic shock – i.e., a shock to a specific
agent – can well be the source of an epidemic diffusion of financial distress.
In other words, idiosyncratic shocks do not cancel out in the aggregate, espe-
cially if the macro-economy is characterized by an underlying network struc-
ture and the idiosyncratic shocks hit crucial nodes of the network. Therefore
1The idea of a “secular stagnation” pioneered by L. Summers, which is gaining ground
in the profession, is based exactly on the unusual length and painfulness of the recovery
from the Great Recession.
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a recession may not be caused only by an aggregate shock.
To be specific, in a credit network the financial accelerator can lead to an
avalanche of bankruptcies, due to the positive feedback of the bankruptcy of
a single agent on the net worth of the ”neighbours”, linked to the bankrupt
agent by credit relationship. This is of course ruled out by construction in a
framework with a representative firm and a representative bank.
In order to deal with these issues, one has to start with a population
of heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity, therefore, is key in modelling the
phenomena which we want to investigate.
1.3 Heterogeneity in a Neoclassical world
The way in which financial frictions have been incorporated in current macroe-
conomic models provides an example of a recurrent pattern in the develop-
ment of contemporary macroeconomics. Research issues brought to the fore
by new macroeconomic facts are incorporated into an analytical edifice based
on Neoclassical foundations by means of appropriate twists of some assump-
tions or by additional assumptions, as epicycles in Ptolemaic astronomy.
This is the way in which “normal science” (in Kuhn’s wording) adjusts to
real macroeconomic developments. In this way, there is nothing truly new
under the sun.2
Heterogeneity has been incorporated in Neoclassical models since the
early ’90s of last century. This is an impressive achievement as the Neo-
classical approach is utterly unsuitable for the study of this issue. In a
Neoclassical Representative Agent-Rational Expectations world, equilibrium
prices depend on a relatively small number of state variables and shocks.
2As Max Planck put it: “Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory
and, when successful, finds none.”
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Forming Rational Expectations of future prices in such an environment is a
daunting but not impossible task, as the Representative Agent in the model
has the same information of the modeller herself, the “true” model of the
economy included (at least in reduced form).
Things are much more complicated in a multi-agent setting. In this case
equilibrium prices are in principle a function of the entire distribution of
agents (e.g., households’ wealth). Hence, to form expectations agents need
to know the entire distribution at each point in time, i.e., the law of motion
of this distribution. An impossible task. This is the well known “curse of
dimensionality”.3
Neoclassical Heterogeneous Agents Models have been developed in order
to study the causes and consequences of income and wealth inequality in a
DSGE framework.4
The seminal papers by Imrohoroglu, Hugget, Aiyagari essentially relax
only the Representative Agent assumption (and only as far as households
are concerned) but generally retain all the other conceptual building blocks
of DSGE models (intertemporal optimization, continuous market clearing
and general equilibrium).5
In Aiyagari (1994) households are heterogeneous because of idiosyncratic
shocks to earnings. If the markets were complete, these shocks would be
insurable and therefore they would not impinge on average or aggregate con-
3One possible way out is to keep the number of agents low, i.e. to reduce the di-
mensionality of the problem, e.g. two types of agents. An example, among many, is the
NK-DSGE framework with Limited Asset Market Participation, where households can
be either free to access financial markets or financially constrained. In the latter case
households cannot smooth consumption by borrowing and lending.
4These models are also known as Bewley models (according to the terminology pro-
posed by Ljungqvist (2004)) or Standard Incomplete Markets models (Heathcote (2009)).
Notice that Heterogeneous Agents and Incomplete Market go hand in hand, for the reasons
which will become clear momentarily.
5See Rios-Rull (1995) for a review of early work in this area.
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sumption (they would wash out in the aggregate).6 Under these circum-
stances the long run or “equilibrium” distribution of wealth would be both
indeterminate and irrelevant (because any distribution of wealth would yield
the same average behaviour).
If markets were incomplete, on the contrary, the possibility to insure
against idiosyncratic risk would be limited and therefore: (i) idiosyncratic
risk would impact on consumption (and macroeconomic performance), (ii)
the equilibrium distribution of wealth would be determinate. In particular
in Aiyagari’s model, inequality yields precautionary savings which impact
positively – through investment – on growth.
Research in this field has been extended at least in three directions: (1)
the analysis of other sources of heterogeneity (besides idiosyncratic shocks
to earnings), e.g. innate characteristics; (2) the analysis of additional ways
to insure idiosyncratic shocks; (3) the impact on aggregate fluctuations (see
Heathcote, 2009). Focusing on third line, we will single out the pioneering
paper by Krusell and Smith (Krusell, 1998) as typical of the approach.
Krusell and Smith circumvent the curse of dimensionality in a very smart
way. They summarize the shape of the agents’ distribution by means of a
finite number of its moments. In this way they can abstract from the actual
distribution and be as precise as they wish in describing its shape: The larger
the number of moments considered, the more granular the description of the
6Completeness and homothetic preferences imply a linear relationship between con-
sumption and wealth at the individual level, i.e. Engel curves are linear. In this case,
perfect approximation applies: average consumption will be a linear function of average
wealth. Only the first moment of the distribution of wealth is necessary to determine
average (and aggregate) consumption. Heterogeneity, as captured by the variance and
higher moments of the distribution, is irrelevant. Of course this is no longer true if the
relationship between consumption and wealth at the individual level is non linear. If the
relationship were concave, for instance, an increase in the dispersion of wealth would lead
to lower consumption on average – thanks to Jensen inequality – even if the mean were
preserved.
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distribution. For simplicity, they use only two moments. The 1st moment
(mean) captures the central tendency of the distribution, the 2nd moment
(variance) captures the dispersion, one aspect of the degree of heterogeneity
characterizing the distribution. When dispersion is low, the mean of the
distribution is almost sufficient to describe the distribution itself. Therefore
higher moment(s) of the distribution can be safely ignored and one can think
of the economy “as if” it were a Representative Agent world, identified with
the Average Agent.
Agents in a Krusell-Smith economy are “near rational” as they optimize
using only the moments of the distribution. Forming near rational expecta-
tions of future prices in such an environment is a daunting but not impossible
task as equilibrium prices are functions only of the moments of the distribu-
tion instead of the entire distribution.
In this model there is approximate aggregation:“in equilibrium all aggre-
gate variables ... can be almost perfectly described as a function of two simple
statistics: the mean of the wealth distribution and the aggregate productiv-
ity shock” (Krusell, 1998, p.869). Using only these measures near rational
agents are able to minimize the forecast errors (therefore higher moments of
the distribution do not affect the decision of the agents).
Moreover, Krusell and Smith show through simulations that macroeco-
nomic time series generated by the model are almost indistinguishable from
those generated by a Representative Agent model. Hence macroeconomic
fluctuation can be sufficiently described by fluctuation of the mean, higher
moments of the distribution do not add much to the picture. In other words:
Taking heterogeneity on board does not add much to the accuracy of the
model. Only the first moment of the distribution have macroeconomic con-
sequences. In a sense, this is a very smart way of resurrecting the moribund
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Representative Agent and the macroeconomic literature based on it.
However, as shown by Heathcote (2009) with reference to fiscal shocks,
there are indeed real world circumstances in which heterogeneity has impor-
tant macroeconomic consequences even in Neoclassical multi-agent models.
1.4 Agent Based Models (ABMs)
The research agenda of the Neoclassical multi-agent literature is very specific,
dictated by the self-imposed guidelines on the way in which economic theo-
rizing should take form in the Neoclassical approach. Heterogeneity therefore
is key in these models but is dealt with in a restricted, disciplined environ-
ment. This may be considered a virtue of the approach but can also be a
limitation as issues and problems which are indeed important “out there”, in
the real world, are left out of the admissible set of issues and problems to be
dealt with. Agent Based Models (ABMs) have a completely different origin
and a much more flexible agenda. ABMs are the analytical and computa-
tional tools developed by an interdisciplinary network of scientists – physi-
cists, economists, computer scientists – to explore the properties of Complex
Adaptive Systems (CAS), i.e., “systems comprising large numbers of coupled
elements the properties of which are modifiable as a result of environmen-
tal interactions...In general CAS are highly non-linear and are organized on
many spatial and temporal scales” (1st workshop on CAS, Santa Fe, 1986).
In ABMs a multitude of objects, which are heterogeneous under differ-
ent profiles, interact with each other and the environment. The objects are
autonomous, i.e., there is no centralized (“top down”) coordinating or con-
trolling mechanism. Therefore, ABMs cannot be solved analytically. The
output of the model must be computed and consists of simulated time series.
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Agent based Computational Economics (ACE) is the application of AB
modelling to economics or: “The computational study of economic processes
modelled as dynamic systems of interacting agents” (Tesfatsion and Judd,
2006, p.832). The economy, in fact, can be conceived of as a complex adaptive
system.
Behavioural equations may or may not be derived from optimization.
AB modellers generally prefer to assume that agents are characterized by
bounded rationality; they are “not global optimizers, they use simple rules
(rules of thumb) based on local information” (Epstein, 2006a, p.1588).7
No equilibrium condition is required (out-of-equilibrium dynamics). This
is, in a sense, a consequence of the assumption according to which there is
no top down coordinating mechanism in ABMs. The Walrasian auctioneer,
who is gently nudging the agents towrds an equilibrium position, is indeed a
metaphor of such a top down coordinating mechanism. AB modellers, in fact,
generally prefer to assume that markets are systematically in disequilibrium.
In principle, however, at least some markets may converge to a statistical
equilibrium (see below).
ABMs are built from the bottom-up. At the micro level, the behavior of
heterogeneous agents is captured by simple, often empirically-based heuris-
tics which allow for adaptation, i.e. gradual change over time in response
to changing circumstances. Aggregate variables are determined by means
of summation or averaging across the population of heterogeneous agents.
Instead of untying the Gordian knot of aggregation, in ABMs this is cut
by allowing the computational tool to do the job. Due to interaction and
non-linearities, statistical regularities emerge at the macroscopic level that
cannot be inferred from the primitives of individuals. These emergent prop-
7In principle, however, behavioural rules can be either grounded in bounded rationality
(rules of thumb) or can be derived from specific optimization problems (optimal rules).
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erties are at the core of macroeconomics in a complex setting. Generally,
aggregate variables in Macroeconomic ABM (e.g. GDP) show a tendency to
self-organize towards a stable aggregate configuration occasionally punctu-
ated by bursts of rapid change. The self-organization of the macro-economy
can be represented by a statistical equilibrium in which the aggregate spon-
taneous order is compatible with individual disequilibrium. The equilibrium
of a system no longer requires that every single element be in equilibrium by
itself, but rather that the statistical distributions describing aggregate phe-
nomena be stable, i.e. in “a state of macroscopic equilibrium maintained by
a large number of transitions in opposite directions” (Feller, 1957, p. 356).
This is not general equilibrium in the standard meaning i.e. a state in which
demand equals supply in each and every market.
In a macroeconomic ABM – i.e., an ABMs applied to the macro-economy
– a “crisis”, i.e., a deep downturn followed by a long and painful recovery,
is a macroscopic phenomenon which spontaneously emerges from the web of
microscopic interactions. In a macro ABM, in other words, big shocks are
not necessary to explain big recessions, an appealing property indeed in the
light of the Global Financial Crisis.
The real world phenomena that are conceived of as rare“pathologies” in
the Neoclassical view – high and persistent unemployment, over-indebtedness
and financial instability, bankruptcies, domino effects and the spreading of
systemic risk – turn out to be the spontaneous emerging macroscopic con-
sequence of complex interactions in a multi-agent framework with heteroge-
neous agents.
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1.5 Plan of the book
The main aim of this book is to provide an introduction to Agent-Based
Modelling methodology with an emphasis on its application to macroeco-
nomics.
The book is organized as follows. In chapter 2 we answer the most basic
questions: What is an ABM? When is it necessary and/or appropiate to
build such a model? The chapter ends with a succinct overview of a very
early example of ABM: Schelling’s model of racial segregation.
In chapter 3 we provide a formal characterization of an ABM as a re-
cursive model. We put ABMs in the wider context of simulation models
and introduce notation and key concepts to describe the agents’ state and
behavioural rules in ABMs in rigorous terms.
Chapter 4 is devoted to a general overview of rationality, the determina-
tion of behavioural rules and expectation formation in contemporary macroe-
conomics, from Keynesian aggregative models to macroeconomic ABMs pass-
ing through monetarist, New Classical and New Keynesian models. This
survey allows to put the AB methodology into context and paves the way
to the more detailed analysis of behavioural rules and learning processes in
chapter 5.
Chapter 5, in fact, digs deeper into the definition and description of
agent’s rationality and learning processes. Where do behavioral rules come
from? Agents in real economies are intentional subjects. In order to de-
cide on a line of action (a behavioural rule), in fact, they must form mental
representations of their environment and of the behavior of other agents. Be-
havioral rules in the real world, therefore, must be related to the cognitive
processes that guide actions. Learning is a key ingredient of these cognitive
processes.
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Chapter 6 deals with the issue of interaction, which is key in ABMs. In a
sense the chapter is an introductory overview of network theory, a rapidly ex-
panding field both in mainstream and complexity theory. ABMs, in fact, are
often based on an underlying network structure, e.g. of trading relationships,
credit relationships, supply chain etc.
Chapter 7 explores the research outcome of an ABM, i.e. the model
behaviour. The AB researcher, in fact, sets up the “rules of the game” –
i.e. she builds the model – but does not know in advance the implications
of those rules, e.g. the statistical structure of the output of simulations.
The chapter presents techniques to gain understanding about the model be-
haviour – the Data Generating Process implicit in the ABM – which are quite
under-explored in the AB literature. In a model which requires simulations
only inductive knowledge about its behaviour can be gained, by repeatedly
running the model under different samples from the parameter space.
Chapters 8 is devoted to the empirical validation of ABMs. Empirically
validating an ABM means, broadly speaking,“taking the model to the data”,
essentially in the form of empirical and/or experimental data. Validation may
concern the model inputs and/or outputs. Input validation is essentially the
assessment of the “realism” of the assumptions on which the model rests
while output validation is the assessment of the capability of the model to
replicate in artificial or simulated data the stylized facts of economic reality
under consideration. Output validation is a joint test on the structure of the
model and the values of the parameters. This means that input and output
validation are connected.
Chapters 9 deals with the issue of estimation of ABM parameters, an
intriguing new field which aims at aligning the empirical validation techniques
of ABMs to that of standard macroeconomic models where estimation tools
13




Economics: What, Why, When
Matteo Richiardi
2.1 Introduction
What are agent-based (AB) models? In a nutshell, they are models, i.e.
abstract representations of the reality, in which (i) a multitude of objects
interact with each other and with the environment, (ii) the objects are au-
tonomous, i.e there is no central, or “top-down”, control over their behavior
(and, more generally, on the dynamics of the system1, and (iii) the outcome of
their interaction is numerically computed. Since the objects are autonomous,
they are called “agents”. The application of agent-based modeling to eco-
nomics is called Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE). As Leigh
1The Walrasian auctioneer, for instance, is a top-down device for ensuring market
clearing. Another example of top-down control is the consistency-of-expectations require-
ment typically introduced by the modeler in order to allow for a meaningful equilibrium
in neoclassical models. More on this point on section 2.2 below.
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Tesfatsion —one of the leading researchers in the field and the “mother” of
the ACE acronym— defines it, ACE is
the computational study of economic processes modeled as dy-
namic systems of interacting agents (Tesfatsion, 2006).
In other terms AB models are the tool traditionally employed by ACE
researchers to study economies as complex evolving systems, that is systems
composed by many interacting units evolving through time.
None of the features above, in isolation, defines the methodology: the
micro-perspective implied by (i) and (ii) is roughly the same as the one
adopted, for instance, by game theory, where strategic interaction is inves-
tigated analytically (though in game theory the number of individuals that
populate the models is generally very small). The computational approach,
instead, is typical of Computational General Equilibrium or Stock-Flow Con-
sistent models, which however are based on aggregate representations of the
system.
In this introductory chapter we describe the features of AB models (sec-
tion 2.2), offering an overview of their historical development (section 2.3),
discussing when they can be fruitfully employed and how they can be com-
bined with more traditional approaches (section 2.4). As an example, we
describe one of the first and most prominent AB models, Thomas Schelling’s
Segregation model (section 2.5). Conclusions follow.
2.2 Features of agent-based models
The basic units of AB models are the “agents”. In economics, agents can
be anything from individuals to social groups, like families or firms. They
may also be more complicated organizations (banks for instance) or even
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industries or countries. Agents can be composed by other agents: the only
requirement being that they are perceived as a unit from the outside, and
that they “do” something, that is they have the ability to act, and possibly
to react to external stimuli and interact with the environment and with other
agents.
The environment, which may include physical entities (like infrastruc-
tures, geographical locations, etc.) and institutions (like markets, regulatory
systems, etc.) can also be modeled in terms of agents (a central bank, the or-
der book of a stock exchange, etc.), whenever the conditions outlined above
are met. If not, it should be thought of simply as a set of variables (say
“weather”, or “business confidence”) characterizing the system as a whole
or one of its parts. These variables may be common knowledge among the
agents or communicated throughout the system by some specific agent —say
the statistical office— at specific times.
From what we have said so far, it should be clear that aggregate vari-
ables like consumption, savings, investment, disposable income, which are
the prime units of analysis of Keynesian macroeconomics, cannot be modeled
as agents in an AB framework —they are computed by aggregating microeco-
nomic agent quantities; the same applies to the fictitious representation of a
“representative agent” (RA), a cornerstone of neoclassical economics. There-
fore, ACE can in principle provide sound microfoundations for the traditional
Keynesian macroeconomics, and sound aggregate results for the neoclassical
analysis based on individual optimization. The direct modeling of a demand
or a supply curve is also forbidden in an agent-based setting: rather, these
aggregate functions may (or may not) emerge as the outcome of the decisions
of the individual agents.
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2.2.1 Scope of agent-based models
AB models are in general developed to analyze the effects of interaction.
What do we exactly mean by interaction? An interaction between agents
in a real-world economy may take many different forms. It may represent
a physical exchange of commodities, but it may also be a direct exchange
of information or knowledge, or even an expectation relationship (agent A
thinks that agent B is relevant for the consequences of her actions, and
therefore forms an expectation over agent B’s future actions). Notice that
such a general definition of interactions encompasses the traditional notion
of externalities in economics, which is one of the possible causes for market
failures. The AB approach, contrary to the standard approach to economics,
does not treat externalities as a perversion of an economic system, but it
acknowledges their central role in shaping social dynamics. As we shall show
in more details below, the fact that agents directly interact in non trivial
ways is often central to understand how and why economies behave as we
observe them to do in reality.
In general, common AB research questions are related to how the aggre-
gate behavior of a system is affected by differences in individual behavior,
individual characteristics, norms and institutions, etc. The focus of interest
is generally explanation and replication, rather than prediction and control
(Epstein, 2008). In other terms, much more effort has been historically put in
describing reality like it is, and possibly explaining why it is like we observe
it, rather than understanding how it will be and what we need to do to make
it like we would like it to be.
AB models are typically general (dis)equilibrium models: both the sup-
ply side and the demand side of a market are explicitly modeled, and the
feedbacks between the different sides/level of analysis (micro and macro,
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for instance) constitute the main object of interest. However, unlike what
happens in the standard general equilibrium model, there is no top-down re-
strictions preventing the economy to always fluctuate out-of-equilibrium. In
fact, equilibrium in its traditional meaning is not a requirement in AB model-
ing, and if any type of equilibria emerges, it must be an endogenous outcome
generated by the interactions among the agents. For example, in general
equilibrium models the aggregate supply-demand equivalence is posited as
an assumption. In equivalent AB models of market dynamics, one would
typically observe an evolving relationship between aggregate supply and de-
mand, which may not always be perfectly balanced, but nonetheless may tell
us something about the endogenous re-equilibrating ability of the economy.
All that accounts for the complexity of AB models, and require that in-
dividual behavior is kept as simple as possible, to avoid the risk of having an
excessively rich model which would then hamper interpretation and analysis.2
These common characteristics are a distinctive feature of AB models and dis-
tinguish the methodology from other techniques that share the same basic
ingredients —once again, micro-foundations and a computational approach.
In particular, they discriminate between AB models and microsimulation,
a technique used to investigate the effects of individual heterogeneity, of-
ten in one-sided models of a market (labor supply for example), mainly for
prediction or policy analysis.
2.2.2 The whole and its parts
Having agents as the unit of analysis, AB modeling is deeply rooted in
methodological individualism. This doctrine was introduced as a method-
ological precept for the social sciences by Max Weber, most importantly in
2A 1:1 map of reality being not only almost impossible to build, but also by far useless.
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the first chapter of Economy and Society —although the term was already
present in Schumpeter.3 Methodological individualism amounts to the claim
that social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from
individual actions, which in turn must be explained through reference to the
intentional states that motivate the individual actors.4 However, the term
still bears some ambivalence over whether explanations should be in terms
of individuals alone, or in terms of individuals plus their interaction (Hodg-
son, 2007). In the first meaning, methodological individualism suggests that
the “whole” is nothing but the “sum of its parts”, a position that has been
labeled reductionism (Jones, 2000). This interpretation implies that the ag-
gregate behavior can be derived observing the behavior of a single agent, a
position that is clearly incompatible with the AB modeling approach. On
the other hand, reductionism is implicit in the RA paradigm, which claims
that the whole society can be analyzed in terms of the behavior of a single,
representative, individual.
The opposite view is holism, the idea that the properties of a given system
cannot be determined or explained by the sum of its component parts alone;
rather, the system as a whole determines in important ways how the parts
behave.5 As such, holism is closely related to organicism, introduced as a
biological doctrine stressing the importance of the organization, rather than
the composition, of organisms.6 This view has gained renewed popularity as
a new science of Complexity —which, as we will discuss in the next section, is
3See Weber (1968) and Schumpeter (1909).
4The use of methodological individualism in Economics was championed by the Aus-
trian school of Economics in the XX century, of which Friederich von Hayek was one of the
main exponent (von Hayek, 1948). The legacy of Hayek to agent-based modelling and the
complex system approach (see for instance von Hayek (1967)) has been amply recognized
(Rosser, 1999; Vaughn, 1999; Koppl, 2000; Vriend, 2002; Rosser, 2009).
5The general principle of holism was concisely summarized by Aristotle in his Meta-
physics: “The whole is more than the sum of its parts”.
6William Emerson Ritter coined the term in 1919.
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to a large extent responsible for the introduction of AB models in the study
of social and biological systems— developed in the last decades of the XX
century.
So, where does AB modeling stand in this debate? As already noted, AB
models are characterized by the fact that aggregate outcomes (the “whole”)
are computed as the sum of individual characteristics (its “parts”). However,
aggregate behavior can often be recognized as distinct from the behavior of
the comprising agents, leading to the discovery of unexpected (“emergent”)
properties. In this sense, the whole is more than —and different from—
the sum of its parts. As the Nobel price-winner phisicists Philiph Anderson
concisely expressed, “more is different” (Anderson, 1972). It might even be
the case than the whole appears to act as if it followed a distinct logic, with
own goals and means, as in the case of a cartel of firms that act in order
to influence the market price of a good. From the outside, the “whole”
appears no different from a new agent type. A new entity is born, the
computational experiment has been successful in “growing artificial societies
from the bottom up”.7 Epstein (2006b, p.66) explains the point with the
following analogy:
Suppose we know all of the underlying components of a system
and all of the rules by which these components interact —does
it then follow that we understand the system? Perhaps not. For
example, if we know the color, shape and location of every piece
of glass in a stained glass window, do we necessarily know what
figure will emerge from their conglomeration? While clearly all
the information is there, we may not be able to imagine what the
completed window looks like just from reading about each piece
7As in the title of the well known book by Epstein and Axtell (1996).
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and its location. We may need to “assemble” the window in some
form before any kind of image can emerge. We might get a good
idea of the window by using a crude line drawing, or perhaps a
more elaborate full-color diagram will be required. The level of
necessary detail will be linked to some inherent characteristics of
the actual image. In some cases, the easiest way to “know” the
window is to assemble the entire thing piece by piece.
2.2.3 The dual problem of the micro-macro relation
As we have seen, AB modeling allow to investigate the interplay occurring
at two different scales of a given system: the micro structure and the macro
structure. This investigation may occur in two directions: (i) to find the
aggregate implications of given individual behaviors and interaction struc-
tures, and (ii) to find the conditions at the micro level that give rise to some
observed macro phenomena. We refer to these two perspectives as the dual
problem of the micro-macro relation. Both share the same approach: “If you
didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it”(Epstein, 1999), which motivates the
definition of ACE as generative social science.
Of course, AB modeling is by no means the only way to study the dual
problem of the micro-macro relation. However, taking into account the inter-
action of a multitude of (heterogeneous) agents, of possibly different types,
easily becomes analytically intractable, and the traditional approach of sim-
plifying everything may —as it should be clear from the discussion above—
“throw the baby out with the wash water”. On the contrary, AB models
only require to “wait and see” the unveiling of the consequences of the as-
sumptions, and leave much more freedom than conventional economics in the
specifications of the assumptions.
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Because of this focus on the theoretical links between micro and macro
the typical AB model is a relatively small “toy” model, where only the es-
sential features for some interesting aggregate properties to emerge from the
rules of micro interaction are included, possibly at the expenses of realism.8
However, in recent years larger AB models are starting to appear, claiming
a richer empirical content. These models explicitly aim at replacing dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) as the workhorse at the core
of macroeconomics, and constitute at present the biggest challenge for AB
research.9
2.2.4 Adaptive versus rational expectations
The generative approach of AB modeling has one crucial theoretical impli-
cation, which accounts for the main divergence with neoclassical models:
rational expectations (RE) are banned.
The assumption of RE —which was introduced in economics by Muth
(1961)— states that agents’ predictions of the future value of economically
relevant variables are not systematically wrong, in that all errors are random.
This amounts to say that RE are model-consistent: all agents in the model
are able to solve the model, and behave in a mutually consistent way so
that outcomes meet expectations, on average; no one regrets his decision
rule, though many may be disappointed by the outcome.10 Thus, RE lead
naturally to Nash-type equilibria concepts: given an equilibrium outcome,
no (rational) individual would unilaterally depart.
Appealing as it seems, RE have a number of drawbacks and limitations.
8As exemplified by the Schelling’s segregation model described below.
9See Dawid et al. (2013) and Caballero (2010).
10The strongest version of RE leads to the efficient-market hypothesis, which asserts
that financial markets are “informationally efficient” and no arbitrage opportunities can
arise.
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First, their application to macro models with representative agents is theo-
retically flawed as it suffers from the usual aggregation problem: even if all
individuals have RE, the representative household describing these behaviors
may exhibit behavior that is not rational.11 But, admittedly, this is a prob-
lem of RA, not of RE. However, even in a truly microfounded model with
perfect knowledge, RE outcomes might easily be non-computable: agents
have to anticipate the outcome and conform to it in advance; therefore, the
system “jumps” to the equilibrium. In the best case, off-equilibrium tra-
jectories converge to the equilibrium path. However, strong hypotheses are
needed for such convergence properties to hold, and these are not warranted
by the assumptions made at the micro level. The existence of a RE Nash
equilibrium (or of some refinements thereof) does not imply that such an
equilibrium is attainable, not to say that it can be attained on reasonable
time scales, or at reasonable computing costs. As Duncan Foley summarizes,
The theories of computability and computational complexity sug-
gest that there are two inherent limitations to the rational choice
paradigm. One limitation stems from the possibility that the
agent’s problem is in fact undecidable, so that no computational
procedure exists which for all inputs will give her the needed an-
swer in finite time. A second limitation is posed by computational
complexity in that even if her problem is decidable, the computa-
tional cost of solving it may in many situations be so large as to
overwhelm any possible gains from the optimal choice of action”
(Albin, 1998).
By converse, in AB models —much as in the real world— agents are
characterized by bounded rationality and hold adaptive expectations (Con-
11See Janssen (1993).
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lisk, 1996; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001a). They have to learn from their
experience and possibly from other agents. They are goal seekers and they
can be forward looking, but their ability to infer the rules of the game in or-
der to form expectations is constrained by what they know about the model
they inhabit, which is typically limited, and may change over time. More-
over, their computing ability is also constrained. They therefore have to use
simple rules based on local information (Edmonds, 1999; Manson, 2006; Pyka
and Fagiolo, 2007; Hommes, 2009).
How does individual and social learning affect the behavior of a system?
An extreme viewpoint is that evolutionary mechanisms will result in surviv-
ing individuals with high levels of rationality, or who will behave as if they
were fully rational. Professional billiard players might not be able to assess
numerically the angles and distances of the balls, compute the optimum di-
rections of travel, and hit the balls at the exact point and with the strength
indicated by the formulas. However, if they were not able to reach essen-
tially the same result, they would not in fact be expert billiard players: they
behave as if they knew the math, and the same math can be used by some
external observer to describe and predict their action (Friedman, 1953).
However, it is not true that individual rationality always leads to individ-
ually optimal outcomes, nor that competitive pressure is able to compensate
for lack of individual rationality. The winner curse exemplifies: in a com-
mon value auctions with incomplete information, the auctioned item is worth
roughly the same to all bidders, who differ only by their respective estimates
of the market value. The winner is the bidder with the highest bid, which
reflects the highest estimate. If we assume that the average estimate is ac-
curate, then the highest bidder overestimates the item’s value: thus, the
auction’s winner is likely to overpay.
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It is also not true that a sub-optimal individual behavior necessarily leads
to inefficiencies. For instance, it is generally acknowledged that freeways
cannot sustain a flux of more than 2,000 vehicles per hour per lane. However,
urban freeways are able to carry about 2,500-3,000 vehicles per hour per lane,
because drivers “learn” that in order to go faster they have to restrain from
passing slower vehicles (Richiardi, 2005).
The same holds with social outcomes. While neoclassical modeling im-
plicitly assumes that “the invisible hand requires rational fingers” (Epstein,
2006b, p. 26), AB models allow to investigate how different types of fingers
work, from the dumbest to the more expert.
Note that while it is easy to implement adaptive expectations in a com-
puter simulation, it is very cumbersome to simulate agents with rational ex-
pectations (the opposite is true in analytical models), as this involves solving
the problem of the agents simultaneously, while the computer is essentially a
sequential machine.12 It could be argued that the same holds for real agents.
2.2.5 Additional features of agent-based models
We have so far introduced the three fundamental characteristics of AB mod-
els: there are agents that play the role of actors, there is no script or Deus
ex-machina13 and the story is played “live” (computed).
However, there are a number of characteristics that are often found in
AB models, and may motivate their use. Following Epstein (1999; 2006a) we
can include:
• Heterogeneity. While in analytical models there is a big advantage in
reducing the ways in which individuals differ, the computational bur-
12See chapter 5 on AB models as recursive systems.
13In the Greek theater, a mechanism was used to drop one or more divinities on the
stage to solve complicated situations, in which no apparent ways out were available.
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den of an AB model does not change at all if different values of the
parameters (preferences, endowments, location, social contacts, abili-
ties etc.) are specified for different individuals. Normally, this is done
by choosing a distribution for each relevant parameter, and this simply
implies that a few parameters (those governing the distribution) are
added to the model.
• Explicit space. This can be seen as specification of the previous point:
individuals often differ in the physical place where they are located, and
/or in the neighbors with whom they can or have to interact (which
define the network structure of the model).
• Local interaction. Again, this can be seen as a specification of the net-
work structure connecting the agents. Analytical models often assume
either global interaction (as in Walrasian markets), or very simple local
interaction. AB models allow for much richer specifications.
• Scalability. AB models can be easily scaled up. This is different from
analytical models, where solutions can generally be found either for
very few or very many agents. For example, in physics planetary mo-
tion can be analytically handled only with one, two, three or infinitely
many planets. Similarly, in economics analytical models exist for mo-
nopolies, duopolies and perfect competition. However, there are many
examples where the scaling up of a system (by increasing the number
of agents, or the number of choices) might end up in a very different
behavior: for instance, when a phase transition occurs at some thresh-
old. The identification of these qualitative change in behavior or, by
converse, of scaling regularities (“scaling laws”) might be important in
understanding a dynamical system. In an AB model, the only con-
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straint for scaling up a model is computing time. This should not be
downplayed, and great care should be taken that the model remains
of tractable computational complexity, but as computing power con-
stantly increases, the issue is in principle of limited importance.14
• Non-equilibrium dynamics. AB models are (stochastic) recursive mod-
els, in which the state of the system at time t + 1 is computed (or
probabilistically evaluated) starting from the state at time t. Hence,
they allow the investigation of what happens all along the route, not
only at the start and at the end of the journey.
The latter point is of great importance and must be elaborated upon. W.
Brian Arthur (2006) offered a beautiful and concise statement of its relevance
for economic theory:
Standard neoclassical economics asks what agents’ actions, strate-
gies, or expectations are in equilibrium with (consistent with) the
outcome or pattern these behaviors aggregatively create. Agent-
based computational economics enables us to ask a wider ques-
tion: how agents’ actions, strategies or expectations might react
to —might endogenously change with— the pattern they create.
In other words, it enables us to examine how the economy behaves
out of equilibrium, when it is not at a steady state.
This out-of-equilibrium approach is not a minor adjunct to stan-
dard economic theory; it is economics done in a more general
14By “tractable computational complexity” we generally mean models that can be com-
puted in polynomial time, O(nk), where k is a nonnegative integer and n is the complexity
of the input. Indeed, according to the Cobham-Edmonds thesis computational problems
can be feasibly computed on some computational device only if they can be computed in
polynomial time; that is, if they lie in the complexity class P. However, the size of the
exponent k and of the input n does matter: when n is large, even O(n3) algorithms are
often impractical.
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way. [...] The static equilibrium approach suffers two charac-
teristic indeterminacies: it cannot easily resolve among multiple
equilibria; nor can it easily model individuals’ choices of expec-
tations. Both problems are ones of formation (of an equilibrium
and of an “ecology” of expectations, respectively), and when ana-
lyzed in formation —that is, out of equilibrium— these anomalies
disappear.
Of course, the fact that AB models can be investigated out of equilib-
rium does not mean that equilibrium analysis is not relevant for AB models.
Think of equilibrium as some sort of “constant” behavior, either at the micro
or at the macro level: a regularity that the model is able to produce, under
some circumstances. Admittedly, this is a very loose definition of equilib-
rium, and we will come back to it in chapter 5. What is sufficient to say here
is that the characterization of such regularities is an inescapable requirement
for the understanding of the behavior of a system. Moreover, a regularity
needs not to be absorbing (once there, the model displays it forever since);
it may be transient, and vanish after some time, possibly when some other
condition is met. These transient regularities might characterize the adjust-
ment phases, or —in Artur’s parlance— the non-equilibrium properties of
the system. What we believe is important to stress is that a model without
regularities is useless : we don’t really need a formal apparatus to say that
anything can happen. We can go further, claiming that a model without reg-
ularities is impossible: a model which has no properties does not exist (even
pure white noise can be formally characterized). In this sense, equilibrium
analysis is not marginalized by AB modeling. But the point remains that in
AB modeling we can let the properties of the system manifest themselves,
and study their dynamic unfolding.
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2.3 The development of ACE
The roots of AB modeling can be traced down to the study of cellular au-
tomata.15 AB models further developed within the evolutionary economics
approach and the so-called Santa Fe perspective on the study of complex
systems, though an overlooked antecedent is to be found in the dynamic
microsimulation literature.
2.3.1 Evolutionary Roots
From an historical point of view, the first attempts to introduce in the study
of economic dynamics thinking concepts like bounded rationality, adaptive
expectations, disequilibrium, local interactions, and so on, come from what
we now label “evolutionary economics” (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). Evolution-
ary economics employs metaphors and notions from evolutionary biology to
describe the dynamics of firms, markets and economies over time. Central
to this approach are the notions of selection (only the best firms survive
competition), variety over which selection operates (firms are heterogeneous
in their knowledge bases and cognitive repertoires, that is behavioral and
learning rules), novelty (firms endogenously introduce innovations) and in-
teraction (firms exchange information and knowledge).
The seminal book by Nelson and Winter (1982a) was a landmark achieve-
ment in this respect, as it presented a series of stylized models of industry
dynamics very much in the spirit of what we now call AB models. These mod-
els describe the evolution of industries characterized by boundedly rational
firms and analyzed by means of simulations, in line with the suggestions of
Herbert Simon (1981).
15See von Neumann and Burks (1966); Gardner (1970) and, for a first application to
social issues, Schelling (1969).
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The book emphasized the role of routines and heuristics. These behav-
ioral rules need to be robust in the sense that they can be used repeatedly
and successfully in similar circumstances, but simple enough to be devel-
oped by real world agents without the computational abilities and mental
sophistication of rational profit maximizers neoclassical agents. Despite their
simplicity, heuristics and routines can be applied to solve in intelligent ways
the complex problems faced everyday by real world organizations. Just as a
Rubik cube solver decomposes the problem of getting a cube with each face
consisting of one color in smaller but simpler tasks (getting a single face with
one color, then adding another face with another color, and so on), firms
facing complex problems (introducing an innovation, coping with turbulent
markets, etc.) try to decompose them in smaller tasks and goals to which
they apply some pre-existing routine. In other words, problems that like the
Rubik’s cube are extremely difficult (if not impossible) to solve in a one shot
way, are typically decomposed in easily recognizable sub-modules to which
there is already a solution. Efficiency is traded off for feasibility: rationality,
in many difficult and interesting cases, may not be an intelligent way to cope
with a problem (Dosi et al., 2005).
Evolutionary economics can be seen as one of the first, most important,
antecedents of the ACE approach. ACE is in some sense a more general
perspective, as it is not necessarily linked with the idea of selection typical of
the evolutionary camp. This has restricted the applicability of evolutionary
models to situations where selection is an issue, primarily industry and firm
dynamics. The demand side of the markets were instead less prone to be
modeled via the variety-selection metaphor (consumers are not selected on
the base of what they choose to consume).
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2.3.2 The Santa Fe perspective: The economy as an
evolving complex system
The development of AB computational economics is closely linked with the
work conducted at the Santa Fe Institute, a private, not-for-profit, indepen-
dent research and education center founded in 1984 in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
The purpose of the Institute has been, since its foundation, to “foster multi-
disciplinary collaboration in pursuit of understanding the common themes
that arise in natural, artificial, and social systems”. This unified view is the
dominant theme of what has been called the new science of complexity.16
For what concerns economics, the main outcomes of the research project
conducted at the Santa Fe Institute were three books, all bearing the title
The economy as an evolving complex system (Anderson et al., 1988; Arthur
et al., 1997; Blume and Durlauf, 2006). From the preface of the 1997 volume,
edited by W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf and David Lane,
In September 1987 twenty people came together at the Santa Fe
Institute to talk about “the economy as a evolving, complex sys-
tem”. Ten were theoretical economists, invited by Kenneth J. Ar-
row, and ten were physicists, biologists and computer scientists,
invited by Philip W. Anderson. The meeting was motivated by
the hope that new ideas bubbling in the natural sciences, loosely
tied together under the rubric of “the sciences of complexity”,
might stimulate new ways of thinking about economic problems.
16See also, among many others, (Edmonds, 1999; Phelan, 2001; Chu et al., 2003) and
especially the popular books by James Gleick (Gleick, 1987) and Mitchell Waldrop (Wal-
drop, 1992). A rather critical view of the research on complex systems undertaken at
the Santa Fe Institute through the mid-1990s can be found in the writings of the science
journalist John Horgan (Horgan, 1995, 1997). A very good account of the relationships
between complexity theory, cybernetics, catastrophe theory and chaos theory (the four
“C”) and their implications for economic theory, can be found in (Rosser, 1999).
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[...] But just what is the complexity perspective in economics?
That is not an easy question to answer. [...] Looking back over the
developments in the past decade, and of the papers produced by
the program, we believe that a coherent perspective —sometimes
called the “Santa Fe approach”— has emerged within economics
(Arthur et al., 1997).
Arthur goes on in describing the main characteristics of the Santa Fe
approach.17 These were identified in models having cognitive foundations,
structural foundations, no global controller, and exhibiting continual adapta-
tion, perpetual novelty and out-of-equilibrium dynamics (Arthur, 1990).
Two main reasons can help explaining why the Santa Fe approach gained
some visibility outside the restricted group of people interested in the com-
plexity theory (perhaps contributing in this way to mount what Horgan
(1995, 1997) called an “intellectual fad”). Together, they offered an ap-
pealing suggestion of both what to do and how to do it. The first reason
was the ability to present the complexity paradigm as a unitary perspective.
This unitary vision stressed in particular the existence of feedbacks between
functionalities and objectives : individual objectives determine to some extent
the use and modification of existing functionalities, but functionalities direct
to some extent the choice of individual objectives. It is this analytical focus
that proved to be valuable in disciplines as diverse as the social sciences, the
biological sciences and even architecture. The second reason has to do with
the creation of a specific simulation platform that allowed relatively inex-
perienced researchers to build their own “toy” models that, thanks to the
17Although this perspective is associated with the Santa Fe Institute, it was initiated in
Europe by chemists and physicists concerned with emergent structures and disequilibrium
dynamics (more precisely, in Brussel by the group of the Nobel prize winner physical
chemist Ilya Progogine and in Stuttgart by the group of the theoretical physicist Hermann
Haken) —see (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989; Haken, 1983).
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enormous and sustained increase in commonly available computing power,
could run quickly even on small PCs. This simulation platform was called
Swarm (Askenazi et al., 1996), and consisted in a series of libraries that im-
plemented many of the functionalities and technicalities needed to build an
agent-based simulation, as the schedule of the events, the passing of time and
graphical widgets to monitor the simulation. In addition to offering a prac-
tical tool to write agent-based simulations, the Swarm approach proposed
a protocol in simulation design, which the Swarm libraries exemplified.
Ten years and two volumes later, Blume and Durlauf summarize this
intellectual Odyssey as follows:
On some levels, there has been great success. Much of the origi-
nal motivation [...] revolved around the belief that economic re-
search could benefit from an injection of new mathematical mod-
els and new substantive perspectives on human behavior. [...] At
the same time [...] some of the early aspirations were not met.
The models presented here do not represent any sort of rejection
of neoclassical economics. One reason for this is related to the
misunderstanding of many non-economists about the nature of
economic theory; simply put, the theory was able to absorb SFI-
type advances without changing its fundamental nature. Put
differently, economic theory has an immense number of strengths
that have been complemented and thereby enriched by the SFI
approach. Hence, relative to the halcyon period of the 1980s,
this SFI volume is more modest in its claims, but we think much
stronger in its achievements (Blume and Durlauf, 2006).
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Figure 2.1: Excerpt from the Bulletin of the Santa Fe Institute, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1986
2.3.3 AB models as dynamic microsimulations
An earlier antecedent of AB modeling can be identified in the dynamic mi-
crosimulation (DMS) literature, and in particular in two almost forgotten
works: Barbara Bergmann’s microsimulation of the US economy and Gun-
nar Eliasson’s microsimulation of the Swedish economy (Bergmann, 1974;
Eliasson et al., 1976; Bergmann et al., 1977; Eliasson, 1977). For the con-
nections between AB modeling and DMS see Richiardi (2013).
Broadly defined, microsimulation is a methodology used in a large variety
of scientific fields to simulate the states and behaviors of different units —
individuals, households, firms, etc.— as they evolve in a given environment
—a market, a state, an institution. Very often it is motivated by a policy
interest, so that narrower definitions are generally provided.18
18For instance, Martini and Trivellato (1997, p. 85) define microsimulation models
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The field of microsimulation originates from the work of Guy Orcutt in
the late 1950s (Orcutt, 1957; Orcutt et al., 1961). Orcutt was concerned that
macroeconomic models of his time had little to say about the impact of gov-
ernment policy on things like income distribution or poverty, because these
models were predicting highly aggregated outputs while lacking sufficiently
detailed information of the underlying micro relationships, in terms of the
behavior and interaction of the elemental decision-making units. However,
if a non-linear relationship exists between an output Y and inputs X, the
average value of Y will indeed depend on the whole distribution of X, not
on the average value of X only.
Orcutt’s revolutionary contribution consisted in his advocacy for a new
type of modeling which uses as inputs representative distributions of individ-
uals, households or firms, and puts emphasis on their heterogeneous decision
making, as in the real world. In so doing, not only the average value of Y is
correctly computed, but its entire distribution can be analyzed. In Orcutt’s
words, “this new type of model consists of various sorts of interacting units
which receive inputs and generate outputs. The outputs of each unit are, in
part, functionally related to prior events and, in part, the result of a series
of random drawings from discrete probability distributions”.
As defined, DMS appears very similar to AB modeling. The main dif-
ferences can be traced down to the following (i), microsimulations are more
policy-oriented, while AB models are more theory-oriented; (ii) microsimula-
tions generally rely on a partial equilibrium approach, while AB models are
most often closed models.
Bergmann and Eliasson questioned the second tenet, and introduced two
as “computer programs that simulate aggregate and distributional effects of a policy, by
implementing the provisions of the policy on a representative sample of individuals and
families, and then summing up the results across individual units”.
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basic innovations with respect to the DMS literature that was emerging at the
time —and in which they were firmly grounded: in their macro models with
production, investment, and consumption (Eliasson also had a demographic
module) they explicitly considered the interaction between the supply and
demand for labor, and they modeled the behavior of firms and workers in a
structural sense. On the other hand, the standard approach to microsimula-
tion —or, as Guy Orcutt called it, the “microanalytic approach for modeling
national economies” (Orcutt, 1990) — was based on the use of what he
considered as a-theoretical conditional probability functions, whose change
over time, in a recursive framework, describe the evolution of the different
processes that were included in the model. This is akin to reduced-form mod-
eling, where each process is analyzed conditional on the past determination
of all other processes, including the lagged outcome of the process itself.
Bergmann and Eliasson had a complete and structural, although rel-
atively simple, model of the economy, which were calibrated to replicate
many features of the US and Swedish economy, respectively. However, their
approach passed relatively unnoticed in the DMS literature, which evolved
along the lines identified by Orcutt mainly as reduced form, probabilistic
partial equilibrium models, with limited interaction between the micro unit
of analysis, and with abundant use of external coordination devices in terms
of alignment to exogenously identified control totals. On the contrary, the
AB approach emerged with a focus on general equilibrium feedbacks and in-
teraction, at the expenses of richer empirical grounding. Hence, the work of
Bergmann and Eliasson could be interpreted as a bridge between the (older)
DMS literature and the (newer) AB modeling literature, though this intel-
lectual debt goes relatively unnoticed among AB practitioners.
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2.3.4 The experimental machine
Crucial for the development of agent-based modeling has been the increas-
ing availability of computing power, which allowed to run even complicated
simulations on small PCs.19
Together with continuous hardware improvements came software develop-
ment. Aside traditional programming (in Fortran, C++, etc.) three different
approaches emerged. The first one relies on general-purpose mathematical
software, like Mathematica, Matlab or Matcad. The second one, ex-
emplified by the Starlogo/Netlogo experience, is based on the idea of
an agent-based specific language (Resnick, 1994). The third one represents a
protocol in the design process, implemented as agent-based specific libraries
in standard programming languages (like Java).20 The ancestor of these
agent-based tools is Swarm. The principles of the Swarm approach are:
• the use of object-oriented programming language, with different objects
(and object types) being a natural counterpart for different agents (and
agent types);
• a separate implementation of the model and the tools used for moni-
toring and conducting experiments on the model (the so called “Ob-
server”);
• an architecture that allows nesting models one into another, in order
to build a hierarchy of “swarms” —a swarm being a group of objects
19This is summarized by the empirical law of a twofold increase in performance every
two years. It is worth remembering that some of the brightest minds of their time —
gathered together around physicists Robert Oppenheimer under the Manhattan project,
the World War II U.S. Army project at Los Alamos aimed at developing the atomic bomb—
were reported to spend half of their time and effort in order to find smarter algorithms
and save precious computing time on the huge but slow machines available (Gleick, 1992).
20This allows the possibility to integrate tools developed as separate libraries by third
parties (for graphical visualization, statistical analysis, database management, etc.).
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and a schedule of actions that the objects execute. One swarm can
thus contain lower-level swarms whose schedules are integrated into
the higher-level schedule.
While in the “revolutionary” days of the Santa Fe Institute the third
approach appeared to be the most promising, a more anarchic attitude (Fey-
erabend, 1975) has now emerged among practitioners.
Finally, despite the fact that AB models are most often computer models,
and that the methodology could not develop in the absence of cheap and
easy-to-handle personal computers, it is beneficial to remember that one of
the most well-known agent-based models, the pioneering work on spatial
segregation by the Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, did not make use of
computers at all (Schelling, 1971). As Schelling recalls, he had the original
idea while seating on the aeroplane, and investigated it with paper and pencil.
When he arrived home, he explained his son the rules of the game and got him
to move zincs and coppers from the child’s own collection on a checkerboard,
looking for the results. “The dynamics were sufficiently intriguing to keep
my twelve-year-old engage” (Schelling, 2006).
2.4 Why agents
Although ACE developed together with the Santa Fe approach, its applica-
bility is by no way limited to the analysis of complex systems. Abstracting
from the characteristics of the system being modeled, ACE proves valuable
in two cases:
• to get a quick intuition of the dynamics that the system is able to
produce, and
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• to thoroughly investigate models that are not susceptible of a more
traditional analysis, or are susceptible of a more traditional analysis
only at too a high cost.
Often, an AB model can be quickly implemented, and it can be used not
differently from scrap paper. It allows to experiment with hypothesis and
assumptions, and gives a hint to which results can be proved. It often sug-
gests the refinements that might eventually lead to a fully algebraic solution
of the model.
However, it might turn out that an analytical solution is not even nec-
essary, or not feasible. It is possible to identify three distinct uses of agent-
based models in the social sciences, a part from the “scrap paper” one de-
scribed above. These uses can be ranked according to their auxiliary nature,
with respect to analytical modeling (Axtell, 2000).21
The first use is numerical computation of analytical models. Note with
Axtell that
“[t]here are a variety of ways in which formal models resist full
analysis. Indeed, it is seemingly only in very restrictive circum-
stances that one ever has a model that is completely soluble, in
the sense that everything of importance about it can be obtained
solely from analytical manipulations”.
Situations in which resort to numerical computation may prove useful in-
clude (a) when a model is not analytically soluble for some relevant variable,
(b) when a model is stochastic, and the empirical distribution of some rele-
vant variable needs to be compared with the theoretical one, of which often
few moments can be analytically derived, (c) when a model is solved for the
21The categories identified below correspond only partially to Axtell’s.
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equilibrium, but the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are not known. In partic-
ular, with reference to the last point, it may happen that multiple equilibria
exist, that the equilibrium or (at least some of) the equilibria are unstable,
that they are realized only in the very long run. Conversely, it may happen
that equilibria exist but are not computable.22 Finally, it may be the case
that the equilibrium is less important than the out-of-equilibrium fluctua-
tions or extreme events. Clearly, agent-based simulations are not the only
way to perform numerical computations of a given analytical model. How-
ever, they may prove effective and simple to implement, especially for models
with micro-foundations.
The second use is testing the robustness of analytical models with respect
to departures from some of the assumptions. Assumptions may relate to
the behavior of the agents, or to the structure of the model. Note that,
in general, as the assumptions are relaxed or altered, an analytical solution
becomes very improbable (otherwise, the possibility of changing them could
have been easily incorporated in the original work, leading to a more general
model). One important feature of ACE is that in considering departures from
the assumptions of the reference model, a number of different alternatives can
be investigated, thus offering intuition toward a further generalization of the
model itself.
The first two uses of ACE models are complementary to mathematical
analysis. The third use is a substitute, going beyond the existence of an an-
alytical reference model. It provides stand-alone simulation models for (a)
problems that are analytically intractable, or (b) problems for which an an-
alytical solution bears no advantage. The latter may happen when negative
results are involved, for instance. A simulation may be enough to show that
22Axtell provides references and examples for each case.
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some institution or norm does not work in the intended way. Analytical
intractability may arise when more complicated assumptions are needed, or
when the researcher wants to investigate the overall effect of a number of
mechanisms (each possibly already analytically understood in simpler mod-
els), at work at the same time.
It must be added that developing AB models as substitutes for mathe-
matical analysis, in economics is also a way to propose an alternative to the
standard mainstream (neoclassical) paradigm. Neoclassical models are in-
deed firmly rooted in the presumption that any meaningful economic model
must start from a set of unavoidable assumptions that represent the core of
the paradigm. These, in a nutshell, are: (i) agents are fully-rational with
unbounded computational skills; (ii) equilibrium is defined by rational ex-
pectations at the individual level, and by a no-arbitrage condition at the
aggregate level; (iii) interactions and heterogeneity, to a first approximation,
only add noise to the underlying economic dynamics, so that one can safely
employ models with a representative individual replacing a wealth of het-
erogeneous agents, and focus on simple setups concerning interactions and
externalities (for instance, competitive markets where firms do not interact
with anyone else or strategic situations where everyone interacts with every-
one else). Notice that this set of core assumptions are typically not sufficient
to get analytical solutions from a neoclassical model (other, ever stronger as-
sumptions are necessary), but they help a lot in simplifying the framework:
in fact removing each of them generates a lot of problems as far as analytical
tractability of neoclassical models is concerned. Therefore, studying comple-
mentary models in an ACE perspective also means to provide a valid scientific
alternative paradigm to neoclassical economics, one firmly rooted instead on
concepts like bounded rationality, direct interactions, disequilibrium, etc..
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As will be clearer in what follows, these departures from the benchmark
assumption traditionally used in neoclassical models are also more in line
with what experimental and empirical data tell us about the way real-world
economic agents (all of us) behave and interact in everyday life. Interpreted
in the light of empirical and experimental evidence, assumptions like full
rationality are clearly at odds with reality. Under that perspective, ACE
can be seen as a substitute to standard neoclassical approaches to economics
that tries to build more reasonable models of the reality to better address
its behavior, a new approach that rejects the idea that good models can be
built using false assumptions and trying instead to explore models based on
assumptions more in line with what we know about how real-world agents
behave and interact.
2.5 An ante litteram agent-based model:
Thomas Schelling’s Segregation model
One of the early and most well known examples of an AB model is the seg-
regation model proposed by Thomas Schelling, who received the 2005 Nobel
prize for his studies in game theory (Schelling, 1969, 1971). To correctly
assess the importance of the model, it must be evaluated against the social
and historical background of the time. Up to the end of the 1960s racial
segregation was institutionalized in the United States. Racial laws required
that public schools, public places and public transportation, like trains and
buses, had separate facilities for whites and blacks. Residential segregation
was also prescribed in some States, although it is now widely recognized that
it mainly came about through organized, mostly private efforts to ghettoize
blacks in the early twentieth century - particularly the years between the
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world wars. But if the social attitude was the strongest force in produc-
ing residential segregation, the Civil Right movement of the 1960s greatly
contributed to a change of climate, with the white population exhibiting in-
creasing levels of tolerance. Eventually, the movement gained such strength
to achieve its main objective, the abolition of the racial laws: this was sealed
in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 which, among many other things, outlawed
a wide range of discriminatory conduct in housing markets. Hence, both the
general public attitude and the law changed dramatically during the 1960s.
As a consequence, many observers predicted a rapid decline in housing segre-
gation. The decline, however, was almost imperceptible. The question then
was why this happened. Schelling’s segregation model brought an answer,
suggesting that small differences in tolerance level or initial location could
trigger high level of segregation even without formal (legal) constraints, and
even for decent levels of overall tolerance. In the model whites and blacks
are (randomly) located over a grid, each individual occupying one cell. As
a consequence, each individual has at most eight neighbours (Moore neigh-
bourhood), located on adjacent cells. Preferences over residential patterns
are represented as the maximum quota of racially different neighbours that
an individual tolerates. For simplicity, we can assume that preferences are
identical: a unique number defines the level of tolerance in the population.
For example, if the tolerance level is 50% and an individual has only five
neighbours, he would be satisfied if no more than two of his neighbours are
racially different. If an individual is not satisfied by his current location, he
tries to move to a different location where he is satisfied.
The mechanism that generates segregation is the following. Since indi-
viduals are initially located randomly on the grid, by chance there will be
someone who is not satisfied. His decision to move creates two externalities:
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one in the location of origin and the other in the location of destination. For
example, suppose a white individual decides to move because there are too
many black people around. As he leaves, the ethnic composition of his neigh-
bourhood is affected (there is one white less). This increases the possibility
that another white individual, who was previously satisfied, becomes eager
to move. A similar situation occurs in the area of destination. The arrival
of a white individual affects the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood,
possibly causing some black individual to become unsatisfied. Thus, a small
non-homogeneity in the initial residential pattern triggers a chain effect that
eventually leads to high levels of segregation. This mechanism is reinforced
when preferences are not homogeneous in the population.
Figure 2.2, which shows the Netlogo implementation of the Schelling
model, exemplifies.23 The left panel depicts the initial residential pattern,
for a population of 2,000 individuals, evenly divided between “green” and
“red”, living on a 51x51 cells torus (hence the population density is 76.9%).
Two values for the tolerance threshold are tested: in the first configuration,
tolerance is extremely high (70%), while in the second it is significantly lower
(30%), although at a level that would still be considered decent by many
commentators. The initial residential pattern (obviously) shows no levels of
segregation: every individual has on average 50% of neighbors of a different
race. However, after just a few periods the equilibrium configurations of
the middle (for a tolerance level of 70%) and right (for tolerance level of
30%) panels are obtained. The level of segregation is high: more than three
quarters of neighbors are on average of the same racial group, even when
individuals are actually happy to live in a neighborhood dominated by a
different racial group! Moreover, most people live in perfectly homogeneous




(a) Initial (random) pattern. The average share of racially similar neighbors is roughly
50%. With a tolerance level of 70% (40%), less than 20% (more than 80%) of the individ-
uals are not satisfied.
(b) Tolerance level = 70%. Final pattern: the average share of racially similar neighbors
is 72.1%; everyone is satisfied.
(c) Tolerance level = 30%. Final pattern: the average share of racially similar neighbors
is 99.7%; everyone is satisfied.
Figure 2.2: Netlogo implementation of Schelling’s segregation model
clusters, with different ethnic clusters being often physically separated from
each other (by “no man’s lands”). Only the relative mix brought by confining
clusters keeps down the measure of overall segregation in the middle panel.
Should the overall composition of the population be biased in favour of one
ethnic group, we would clearly recognize the formation of ghettos.
Note that the formation of racially homogeneous ethnic clusters and ghet-
tos is an emergent property of the system, which could hardly be deduced
by looking at individual behavior alone, without considering the effects of
interaction. Actually, it can be shown that no matter the shape of individual
preferences, the resulting aggregate pattern is always one in which segrega-
tion occurs. Moreover, the clusters themselves could be considered as the
elementary unit of analysis at a different, more aggregate level, and their
behavior — whether they shrink, expand, merge or vanish — studied with
respect to some exogenous changes in the environment. Not only a prop-
erty, that is a statistical regularity, has emerged, but also a whole new entity
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can be recognized. However, this new entity is nothing else but a subjec-
tive interpretation by some external observer of an emergent property of the
system.
2.6 Conclusions
In their brilliant book, John Miller and Scott Page (2006) maintain that the
interest of many social phenomena lies “in between” the extremes: in between
various scientific fields, in between the few (often just one or two) and the
infinitely many agents of neoclassical models, in between the continuous and
the discrete, in between the micro and the macro. They argue that the science
of complex systems, and in particular the use of computational models, is
the most appropriate approach to the investigation of these phenomena.
In this short introduction, we have discussed why this might be the case.
We have described the main features of ACE, and showed how it can be
a valid methodology for the investigation of social phenomena. The use of
AB models can complement the traditional tools, or can provide a valid
alternative. Although the agent-based methodology is used in disciplines as
different as biology, medicine, natural resources management and sociology,
its potential for economics is still deeply undervalued. We therefore conclude
with J. Doyne Farmer and Duncan Foley that “[t]he economy needs agent-
based modelling” (Farmer and Foley, 2009). The rest of the book is devoted








A rather common misunderstanding about simulations is that they are not
as sound as mathematical models. Computer simulations are, according to a
popular view, characterized by an intermediate level of abstraction: they are
more abstract than verbal descriptions but less abstract than “pure” mathe-
matics. This is nonsense. Simulations do consist of a well-defined (although
not concise) set of functions, which relate inputs to outputs. These func-
tions describe a fully recursive system and unambiguously define its macro
dynamics. In this respect, AB models are no different from any other model:
they are logical theorems saying that, given the environment and the rules
described by the model, outputs necessarily follow from inputs. As any other
model, they provide sufficiency theorems: the environment and the rules are
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sufficient conditions to obtain the results, given the inputs. The resort to
computer simulations is only an efficient way —given some conditions— to
obtain the results.
In this chapter we offer a characterisation of AB models as recursive mod-
els. The chapter has a simple structure: section 3.2 places AB modelling in
the wider context of simulation models; section 3.3 introduces the notation
and the key concepts; finally, section 3.4 concludes elaborating on what con-
stitutes a “proof” of what in an AB setting.
3.2 Discrete-event vs. continuous simulations
and the management of time
Computer-based simulations face the problem of reproducing real-life phe-
nomena, many of which are temporally continuous processes, using discrete
microprocessors. The abstract representation of a continuous phenomenon
in a simulation model requires that all events be presented in discrete terms.
However, there are different ways of simulating a discrete system.
In Discrete Event Simulations (DES) entities are thought of as moving
between different states as time passes. The entities enter the system and
visit some of the states (not necessarily only once) before leaving the system.
This can be contrasted with System Dynamics (SD), or continuous simulation
modelling, a technique created during the mid-1950s by Jay Forrester at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Forrester, 1971), which characterizes
a system in terms of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). SD takes a
slightly different approach to DES, focusing more on flows around networks
than on the individual behaviour of entities. In SD three main objects are
considered: stocks, flows and delays. Stocks are basic stores of objects, as the
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number of unemployed workers. Flows define the movement of items between
different stocks in the system and out/into the system itself, as, for example,
the rates in and out of employment and the fraction of workers that enter
and exit the labour force in a given time frame (e.g. a week). Finally, there
may be delays between measurement and action upon that measurement, for
instance if it takes some time before unemployed workers become discouraged
and decide to leave the labour force. An SD model is a network of stocks,
flows and delays.
Note that in DES inherently continuous processes, as the increase in hu-
man capital due to being in education, must be discretized (for instance by
modelling degree completion: the level of human capital increases only upon
obtaining the degree). On the other hand, a continuous approximation must
be taken for inherently discrete events in SD, as in the labour example above:
if there are many workers, the fact that any individual can be in only one
state (either employed or unemployed) does not affect the smoothness of the
aggregate flows. The discrete nature of digital computers however requires to
take a further approximation, simulating to any degree of accuracy the differ-
ential equations with the corresponding difference equations, by considering
increasingly smaller time frames.
Where do AB models lie in this taxonomy? AB models are in essence
discrete event simulations. Although there are authors in the simulation lit-
erature stressing the difference between AB models and DES (Siebers et al.,
2010, see for instance), these differences appear to be related more to the
modelling specification and the purpose of the analysis than to the technical
implementation. The theory of discrete event simulations originated in the
Operation Research (OR) literature, a discipline concerned with system op-
timization where decision problems are broken down into basic components
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Discrete-event simulations AB models
Process oriented (top down modelling
approach); the focus is on modelling
the system in detail, not the entities.
Individual based (bottom up mod-
elling approach); the focus is on mod-
elling the entities and interactions be-
tween them.
One thread of control (centralized).
Each agent has its own thread of con-
trol (decentralized).
Passive entities, i.e. something is done
to the entities while they move trough
the system; intelligence (e.g. decision
making) is modelled as part in the sys-
tem.
Active entities, i.e. the entities them-
selves can take on the initiative to do
something; intelligence is represented
within each individual entity.
Queues are a key element. No concept of queues.
Flow of entities through a system;
macro behaviour is modelled.
No concept of flows; macro behaviour
is not modelled, it emerges from
the micro decisions of the individual
agents.
Input distributions are often based on
collect/measured (objective) data.
Input distributions are often based on
theories or subjective data.
Table 3.1: Discrete Event Simulations (DES) vs. Agent-Based (AB) models. Source:
Siebers et al. (2010).
and then solved in defined steps by mathematical analysis. Discrete event
simulations are therefore often understood as top-down exercises: the object
of interest is a specific process (e.g. the functioning of an emergency room),
which is analyzed in terms of its constituent sub-processes. The difference in
perspective can be seen in table 3.1, which describes the main attributes of
the two techniques according to Siebers et al. (2010).
Apart from these difference in use, AB modelling and DES share the
same structure: in both cases, models consist of a set of entities that interact
with each other in an environment. This leads researchers within the OR
literature itself to recognise that the two methodologies “are like England
and America —separated by a common language.” (Brailsford, 2014, p.3).
Note that the recognition of the atomistic (i.e. discrete, at a microscopic
level) nature of most processes implies that any SD system admits a DES/AB
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representation (Macal, 2010). Every well formulated continuous simulation
model has an equivalent formulation as a discrete event simulation. However,
in some cases this may not be convenient, as AB models are a lot more time
consuming to build and run.
Within the literature on DES, an important distinction concerns the
treatment of time. Discrete-time simulations break up time into regular time
slices ∆t (steps) and the simulator calculates the variation of state variables
for all the elements of the simulated model between one point in time and
the following. Nothing is known about the order of the events that happen
within each time period: discrete events (marriage, job loss, etc.) could have
happened at any moment in ∆t, while inherently continuous events (ageing,
wealth accumulation, etc.) are best thought to progress linearly between one
point in time and the following one.
By converse, Discrete-time simulations are characterized by irregular time
frames that are punctuated by the occurrence of discrete events (jumps).
Between consecutive events, no change in the system is assumed to occur;
thus the simulation can directly jump in time from one event to the next.
Note the distinction between treatment of events and treatment of time.
Irrespective of time being sampled at regular or irregular intervals, an AB
model is always a discrete event simulation.
In both continuous and discrete time, discrete event simulations and AB
models can be understood as a recursive systems (figure 3.1). A recursive
system is one in which the output is dependent on one or more of its past
outputs. If the system is “memoryless”, meaning that the probability dis-
tribution of the next state depends only on the current state and not on
the sequence of events that preceded it, the system is a Markov chain: “the
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Figure 3.1: The recursive nature of AB models.
future depends on the past only through the present”. Note that it is always
possible to redefine the state space by taking into account all relevant past
states, so that the identification of Markov chains and recursive systems is
complete. For instance, suppose that the transitions between employment
(E) and unemployment (U) depend on the current state, s0 = {U,E}, and
the state in the previous period, s−1 = {U,E}. We can redefine the state
space as s = {(U,U), (U,E), (E,U), (E,E)}, where each possible state is
a combination of the current and the previous state, (s0, s−1), obtaining a
Markov chain. Hence, AB models are Markov Chain (Izquierdo et al., 2009).
Further, AB models can also be seen as dynamical systems (Hinkelmann
et al., 2011) —where a function describes the time evolution of the system in
the state space (Luenberger, 1979). Markov chains are naturally related to
linear dynamical systems, since the state transition probabilities of Markov
chains evolve as a linear dynamical system (Attal, 2010).
Markov chains are important because, if some conditions hold, it is pos-
sible to characterise a stationary distribution of the states by looking only
54
at the transition matrix between states. Unfortunately, the applicability of
Markov chain theory to AB modelling is limited. This is because the state
space of an AB model can grow enormous, so that he transition matrix often
does not have an analytical representation, and it might well be time inho-
mogenous, that is the probability of a transition from one state to another
state might change over time.
The recursive nature of AB models has one important computational
consequence. As Barbara Bergmann put it,
The elimination of simultaneous equations allows us to get results
from a simulation model without having to go through a process
of solution. (Bergmann, 1990)
It is the recursive structure of the simulation that allows computability.
This is to be contrasted with the fixed point structure of rational expecta-
tions models (see the next chapter), which makes computability much harder.
Moreover, recursivity has not only an instrumental value in modelling com-
plex system: it also reflects an intrinsic characteristics of reality:
The world is essentially recursive: response follows stimulus, how-
ever short the lag. (Watts, 1991)
3.3 The structure of an AB model
In this section, we offer a formal characterization of AB models as recursive
systems. Our analysis applies both to models set in discrete time, and to
models set in continuous time, the only difference being the interpretation
of t + 1: one (regular) step ahead to the next period in discrete time, and
one (irregular) jump ahead to the time of the next event in event queue in
continuous time.
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At each time t an agent i, i ∈ 1 . . . n, is fully described by some state
variables xi,t ∈ <k.1 Let the evolution of her state variables be specified by
the difference equation:
xi,t+1 = f i(xi,t,x−i,t,θi, ξi,t). (3.1)
where ξi,t are stochastic terms, and θi ∈ Θ is a vector of parameters, with
Θ being a compact subset of RQ. The behavioural rules may be individual-
specific both in the functional form f i(.) and in the parameters θi, and may
also depend on the state x−i of all agents other than i.
2 The set of structural
equations (3.1), defined at the individual level, specifies the data generating
process (DGP) of the model.
At any point in time, the system is in a state X t = (xi,t) which is the
matrix of all individual states. By replacing eq. (3.1) in the definition above,
we obtain
X t+1 = F (X t,θ,Ξt), (3.2)
where Ξt is a matrix containing all stochastic elements at time t. Equation
(3.2) defines the transition equation of the system.
Note that in optimal control theory it is distinguished between state and
control variables, where the latter are characterised by two qualifiers:
1. control variables are subject to the optimiser’s choice,
2. they have an effect on the value of the state variable of interest.
In AB models however, because agents do not engage in mathematical
1Categorical variables can be indexed with integer values (e.g. 0 for unemployed, 1 for
employed).
2Here and in the following we use “behavioural rules” and similar terms in a loose
sense that encompasses the actual intentional behaviours of individuals as well as other
factors such as technology etc.
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optimization (see chapter 5), there is no real need to distinguish between
state and control variables. Each individual variable evolves according to a
rule, or law of motion, fi. Some of them are simple accounting identities: for
instance, wealth at time t+ 1 is equal to wealth at time t plus income minus
consumption, and it is not a direct object of choice for the individual. But
control variables, as consumption in the above example, are also determined
in an algorithmic way in AB models: for instance, consumption might evolve
as a constant fraction of income, or be influenced by neighbours and friends,
so the only difference is that its law of motion is subject to more assumptions
than the law of motions of wealth.







si,t = s(si,t−1, s−i,t−1, ci,t,θ
s
i ) (3.4)
where c are control variables, s are state variables, C is an objective func-
tion, and the constraint (3.4) is the law of motion of the state variables.3
This introduces a natural distinction between c and s. The solution of the
optimization problem leads to a law of motion for the control variables,
ci,t = c(St−1,θi) (3.5)
where S is the collection of all state variables of all individuals. This can
then be plugged back into the law of motion of the state variables (3.4):
si,t = s̃(St−1,θi) (3.4
′)
3For the sake of clarity, we omit expliciting the stochastic terms
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The two classes of law of motions (3.4′) and (3.5) have the same form. Be-
cause in AB modelling we generally do not explicit the individual optimiza-
tion problem, we can simply refer to both state and control variables as “state
variables” xi = [si, ci], subject to the general law of motion (3.1).
Often, we are interested in some aggregate (observable) statistics of our
economy. A vector of aggregate variables yt is defined as a function over the
state of the system, that is as a projection from X to y:
yt = m(X t,κt). (3.6)
where κt are extra random terms that accounts for measurement errors and
other shocks to the observables, if any. This is the measurement equation,
which together with the transition equation forms the state space represen-
tation of the system. The question is whether it is possible to solve equation
(3.6) for each t, regardless of the specification adopted for f i(.), and the
answer is that a solution can always be found by backward iteration, which
traces the stochastic evolution of yt back to the initial state of the system
and the values of the parameters. Expliciting this relationship is complicated
because of the random terms Ξ and κ that enter at every stage. As the be-
havioural rules f i and the measurement function m need not to be linear,
these random terms cannot be netted out by taking expectations. Therefore,
the only way to analyze the mapping of (X0,θ) into yt is by means of Monte
Carlo analysis, by simulating the model for different initial states and values
of the parameters, and repeating each simulation experiment many times to
obtain a distribution of yt.
However, because digital computers are deterministic machines, it is pos-
sible to further pin down the formalization above.4 In a digital computer
4Analog computers exist in which continuously variable physical quantities, such as
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random terms are not truly random: they are generated by an algorithm
which produces sequences of numbers that resemble the properties of random
numbers. Accordingly, these numbers are referred to as pseudo-random, and
the algorithm is called random number generator. Each sequence is identi-
fied by a seed —–which for the sake of simplicity is often called random seed
(causing some confusion: random seeds are not random).5 Specifying the
random seed guarantees the reproducibility of the results. 6 Therefore, the
random terms Ξ and κ are a deterministic function of the random seed s,
and equations (3.2)-(3.6) reduce to
X t+1 = F (X t,θ, s) (3.2
′)
yt = m(X t, s). (3.6
′)
The random seed can be thought of as a latent parameter, lacking a “natu-
ral” counterpart. Alternatively, and more conveniently, it can be considered
as a further initial condition: Z0 = {X0, s}. By iteratively substituting
electrical potential, fluid pressure, or mechanical motion, are used to represent (analo-
gously) the quantities in the problem to be solved. Answers to the problem are obtained
by measuring the variables in the analog model. Analog computers are not determinis-
tic, as physical quantities cannot be measured with absolute precision. Though digital
computing has taken the lead, analog computers have been widely used in simulating the
operation of aircraft, nuclear power plants, and industrial chemical processes.
5If there are more than one random number generators, we can think of s as the seed of
an additional random number generator determining the seeds of the different generators
used in the model.
6When the random seed is not specified, it is generally taken from some environmental
variable (as the computer clock), which guarantees that it is different for every simulation
run.
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X t+1 with X t using (3.2
′), we get
X t = F (F (· · ·F (Z0,θ) · · · ))








The law of motion (7.1) uniquely relates the value of y at any time t
to the initial conditions of the system and to the values of the parameters,
and is known as the input-output transformation (IOT) function. The word
“function” is appropriate here, as any particular input given to the computer
model will lead to only one output (different inputs might lead to the same
output, though).
This is a convenient mathematical representation, and will be used in
chapter 7 for discussing the properties of AB models. However, from a prac-
tical point of view it is still true that knowledge of the IOT function must
be obtained by Monte Carlo analysis, by simulating the model for different
initial states, parameter values, and random seeds.
Given this framework, it is easy to discuss the alleged differences in terms
of “mathematical soundness” between analytical models and computer sim-
ulations. In analytical models, the behavioural rules (3.1) typically have a
simple structure, with either limited or global interaction, and heterogeneity
is kept to a minimum. Functional forms are often linear (or linearized). Ag-
gregation is performed on selected variables by taking expectations over the
stochastic elements, which are conveniently specified. On the contrary, an
AB model poses little restrictions on the specification of equation (3.1), but
this freedom comes at two prices: (i) the modeller has to exert self-discipline
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in order to stick with the KISS (keep it simple, stupid) principle and connect
with the existing literature, and (ii) the equation for the macro dynamics
(7.1) can easily grow enormous, hindering any attempt at symbolic manipu-
lation. Nevertheless, the functions (7.1) are completely specified. It is thus
possible to explore their local behaviour by analysing the artificial time series
produced by the simulation.
3.4 Obtaining results in AB models
The input-output transformation function (7.1) is the basic object of interest
to derive results in an AB setting. Because it has no analytical formulation, it
has to be analysed by means of simulations. By performing sensitivity analyis
of the model outcomes with respect to the parameters and initial conditions,
we can recover the shape of the IOT function, either locally or globally.
Sensitivity analysis is discussed at length in chapter 7, while chapter 9 deals
with making use of the IOT function for estimating the model parameters.
We now assume our veil of ignorance about the IOT function is finally
lifted, and elaborate on how we can use it to increase our knowledge of the
real world. However, it should be clear that AB models differ from analytical
models only because of this veil of ignorance around the IOT function, which
is sometimes so dark as to make the whole model appear as a “black box”.
Hence, our discussion below is a methodological conclusion that applies to
any type of model. We will revert to the specificities of AB model in the last
paragraph.
When we fix the random seed, the IOT function is a deterministic map-
ping of inputs (parameters and the initial state of the system) into outputs,
hence it identifies sufficient conditions for whatever dynamics emerge. Given
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the assumptions embedded in the model specification, those values of the
parameters and initial conditions are sufficient to generate the observed dy-
namics, in the simulated data. Performing Monte Carlo simulations with
different random seeds allows to make probabilistic statements about the
likelihood of getting an outcome, given the inputs.
If the simulated dynamics bear some resemblance with the real data,
then we stumbled upon a possible explanation of the phenomenon of interest.
However, there might be other explanations, either within the model itself
(other combinations of inputs leading to the same outcomes, an instance of
equifinality or non-identification), or outside the model, when other assump-
tions and model specifications are made. But if the researcher is confident
enough that the assumptions are valid (see chapter 8), then the model offers
a likely explanation.
This form of logical reasoning is called abduction, or “inference to the best
explanation”. Let the observed circumstances be denoted with b, while a is
an hypothetical explanation. Abduction means “guessing” a from b because
a implies b. The American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)
first introduced the concept of abduction using precisely the term “guessing”.
To abduce a from b two steps are involved: determining that a is sufficient,
even if not necessary, for b, and arguing that a is indeed an economical
explanation for b, the KISS principle.
Models (included simulation models) can also be used in a deductive way,
when fed with real (observed) input. Then, given the assumptions made,
outputs will necessarily follow: if we observe a, the model predicts that b will
happen (with some probability distribution if the random feed is not fixed).
In both cases the connection between inputs and outputs is the IOT
function, the black box over which only inductive evidence based on the sim-
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ulated data can be obtained. The “proof” of the results thus lies in the code,
rather than in mathematical reasoning as in analytical models. This is why
it is fundamental, in AB models, to write the simulation code in a clear and
transparent way, document it and make it public. Also, supporting evidence
for the working of the “black box”, the shape of the inferred IOT function,
should be provided, either in terms of analytical results for simple cases, or








In order to achieve her goals, an agent must decide a line of action (a be-
havioural rule). Mental representations of the environment and of the be-
havior of other agents are key in taking this decision. The availability of
an adequate and appropriate information set and of cognitive capabilities to
process information, in turn, are key in forming these mental models. In
a context characterized by uncertainty, one of the most important cogni-
tive process is expectation formation. In this chapter we overview the way in
which rationality, behavioural rules and expectation formation are connected
in modern macroeconomics.
In section 4.2 we set the stage by discussing (optimal) decision making
in an environment of full rationality and certainty. From section 4.3 on, we
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discuss the consequences of uncertainty – in its wide range of specifications –
and expectation on individual decision making and on macroeconomic per-
formance.
Section 4.3 is devoted to the theory of choice in the presence of mea-
surable uncertainty (risk). Uncertainty is measurable when agents are able
to attach probabilities to uncertain events. In this setting the probability
distribution of the variable of interest replaces the true value of the variable
(which is available only in the case of certainty) in the information set of the
agent. We will provide simple examples of choice in the case of risk neutral-
ity (subsection 4.3.1) and risk aversion (subsection 4.3.2). Moreover, we will
discuss choice in a multi-period setting (subsection 4.3.3).
We will show that it is straightforward, and extremely useful, to extend
the notion of measurable uncertainty discussed in subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2
to the multi-period setting. Also in a multi-period context, in fact, the true
values of the variables of interest are replaced by probability distributions.
The Rational approach to Expectation formation (RE) is the natural
candidate to model expectations in such a setting. In fact we introduce a
Linear Stochastic Difference Equation at this early stage of the analysis.
We illustrate its solution by means of a graphical tool which exploits the
two way relationship between current and expected value of a variable of
interest. The true (or actual or current) value of variable x is a function of
the expectation of the same variable xe, in symbols x = f(xe) (represented
by the True Value or TV schedule). On the other hand, the Expectation of
the variable is a function of the current value: xe = g(x) (represented by
the EXpectations or EX schedule). The intersection of these two schedules
yields consistency (equilibrium) between actual and expected values.
This equilibrium yields correct (and model-consistent) expectations only
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when the Expectation schedule coincides with the 45-degree line: xe = x. In
this case, the RE equilibrium (in the absence of shocks) can be characterized
as a fixed point of map f .
Section 4.4 introduces heuristics to form expectations, with special refer-
ence to the adaptive expectation formation mechanism.
Section 4.5 is an overview of macroeconomic thought from the viewpoint
of expectation formation. Using variants of the same basic macroeconomic
framework, we will survey models of the Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis, of
the Monetarist School, of the New Classical Macroeconomics and of the New
Neoclassical Synthesis. We will provide the solution of these macroeconomic
models with adaptive and/or rational expectation. We will also discuss the
effect of shocks with simple examples. We will use the graphical apparatus,
based on the TV and EX schedules, introduced in subsection 4.3.3.
Section 4.6 touches upon the criticisms and objections to rational expec-
tations and paves the way to the thorough discussion of these issues which
will be carried out in chapter 5.
In section 4.7 we present a conceptual framework to discuss the macroe-
conomic role of heterogeneous expectations. In this case the TV and EX
schedules are functions of average expectations, i.e. of the mean of individ-
ual heterogeneous expectations.
Section 4.8 presents some ideas and an example on heterogeneous expec-
tations in macroeconomic ABMs. Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Certainty
Neoclassical choice theory assumes that agents are endowed with full or sub-
stantial rationality, which allows to solve a well defined (usually constrained)
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optimization problem. In its simplest and clearest form, full rationality is
characterized by the following assumptions: (i) agents have an objective
function which associates an index of individual well-being (e.g. utility for
the agent, profit for the firm) to each and every possible choice (consump-
tion for the agent, production for the firm); (ii) agents have constraints (the
budget constraint for the agent, the production function for the firm); (iii)
agents have an information set which contains all the items necessary to the
definition of the objective function and the constraints (prices of consump-
tion goods and income for the agent; costs of inputs, the sale price1 and
the resources to be devoted to production for the firm); (iv) agents have the
cognitive capabilities to carry on the task of finding an optimum of the ob-
jective function under constraints. In the absence of uncertainty – i.e. when
all the necessary information is available – and in the absence of cognitive
limitations agents can therefore define a fully optimal behavioral rule.
For instance, in a competitive setting the manager of a firm sets the
quantity q to be produced by solving the following optimization problem:
maxπ = Pq −Wn
s.t. q = nα
where π represents profit (the objective function), P the price, W the (nomi-
nal) wage, n employment. The constraint is represented by the well behaved
production function q = nα with 0 < α < 1. The information set consists
of α,W,P . It is easy to see that in a competitive setting the manager max-
imizes profits by choosing q∗ such that the selling price P is equal to the
1The price is a piece of information for the firm in perfect competition, when the firm
is a price taker; it is a choice variable in imperfect competition, when the firm has market
power.
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Equation (4.1) is the (optimal) behavioral rule adopted by the firm.
4.3 Uncertainty
It may well happen that some of the variables of interest are uncertain, i.e.,
unknown at the time a decision has to be taken. In our example, this is for
instance the case when the selling price is unknown (for any reasons). The
information set is not complete. Therefore a fully optimal behavioral rule is
not within the reach of the firm.
Following a well-known taxonomy proposed by Knight (1921) we distin-
guish between
• measurable or tractable uncertainty (also known as “risk”): in this case
agents are able to attach probabilities to uncertain events (e.g. “states
of the world”);
• untractable or “true” uncertainty: in this case, agents either do not
know the states of the world or they are incapable of associating prob-
abilities to them. As Keynes (1937) put it: they “simply don’t know”.
Uncertainty is measurable when the agent knows the set of all possible
states of the world, the value that the variable of interest will assume in each
state and the associated probability. In a sense in a risk setting the true
value of the variable is replaced by the true probability distribution of the
variable in the information set of the agent. Of course, all the states of the
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world must be known, i.e. there should be complete information as to the
support of the probability distribution. Moreover, there should be a unique,
“true” probability distribution.
4.3.1 Risk neutrality
For instance, in our example, the manager can still make an optimal choice
if the following pieces of information are available: (i) all the states of the
world (to simplify matters, suppose there are only two states: the good one,
characterized by “high” demand and the bad one with “low” demand),2 (ii)
the selling price in each state of the world (PH and PL respectively, with
PH > PL), (iii) the probability associated to each state of the world (pH and
pL = 1− pH respectively). If the manager is endowed with this information,
she may compute the expected selling price E(P ) = PL + pH(PH − PL).
In the presence of uncertainty, it is crucial for the agent to form expec-
tations, i.e. to figure out unknown aspects of the environment or of the
behavior of other agents which are relevant for the achievement of her objec-
tive. Hence, in the design of agents’ behavior we must take into consideration
the expectation formation mechanism.
An agent is risk neutral if, in the presence of (measurable) uncertainty,
she will maximize the expected value of the uncertain payoff.
In our example, if the manager is risk neutral, she will maximize expected
profits, i.e., the difference between expected sales proceeds and current costs.
Expected sales proceeds, in turn, will be equal to the product of the expected
selling price and the quantity (to be decided by the firm). In the presence of
uncertainty, therefore, the optimization problem of the risk neutral firm in a
2This setting can be easily generalized to any number of states of the world.
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competitive setting must be redesigned as follows
maxE(π) = E(P )q −Wn
s.t. q = nα
E(π) represents expected profit (the objective function). The information
set consists of α, W and the probability distribution of the selling price (PH
with probability pH and PL with probability 1− pH).
The manager maximizes expected profits by choosing q∗ such that the









Equation (4.2) is the (optimal) behavioral rule adopted by the firm in the
presence of measurable uncertainty. In other words an optimal choice can
still be made if the agent knows the probability distribution of the variable
which is uncertain. This probability distribution plays a role in the optimal
behavioral rule: the rule changes if the distribution changes (i.e. if the
support or the pdf of the distribution changes). For instance, the scale of
activity will increase if the probability that the firm associates with a high
aggregate demand (pH) goes up.
4.3.2 Risk aversion
An agent is risk averse if, in the presence of uncertainty, she will maximize
the expected utility of the uncertain payoff. We will discuss this issue in a
simple Diamond (1983) setting.
Consider an agent who must choose in t how much to consume in t+1
and in t+2. For simplicity, suppose the agent can be of two types: (1) an
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“early consumer” who wants to consume c1 in t+1 (for example because she
will need medical treatment) or (2) a“late consumer” who can wait until
period t+2 to consume c2. Utility, as usual, is increasing with consumption
and concave: u′(ci) > 0 and u”(ci) < 0, i = 1, 2. Suppose, moreover that
the agent is endowed with one unit of wealth, which may be invested in t in
(i) a liquid asset with gross return equal to 1 in any future period or (ii) an
illiquid asset with gross return equal to R > 1 in t+2. By assumption, if the
investment in the illiquid asset is liquidated prematurely (i.e. in t+1) it will
go wasted i.e., the return on the illiquid asset in t+1 is zero.
If the agent knew her type (i.e. in the absence of uncertainty), she would
maximize her utility by investing her wealth entirely (1) in the liquid asset
if an early consumer (so that c1 = 1) or (2) in the illiquid asset if a late
consumer (so that c2 = R). Denoting with θ the fraction of wealth invested
in the liquid asset, the fully optimal portfolio choice would be θ∗ = 1 when
the agent is an early consumer and θ∗ = 0 when the agent is a late consumer.
Suppose now that the agent is uncertain about her type which will be
revealed by nature only in t+1. The agent will be an “early consumer” if she
will need medical treatment, a circumstance which is unknown in t and will
materialize only in t+1. The information set is not complete: the piece of
information concerning the type of the agent is not available at the moment
the agent has to make a decision.3 Therefore a fully optimal behavioural rule
is not possible. The agent, however, can still make an optimal choice if the
following pieces of information are available: (i) all the states of the world in
t+1 (in our simple example there are only state 1 in which the agent needs
to consume in t+1 and state 2 in which she can wait until t+2), (ii) the
preferences over consumption in each state of the world represented by the
3In other words, the agent does not know whether she will need medical treatment or
not in t+1.
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well behaved utility functions u(c1) and u(c2), (iii) the probability associated
to each state of the world (p1 and p2 = 1− p1).4
Using this information, the agent can compute the expected utility in t
as the weighted average of the utility of consumption as an early consumer
and the utility of consumption as a late consumer, where the weights are the
probabilities of the two states of the world:
E(U) = u(c1)p1 + u(c2)p2 (4.3)
This is a Von Neumann-Morgestern utility function. Let’s specify u(.) as a
CRRA5 utility function: u(ci) =
c1−σi
1−σ ; i = 1, 2 where σ is the (relative) risk
aversion coefficient.
The risk averse agent will choose in t – i.e., before the type will be revealed
– c1 and c2 in order to maximize her expected utility under the constraint
represented by the composition of her wealth in terms of liquid and illiquid
assets. If the agent turns out to be an early consumer, she will consume
only the fraction of wealth invested in the liquid asset θ (so that c1 = θ); if
she turns out to be a late consumer, in addition to θ she will consume also
the wealth invested in the non-liquid asset, augmented by the rate of return:
4p1 is the probability of being an early consumer, i.e., in our example, of requiring
medical treatment in t+1. Since the endowment has already been invested in t, p1 can
also be conceived as the probability of a “liquidity shock” i.e., a shock which requires the
liquidation of wealth. Thanks to the law of large numbers, p1 (p2) is also the fraction of
early (late) consumers in the population.
5The acronym CRRA stands for Constant Relative Risk Aversion.
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s.t. c1 = θ
c2 = θ + (1− θ)R = R− rθ
where r = R− 1. The elements of the information set are: σ, R and the
probabilities p1 and p2.
Substituting the constraints in the objective function, the optimal choice
of consumption translates into an optimal portfolio decision, i.e. the determi-








[θ + (1− θ)R]1−σ
1− σ
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In the special case σ = 1 (i.e., with log utility), the optimal portfolio choice
boils down to




so that c∗2 = R− rθ∗ = R(1− p1).
From the discussion above, it is clear that an optimal choice can still be
made if the agent knows the probability distribution of the types. The optimal
behavioral rule changes if the distribution changes. For instance, the fraction
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of wealth invested in the liquid asset increases if the probability of being an
early consumer (p1) goes up. This is in a nutshell the methodology assumed
in the theory of choice in the presence of risk i.e. Subjective Expected Utility
theory (Savage, 1954).
4.3.3 Optimal choice in a multi-period setting
In a “dynamic” context – i.e. when the time horizon of the optimizing agent
consists of more than one period – the agent must solve an intertemporal
optimization problem, i.e. she must decide a sequence of optimal values for
the choice variables over a specified multi-period time span. For the sake
of discussion, in the following we suppose this time-horizon is infinite, i.e.
agents are infinitely lived.6 As an example, let’s consider an agent who must
decide the optimal consumption plan over an infinite time horizon.
In a multi-period setting, it is straightforward to assume that there is
uncertainty over the future states of the world.7 Therefore, the infinitely lived




βsu(ct+s) i.e. the expected sum of “felicity functions”
u(ct+s); s = 0, 1, 2... discounted using the factor β.
8 The maximization of
ELU is subject to a sequence of budget constraints, one for each period over
the same time span.
The budget constraint in each period states that the uses of resources
6Of course there can also be the dynamic case in which the time horizon is finite. The
most obvious category of models of this type is the “overlapping generations” model in
which there are only two periods, youth and old age. We will not treat this case here.
7The absence of uncertainty in a multi-period setting characterizes the “perfect fore-
sight” scenario: all the future state variables are known with certainty. We will not deal
with this scenario here.
8The felicity function U(x1t, x2t, ...) or period utility function represents the prefer-
ences of the agent in period t. The arguments of the felicity function in period t = 1, 2, ...
are the goods in the same period (xit, i = 1, 2, ..., N).
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in a certain period must be smaller or equal to the resources available to
the agent. In the simplest case, the agent has a certain amount of an asset
bt−1 (in real terms) which yields a return in one period so that the resources
available in t are Rt−1bt−1 where R is the gross real interest rate. These
resources are used to consume and accumulate assets. The budget constraint
in t therefore is: ct + bt ≤ Rt−1bt−1.9
Assuming that utility is CRRA, the intertemporal optimization problem
of the agent consists in choosing a plan for consumption and asset holdings







s.t. ct+s + bt+s ≤ Rt+s−1bt+s−1 s = 0, 1, ...
Consolidating the first order conditions for a maximum with respect to c
and b one gets the consumption Euler equation:
ct+s = (βRt+s)
−1/σEtct+s+1 s = 0, 1, ... (4.6)
Imposing the usual stationarity condition in (4.6) we get the steady state
of the real interest rate R∗ = 1/β. In words: in the steady state the real
interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference of the agent.
We can linearize the expression above around the steady state. Denoting
with xt+s the percentage deviation of consumption from its steady state in
period t+s, i.e. xt+s :=
ct+s−c∗
c∗
and with Rt+s the percentage deviation of
the real interest rate from its steady state in period t+s, i.e. Rt+s := Rt+s−R
∗
R∗
9The future values of the state variables must also be subject to an expectation. The
expected (in t) budget constraint for t+s is: Et(ct+s + bt+s) ≤ Et(Rt+s−1bt+s−1).
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Rt + Etxt+1 (4.7)
Notice that, in the simplest case in which there is no investment, from the
aggregate resource constraint it follows that output is equal to consumption.
Hence the percentage deviation of consumption from its steady state is equal
to the percentage deviation of output/income from its steady state, a measure
of the output gap.
In order to illustrate the role of expectation formation in this setting in the
simplest possible way, let’s assume that the real interest rate is a stochastic
variable described by the following auto-regressive process:
Rt = (1− ρ)R∗ + ρRt−1 +R∗εt (4.8)
where 0 < ρ < 1 and εt is a white noise stochastic disturbance, i.e. a random
variable with zero mean and constant and finite variance.10
From (4.8) it follows that the deviation of the real interest rate from the
steady state is governed by the following law of motion
Rt = ρRt−1 + εt (4.9)
Suppose the real interest rate were equal to the rate of time preference in
the past. A shock in period T, εT , generates a departure of the real interest
rate from the rate of time preference, RT = εT . Since ρ < 1, over time
the auto-regressive process represented by (4.9) will gradually drive the real
10This assumption is not meant to be realistic. It plays the pedagogical role of allowing
us to introduce rational expectations at a very early stage of the exposition (see section
4.3.3). For a more realistic model of the real interest rate see below, section 4.5.
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interest rate back to its steady state R∗.
Since R is stochastic (by assumption), (4.7) can be conceived as the
semi-reduced form of a macroeconomic model which determines the current
output gap as a function of the expected future output gap (which will be
endogenized in the next section) and an exogenous shock.
A foretaste of Rational Expectation
Equation (4.7) is a Linear Stochastic Difference equation (LSDE). According
to (4.7) the actual or true value of the state variable xt is linearly related
to the expected (in t) value of xt+1 and to the shock Rt. For each possible
realization of the shock, equation (4.7) can be represented as a straight line
on the (Etxt+1, xt) plane, which we will label the True Value (TV) schedule.
11
The 45-degree line on this plane is the Fulfilled Expectations (FE) schedule.
This is the first time we encounter these terms. The terminology and the
graphical apparatus will be used time and time again in the present chapter
to illustrate the different ways in which expectations may be formed and
their consenquences for macroeconomic performance.
The decisionmaking process will be complete only when also expectations
will be endogenously determined. The obvious way to endogenize expecta-
tions consists in solving (4.7) under Rational Expectations (RE). Rational or
model-consistent expectations, introduced by Muth (1961) and popularized
by Lucas and Sargent in the 1970’s, are mathematical expectations, condi-
tioned on the agents’ information set, of the variables of interest. RE are
based on the assumption that agents know the underling “true” economic
model so that they can anticipate the evolution of the variables to be fore-
cast. In fact, we will assume that agents know both the LSDE (4.7) and
11Using the jargon of the adaptive learning literature (see next chapter) equation (4.7)
can be conceived as the Actual Law of Motion of the state variable.
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the stochastic process (4.9). In other words, the information set available to
the private sector consists of the “true” model of the economy (at least in
reduced form) and the parameters characterizing the distribution of R.
In the absence of shocks, (4.7) boils down to xt = Etxt+1. This is rep-
resented by the straight line labelled TV (0) in figure 4.1. In this particular
setting TV(0) coincides with the 45-degree line.
𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 
𝑥𝑡 TV (0) 
E 
EX 





Figure 4.1: RE solution of (4.7)
We will solve (4.7) using the method of “undetermined coefficients”. One
reasonable guess is that xt is a linear function of the random variable Rt i.e.,
xt = αRt where α is an undetermined coefficient. If the coefficient can be
determined (as a polynomial of the parameters showing up in the information
set), then the guess is verified. It is easy to show that the guess is indeed
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Notice that from the guess follows that Etxt+1 = ρxt. This is the equation of
the EXpectation schedule (EX) in figure 4.1. Graphically the solution of the
LSDE can be found at the intersection of the TV and EX schedules. In the
absence of shocks, from (4.10) x = 0 follows. In fact, the intersection of the
EX and TV(0) schedules is the origin of the axes (point E). Notice that, by
construction, in E expectations are fulfilled (the FE schedule coincides with
TV(0)).13
Suppose the economy has settled in the origin and has not experienced
a shock for a long time. Suppose now a shock εT occurs in period T which
generates a departure of the real interest rate from the rate of time preference,
RT = εT , and therefore a departure of consumption (and output) from its
steady state. Graphically, the TV schedule shifts down (see TV (εT )). The
RE solution is xT = − 1σ(1−ρ)εT which can be read as the coordinate on the
y-axis of the intersection point between the EX and TV (εT ) schedules. The
after shock equilibrium is point F, which does not belong to the FE schedule.
In point F there is a recession – due to the sudden increase of the real interest
rate – and expectations are not fulfilled.
The auto-regressive process represented by (4.9) will gradually drive the
real interest rate and consumption back to their steady states (point E). For
instance, in period T+1 the TV schedule moves up (see the dotted line) and
12From the guess follows that Etxt+1 = αEtRt+1. From (4.9) follows that EtRt+1 =
ρRt. Hence Etxt+1 = αρRt = ρxt. Substituting this expression in (4.7) we can infer that
the guess is verified with α = − 1σ(1−ρ) .
13In the absence of shocks, the economy is in the steady state: xt+1 = xt. In equilibrium
(point E): xt = Etxt+1 =. Therefore expectations are fulfilled: xt+1 = Etxt+1.
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a new (transitory) RE solution will materialize, i.e. point G. This process
will go on until the TV schedule reaches the original position, i.e TV(0). At
the end of the process the economy will go back to E.
The departure of output and the interest rate from the steady state is
temporary. Due to the auto-regressive nature of the shock, however, the
return to the steady state takes time, i.e. the shock is characterized by some
persistence. After the shock, in each time period an echo of the shock will
remain in the macrosystem, which will become fainter and fainter over time.
The initial recession will be replaced by smaller and smaller recessions until
the output gap is closed.
In the end, in the presence of RE, in equilibrium endogenous variables
are random processes, because they are (generally linear) functions of the
random exogenous processes which drive their dynamics. The stochasticity
of the exogenous variables is the source of uncertainty.14 If the agent knows
(i) the model of the economy, (ii) all the possible states of the world, (iii) the
value of the random variable(s) of interest (the realization) in each state of the
world, (iv) the probability associated to each state of the world, then she can
compute the RE equilibrium. In a nutshell, to compute the RE equilibrium
the agent needs “only” the model of the economy (at least in reduced form)
and the probability distribution(s) of the variable(s) of interest.
It is easy to show that in a RE context, forecast errors are white noise,
i.e. their average is zero (this is the unbiasedness property of RE). In fact,
from (4.10) it follows that the error the agent makes in forecasting the output
gap ext+1 := xt+1−Etxt+1 is proportional to the error made in forecasting the
14In the perfect foresight case, i.e. in the absence of uncertainty, the agent knows, in
each period t+s, the realization of the stochastic variable Rt+s. Therefore (4.7) becomes
xt = − 1σRt + xt+1 i.e., the output gap is a random walk with a stochastic drift.
81








From (4.9) follows that eRt+1 = εt+1. Hence e
x







Etεt+1 = 0 (4.12)
Since expectations formed rationally are unbiased, in such a world people
do not make systematic mistakes.
Notice that in the multi-period setting with rational expectations, we have
made the same assumption as in the static case in the presence of measurable
uncertainty (risk). In both settings, in fact, the true values of the (exoge-
nous) variables of interest are replaced by probability distributions. The RE
approach to expectation formation is the natural, i.e. most straightforward,
way to model expectations in a dynamic probabilistic (risky) setting in which
uncertainty may be reduced to the knowledge of a probability distribution.
We will meet again this notion in the overview of macroeconomic thinking
in section 4.5.
4.4 Adaptation in expectation formation
In rational choice theory behavioral rules derive from (constrained) opti-
mization. From the economist’s viewpoint, this Neo-classical view of human
decision making has the advantage of drastically reducing the number of sci-
entifically admissible behavioral rules: rules that do not derive from “first
principles” can and must be discarded.15 The main criticism to this approach
15Notice, however that there are many functional forms of the objective function and
many different ways of specifying the constraints. Therefore, the neoclassical approach
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is that the cognitive capabilities implicitly required to properly optimize do
not seem to be within the reach of real human subjects.16
The neoclassical view of human decision making has been challenged by
Herbert Simon, who has pioneered a line of research on the psychological
foundations of actual economic behavior which is now burgeoning under the
general heading of behavioral economics. We will elaborate on this in the
next chapter.
In Simon’s view human beings are characterized by bounded rationality
because their cognitive ability is limited, both in collecting and in processing
the relevant information. Following Keynes and Knight, we can trace back
bounded rationality to a condition of true uncertainty, i.e., a scenario in
which agents don’t have a clue as to the probabilities of unknown states of
the world.
In the presence of bounded rationality, agents adapt to the environment
and to the other agents’ behaviour. Adaptation is the process of adjusting
to changing external circumstances by following quick, computation-saving
heuristics. In this context, expectations may well be incorrect and errors
may be systematic.
The adaptive mechanism to form expectations (AE) – also known as the
error-learning hypothesis can be conceived of as a heuristic to form expec-
tations when the information and cognitive capabilities necessary to solve
optimization problems in the presence of uncertainty are not available to the
can generate many alternative behavioral rules for the same agent and the same problem
depending upon the specific functional form of the objective function and the number and
type of constraints.
16The Neoclassical approach can be defended on the basis of the “as if” argument
put forward by Friedman. According to this argument the realism of assumptions is not
necessary for a model to be valid, the truly important criterion for validity being whether
the model performs well or not in terms of forecasting capability. This argument has been
and still is fiercely debated. Methodologically, we do not agree with it.
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agent. In the AE scheme, an agent updates her expectation of a certain
variable in the future (say period t+1) by a factor which is proportional to
her forecast error in the current period. Using the symbols introduced in the







t + ρ(xt − xet ) (4.13)
where xet+1 is the (non rational) expectation formed in t of the variable x in
t+ 1 and ρ is a positive parameter, smaller or equal to one.
In the history of macroeconomics, Adaptive Expectations have been pro-
posed well before the RE revolution. In fact, the adaptive scheme was in-
troduced in the 1950s by Cagan and Friedman to study hyperinflations and
then adopted by Friedman in the debate on the Phillips curve in the ’60s.
Adaptive expectations have been heavily criticized in the ’70s. RE the-
orists, in fact, held that people cannot be so stupid as to make systematic
mistakes. For a decade or so, this assumption has gone unchallenged and RE
have been all the rage. Nowadays, however, there is a large literature which
departs more or less boldly from the RE assumption to account for the fact
– which has been corroborated by plenty of experimental evidence – accord-
ing to which people cannot be so smart as not to make errors on average.
Adaptive expectations, therefore are currently experiencing a comeback in
the light of the criticisms raised against the RE hypothesis (more on this in
the next chapter).
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4.5 Riding at full gallop through the history
of macroeconomics
In this section we will briefly overview the development of macroeconomic
thought in order to bring to the fore the role of models of expectation for-
mation.
4.5.1 The Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis
We start from the workhorse of the Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis, i.e.,
the IS-LM-Phillips curve (PC) framework which can be conceived as the
mainstream macroeconomic model in the ’50s and ’60s of the last century.
In this framework expectations do not play a role. The central role of ex-
pectations will be brought to the fore by Friedman’s criticism of the Phillips
curve. The development of ideas on expectation formation, therefore, can be
most clearly described as a sequence of variants of this framework in which
expectations are incorporated in different ways.







it +m(xt + πt)
πt = kxt
The first equation is the IS function. The output gap x is decreasing
with the real interest r = i − π, where i is the nominal interest rate and
π is inflation; σ is a positive parameter.17 The second equation is the LM
17The IS function considered in this subsection departs from the standard undergrad-
uate textbook version of the IS-LM model as it determines the output gap instead of the
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function. Money demand (on the RHS of the equation) is increasing with
nominal income (in growth rates), i.e. x+π and decreasing with the nominal
interest rate; φ,m are positive parameters. We assume φ > 1. Money supply
(LHS) grows at the exogenous rate µ. The third equation is the Phillips
curve, which associates inflation positively to the output gap; k is a positive
parameter.18 The Phillips curve can be conceived as a Keynesian Aggregate
Supply (AS) curve on the (x, π) plane. It incorporates nominal rigidity.19
Substituting the LM into the IS equation and setting m = 1 to simplify
notation (and without loss of generality) one gets the Aggregate Demand
(AD) schedule







. Since φ > 1, then d1 > 0.
The IS-LM-PC framework boils down to the the AD-AS system consisting









level of output as a function of the real interest rate. It is, on the other hand, a distant
relative of the consumption Euler equation (4.7). There are two differences: (i) the ex-
pectation of the future output gap is ignored (since the model of this subsection abstracts
from all the expectational variables); (ii) the real interest rate is defined as the difference
between the nominal interest rate and current inflation instead of being described by the
stochastic process (4.9). This definition makes room for monetary policy and for inflation
in the aggregate demand component of the model.
18The original Phillips curve associates inflation to the distance of the unemployment
rate from the natural rate of unemployment. This distance is negatively related to growth
through Okun’s law. Hence the formulation in the text.
19There are many ways of deriving the AS curve. For example, with perfect competition
and nominal wage rigidity, from equation (4.1) one gets P = W̄α q
1−α
α . Taking logs and
differentiating one gets π = kx where k = 1−αα , where we assume that the percent change
of output is measured from the natural level of output.
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Changes in the growth rate of money supply affect both nominal and real
variables.20 This is due to nominal rigidity.
When wages are perfectly flexible, the aggregate scale of activity is always









In this case, of course, changes in monetary policy affect only nominal
variables.
4.5.2 Expectations enter the scene
Friedman’s critique of the Phillips curve led to the Expectations Augmented
Phillips curve (EAPC), i.e.
πt = kxt + π
e
t+1 (4.15)
where πet+1 is the expectation of inflation in t+1, taken in t.
21 The IS-LM-
EAPC framework boils down to the system consisting of the AD and EAPC
20To complete the argument, notice that the IS-LM-PC model in structural form is a
system of three equations in three unknowns, namely the equilibrium levels of the output
gap, inflation, and the nominal interest rate. The reduced form of the model therefore
consists of xK , πK and iK = φ
[
(1 + k) d01+kd1 − 1
]
µ. It is necessary to assume that the
expression in brackets is negative, so that an increase of the quantity of money pushes
the interest rate down. At this point, however, we must re-interpret i as a component of
the nominal interest rate which can be positive or negative. For instance, we can denote
the nominal interest rate properly speaking with in = ī+ i where ī is a given benchmark.
Hence i turns out to be a component of the nominal interest rate which can be negative.
The Zero Lower Bound is hit when i is negative and equal to ī in absolute value.
21This can be conceived also as the equation of the expectations augmented AS curve
(EAS).
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πt = aµ+ bπ
e
t+1 (4.17)
where a := kd0
1+kd1
, b := 1
1+kd1
. The reduced form of the AD-EAPC system
consists of the output gap equation (4.16) and the inflation equation (4.17).
Notice that the latter is a linear relationship between current and expected
inflation, given the growth rate of money supply. To close the model we
need a theory of expectation formation to be applied to the expectation of
inflation.
4.5.3 Adaptive Expectations
As anticipated in the previous section, Friedman proposed an adaptive heuris-
tic to model expectations formation. In the Adaptive Expectations (AE)
setting, expectations are updated according to the following rule:
πet+1 = π
e
t + ρ(πt − πet ) (4.18)
where 0 < ρ ≤ 1. The expression in parentheses is the forecast error et :=
πt − πet . The product ρet is the “error-correction” mechanism.22 23
22Denoting with ∆et,t+1 := π
e
t+1 − πet the change in expectations, the adaptive nature
of the updating rule emerges nicely if we rewrite (4.18) as follows: ∆et,t+1 = ρet. From
this expression it is clear that in an adaptive setting (i) expectations of inflation are
revised upward (downward) if inflation has been underestimated (overestimated); (ii) the
magnitude of this revision is proportional to the error made.
23When maximum weight is given to the forecast error, i.e., ρ = 1, we get static or
naive expectations. In this special case πet+1 = πt.
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Equation (4.18) can be rewritten as
πet+1 = (1− ρ)πet + ρπt (4.19)
i.e. the expectation of inflation in t+ 1 is a weighted average of the expected
and actual levels of inflation in t.24
The AD-EAPC system with adaptive expectations boils down to the out-
put gap equation (4.16), the inflation equation (4.17) and the AE updating
rule (4.19).
The system is recursive. We focus first on the subsystem represented by
the inflation equation and the updating rule. From (4.17) we get: πet+s =
(πt+s−1 − aµ)/b, s = 0, 1. Substituting these expressions into (4.19) and








The steady state of (4.21) is πAE = a
1−bµ. Thanks to the fact that b < 1,
steady state inflation is positive and the steady state is stable.25 Steady
state inflation is a multiple of the growth rate of money supply. Recalling





φ−1 . Hence we can rewrite
24Iterating (4.19), it is easy to infer that the expectation of inflation in t+1 is a weighted
average of past values of inflation with exponentially declining weights:




Notice that only the past values of the variable to be forecast play a role in the AE
mechanism. Additional information which may be relevant to forecast inflation is ignored.
25In fact b < 1 implies 1− ρ < 1− bρ.
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It is easy to see that in the steady state (the “long run” equilibrium),
expected inflation in every period is constant and equal to actual inflation:
πe = πAE (4.23)
i.e., expectations are fulfilled and the forecast error is zero.26
Substituting (4.23) for πet+1 into (4.16) we get the steady state level of
the output gap:
xAE = 0 (4.24)
(4.23) and (4.24) are the long run solution of the AD-EAPC model with
adaptive expectations.27
Stationarity implies fulfilled expectations but forecast errors are always
present out of the long run equilibrium, i.e. during the transitional dynamics.













s=0(1− ρ)s = 1/ρ.
27Notice that the long run equilibrium with AE is exactly the same solution of the
AD-AS system with flexible wages, see subsection 4.5.1 above. Why? Because wages in
the AD-EAS system adjust to expected inflation. When expectations are correct, then
this adjustment is perfect. In other words, wages are perfectly indexed to inflation and
the real wage is at the full employment level.
90
















Figure 4.2: AE: effects of a permanent monetary shock
Expectations are correct when
πet+1 = πt+1 (4.27)
(4.9) represents the Fulfilled Expectations (FE) schedule which coincides
with the 45-degree line by definition.
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We determine the Fulfilled (or correct) Expectations Equilibrium (FEE)
solving the system consisting of (4.26) and (4.9). The solution provides the
coordinates of the intersection E between the TV and FE schedules in figure
4.2. It is easy to verify that the FE of π coincides with its actual value πAE.
The error et+1 := πt+1 − πet+1 is the vertical distance between the TV
and FE schedules. In the steady state the error is zero: stationarity implies
fulfilled expectations.
Suppose the economy has settled in E and has not experienced a shock
for a long time. Suppose that a monetary shock εT > 0 occurs in period
T. This shock generates a higher money growth rate µT = µ + εT . The TV
schedule shifts upwards as shown by TV (µ+ εT ) in figure 4.2. If the shock is
permanent (i.e. the rate of growth of money supply will be µT from T on),
the after shock equilibrium will be point F.
The expansionary monetary shock triggers a monotonically increasing
trajectory for inflation described by the difference equation (4.21). Infla-
tion increases until the economy reaches the new steady state πAE(εT ) =
φ
φ−1(µ+ εT ). During the transition from the lower to the higher steady state
inflation rate, agents make a negative error period after period, i.e., they
systematically underestimate inflation, as shown by the vertical distances in
bold between the new TV schedule and the FE schedule along the path of
increasing inflation betweeen E and F. However, these errors become smaller
and smaller until they disappear in F.
It is easy to see that the new steady state output gap is zero: xAE(εT ) = 0,
i.e., the change in money growth has no effect on real variables. In the long
run there is money super-neutrality.28
28Notice that we get the steady state value of inflation and therefore fulfilled expecta-
tions also imposing the condition πt = π
e
t+1 in (4.17). This is somehow obvious because
in the steady state also the condition above occurs. In other words, in the steady state
current and future inflation are the same and equal to expected inflation.
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If the monetary shock is temporary, the economy will revert gradually
to the original long run equilibrium E as shown in figure 4.3. Therefore
there will be a fluctuation which will be characterized by persistence: both
inflation and the output gap will jump up due to the shock and go down
gradually to the original steady state over time.
Figure 4.3: AE: Effects of a temporary monetary shock
4.5.4 Rational Expectations
The adaptive heuristic proposed by Friedman to model expectation formation
was heavily criticized by Lucas, Sargent and the other intellectual leaders of
the New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM) (or RE school) essentially because
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“in the real world” people do not make systematic errors.29 The RE school
has aimed at modelling a non-myopic process of expectation formation. In
order to present the RE approach in our simple setting, we must rewrite the
inflation equation (4.17).
First of all, with RE the expectation of inflation is defined as
πet+1 = Etπt+1 (4.28)
where Et is the expected value taken in t (and on the basis of the information
set available in t) of π in t+ 1.
Second, we have to introduce a source of randomness. The obvious can-
didate is the growth rate of money supply. Let us explore first the simplest
case:
µt = µ+ εt (4.29)
where εt is a monetary shock (or “monetary innovation”), a white noise
stochastic disturbance (zero mean and constant variance). In words, the (un-
certain) rate of growth of money supply in a given period t+s is a random
variable with constant expected value Et+sµt+s = µ for any s=0,1,2...and
constant variance, equal to the variance of the monetary shock.30 The mon-
etary shock can be conceived as the error the agents make in forecasting the
growth rate of money supply: eµt := µt − Etµt = εt. Thanks to the law of
iterated projections: Etµt+1 = µ.
29In the light of plenty of experimental evidence, there are good reasons to object to
this objection. In Learning To Forecast Experiments, in fact, real human subjects do make
systematic errors. See Hommes and Lux (2013).
30In this simple setting, there is within-period uncertainty. The agent does not know
in t the growth rate of money supply in the same period.
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Therefore, we can rewrite (4.17) as follows
πt = aµt + bEtπt+1 (4.30)
Since µt is stochastic, (4.30) is a LSDE. It can be represented by a sheaf
of TV schedules, one for each possible realization of the random variable
µt on the (Etπt+1, πt) plane. We assume that agents know both the LSDE
and the stochastic process governing µt. In other words, the information set
available to the private sector consists of the “true” model of the economy
(at least in reduced form) and the distribution of εt.
We can solve this LSDE using the method of “undetermined coefficients”.
One reasonable guess is that πt is a linear function of the random variable
µt: πt = α0 + α1µt where α0, α1 are undetermined coefficients. It is easy to
show that the guess is indeed verified.31 The solution of the LSDE is











that the error made in forecasting inflation (also called “price surprise”) is
eπt := π
RE
t − EtπREt = a(µt − µ) = ae
µ
t = aεt (4.32)
In words: the error made in forecasting inflation (price surprise) is propor-
tional to the error made in forecasting money growth (monetary innovation).
In the absence of monetary shocks (and therefore of price surprises), (4.30)
can be written as πt = aµ+ bEtπt+1. This is represented by the straight line
31From the guess follows that Etπt+1 = α0 +α1Etµt+1. But Etµt+1 = µ. Substituting
this expression in the LSDE we can infer that the guess is verified with α0 =
ab
1−bµ and




labelled TV (µ) in figure 4.4. Substituting µt = µ into (4.31) and rearranging










π∗ is the RE solution of (4.30) in the absence of shocks. Notice that, in
the absence of shock, πt = πt+1 = Etπt+1 = π
∗.
The RE solution in the absence of shocks provides the coordinates of
the intersection E between the TV (µ) and FE schedules (see 4.4). In other
words, it is the Fulfilled (or correct) Expectations Equilibrium (FEE) in this
setting.
The RE solution is exactly the same as the AE solution. The AE solution
however is a long run equilibrium, i.e. the steady state of a dynamic process.
The RE solution instead is characterized by the absence of shocks.
Let’s consider now what happens when a shock occurs. Suppose the
economy has settled in E and has not experienced a shock for a long time.
Suppose that a monetary shock εT occurs in period T. This shock generates
a departure of the money growth rate from µ:µT = µ+ εT . As a consequence
the TV schedule shifts up as shown by TV (µ+ εT ) in figure 4.4. If the shock
is not anticipated (so that EtπT+1 = π
∗) there will be a departure of inflation
from π∗. In fact πT = aµT +
ab
1−bµ as shown by (4.31). Graphically the after
shock equilibrium is point F in figure 4.4.
Notice that the error is eπT = πT − a1−bµ = a (µT − µ) i.e. the vertical
distance between the TV schedules (before and after the shock) measured at
the level of expected inflation. Hence
πRET = π
∗ + (πT − ETπT ) = π∗ + a(µT − µ) = π∗ + aεT (4.34)
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Figure 4.4: RE: Effects of a monetary shock
This solution can be generalized to any time period:
πREt = π
∗ + a (µt − µ) = π∗ + aεt (4.35)





The policy implication of the RE setting is the so-called Policy Ineffective-
ness Proposition (PIP) according to which policy changes have real effects
only if unanticipated, i.e. only if they are the source of a price surprise. A
monetary innovation εt in fact, generates a price surprise aεt which makes
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both inflation and the output gap increase. Notice however that this is a
short lived jump. In fact, on average the price suprice is zero (unbiasedness
of RE). Immediately after the shock, the economy will move back from F to
E, leaving only a blip in the time series of inflation and output gap at the
time T the shock occurred.
Persistence
The fluctuation generated by a shock in the previous setting is short lived. In
order to introduce persistence, one can think of a different process governing
the random variable which drives the dynamics of the model. Suppose the
growth rate of money supply is described by the following autoregressive
process of order one:
µt = (1− ρ)µ+ ρµt−1 + εt (4.37)
where 0 < ρ < 1 and εt white noise.
The expected value is Et+sµt+s+1 = (1− ρ)µ+ ρµt+s−1 for any s=0,1,2...
Notice that, in the absence of shocks, the steady state of this process is
µt = µt−1 = µ. The monetary innovation is e
µ
t := µt − Et−1µt = εt.
We use this definition of money growth to solve (4.30) using the method









32One reasonable guess is πt = α0 + α1µt where α0, α1 are undetermined coefficients.
From the guess follows that Etπt+1 = α0 + α1Etµt+1. But from (4.37) follows that
Etµt+1 = (1−ρ)µ+ρµt. Substituting this expression in (4.30) we can infer that the guess
is verified with α0 =
(1−ρ)ab




In the absence of shocks (and therefore of price surprises), (4.30) can be
written as πt = aµ+ bEtπt+1. This is represented by TV (µ) in figure 4.5.





π∗ is the RE solution of (4.30) in the absence of shocks. Notice that this
solution is exactly the same as above.
Figure 4.5: Persistence
Notice now that, in the present setting, expected inflation in t+1 is in-
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creasing with current inflation in t.33
Etπt+1 = π
∗ + ρπt (4.40)
This is the EXpectation schedule in figure 4.5.
The RE solution in the absence of shocks provides the coordinates of the
intersection E between the TV (µ) and EX schedules. By construction it is
also the intersection between the TV and FE schedules. In other words, it is
the Fulfilled (or correct) Expectations Equilibrium (FEE) in this setting.
Let us now explore the consequences of a shock. Suppose the economy
has settled in E for a long time. A monetary shock εT occurs in T. The
money growth rate increases on impact: µT = µ + εT . As a consequence
the TV schedule shifts up as shown by TV (µ + εT ) in figure 4.5. The after
shock equilibrium is point F, which is the intersection of the new TV and
EX schedules. Point F does not belong to the FE schedule. Hence in point
F expectations are not fulfilled.
The auto-regressive process represented by (4.37) will gradually drive
inflation (and the output gap) down to the original level. For instance, in
period T+1 the TV schedule moves down (see the dotted line) and a new
(transitory) RE solution will materialize, i.e. point G. This process will go
on until the TV schedule reaches the original position, i.e TV (µ). At the end
of the process the economy will settle again in E. This process takes time,
i.e. it is characterized by persistence.
33In fact, from the guess it follows Etπt+1 = α0 + α1Etµt+1 = α0 + α1[(1− ρ)µ+ ρµt].
Adding and subtracting ρα0 and recalling that πt = α0 + α1µt we obtain (4.40).
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4.5.5 The New Neoclassical Synthesis
New Classical Macroeconomics has been all the rage in the ’80s of last cen-
tury. By the early ’90s a new approach had gained ground, which chal-
lenged the perfect competition/complete markets setting generally accepted
by NCM theorists. This approach goes under the name of New Keynesian
Economics (NKE). By the end of the ’90s a syncretic approach, the New Neo-
classical Synthesis, merged insights from both the NCM and NKE schools.
The workhorse of the New Neoclassical Synthesis, is the New Keynesian
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (NK-DSGE) model which, in our





it = (1 + γ)πt
πt = kxt + βEtπt+1 + ut
The first equation is the IS relatiosnship between the output gap and the
real interest rate.34 The second equation is a monetary policy rule, namely
a Taylor rule (TR), which defines the policy rate as an increasing function
of inflation (γ > 0).35
34To be precise, the first equation of the standard NK-DSGE model is the so-called
“optimizing IS curve” which is essentally the consumption Euler equation (4.7) where the
real interest rate is endogenized as follows Rt = it − Etπt+1. Usually, a demand shock
is added to the equation. For simplicity and continuity of exposition, we adopt here a
simplified variant of the consumption Euler equation, identical to the one used in the
previous section. Notice moreover that we ignore demand shocks.
35The Taylor rule is an instrument rule, i.e., it is not derived from an optimization
problem (it is a rule of thumb, not an optimal rule). The Taylor Rule captures a change in
the way in which monetary policy has been carried out, from monetary targeting (whereby
the central bank sets the money growth and the interest rate is endogenous) to inflation
targeting (whereby the central bank sets the interest rate as a response to inflation and
the quantity of money is endogenous). The specific formulation we follow characterizes
a regime of strict inflation targeting whereby the interest rate responds only to inflation.
When the central bank reacts also to changes in the output gap, the Taylor rule charac-
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The third equation is the NK Phillips curve (NKPC), which associates
inflation positively to the output gap and expected inflation.36 The NKPC
plays the role of the AS curve in the NK setting.
Finally we introduce a source of randomness, namely a supply shock which
is appended to the NKPC. The supply shock follows the auto-regressive pro-
cess
ut = ρut−1 + εt (4.41)
where εt is white noise. Notice that Etut+1 = ρut. The NK-DSGE workhorse
in our simplified setting therefore is the system of IS-TR-NKPC equations
where the supply shock is described by (4.41).





(4.42) is the equation of the AD curve in the NK context. The NK model
boils down to the AD-AS system where the AS is represented by the NKPC
curve. Substituting (4.42) into the NKPC we end up with:
πt = aut + bEtπt+1 (4.43)
where a := σ
kγ+σ
, b := βσ
kγ+σ
. Notice that both a and b are positive and smaller
than one.
(4.43) is the inflation equation in the NK setting. It can be represented
by a sheaf of TV schedules, one for each possible realization of the random
variable ut on the (Etπt+1, πt plane).
As usual we will solve this LSDE using the method of “undetermined
terizes a regime of flexible inflation targeting (which we do not consider for simplicity).
36In the NKPC, expected inflation is weighted by the discount factor β which is smaller
than one. This is due to nominal rigidity.
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In the absence of shocks (and therefore of price surprises), (4.43) is rep-
resented by TV (0) in figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Effects of a supply shock in the NK-DSGE model
π∗ = 0 is the RE solution of (4.43) in the absence of shocks. Notice that,
in the absence of shock, πt = πt+1 = Etπt+1 = π
∗.
In the present setting:
Etπt+1 = ρπt (4.45)
37The guess is πt = αut where α is undetermined. From the guess follows that Etπt+1 =
αEtut+1. But Etut+1 = ρut. Hence Etπt+1 = ρπt. Substituting this expression in the
LSDE we can infer that the guess is verified with α = a1−bρ
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This is the eqaution of the EXpectation schedule in figure 4.6.
The RE solution in the absence of shocks provides the coordinates of the
intersection E between the TV (0) and EX schedules. By construction it is
also the intersection between the TV and FE schedules. In other words, it is
the Fulfilled (or correct) Expectations Equilibrium (FEE) in this setting.
Suppose the economy has settled in E and has not experienced a shock
for a long time. Suppose that a supply shock εT occurs in period T. As a
consequence, the TV schedule shifts up as shown by TV (εT ) in figure 4.6. If
the shock is not anticipated, graphically the after shock equilibrium is point
F, which is the intersection of the new TV and the EX schedules. Point F
does not belong to the FE schedule.
The auto-regressive process represented by (4.37) will gradually drive
inflation (and the output gap) down to the original level. For instance,
in period T+1 the TV schedule moves down (see dotted line) and a new
(transitory) RE solution will materialize, i.e. point G. This process will go
on until the TV schedule reaches the original position, i.e TV (0). At the end
of the process the economy will settle again in E. This process is characterized
by persistence.
4.6 The limits of Rational Expectations
There are at least three main reasons to criticize the Rational Expectations
hypothesis.
First of all, the burden of “rationality” imposed on agents in RE models –
in terms of content of the information set and computing capability – appears
to be out of the reach of real human beings, who are characterized instead
by bounded rationality as mentioned above (we will elaborate further on this
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issue in the next chapter).
Second, the assumption that agents will sooner or later discover the “true
model” of the economy simply begs another question: which model? In a RE
framework the true model must be the researcher’s model whose solution is
by construction consistent with expectations.38 Therefore, the model all the
agents “have in mind” is exactly the model built by the researcher.
Third, RE usually relies on the over-simplifying assumption of a repre-
sentative agent. In an heterogeneous agents setting, in order to have a RE
equilibrium all the agents must converge to the same rational prediction.39
In principle, however, different agents have different expectations and con-
vergence to RE (through rational learning) is not assured. The persistence
of heterogeneity in economic beliefs is in fact a well known fact of life.
These limits have provided the starting point for a complex web of lines
of research. As to the first and second points, for instance, a large literature
has developed on statistical or adaptive learning pioneered by Evans and
Honkapohja in the early years of the new century, in which agents learn the
numerical values of the parameters of the model by running regressions. In
simple cases statistical learning yields convergence to a Rational Expecta-
tions solution (rational learning): agents indeed learn the parameters of the
true model of the economy and therefore converge to (uniform) rational ex-
pectations. In more complex environments, however, learning may not yield
the RE equilibrium.
As to the third line, let us remind the vast literature on heterogeneous ex-
pectations and heuristic switching pioneered by Brock and Hommes (1997).
38This resembles the ontological argument put forward by Saint Anselm of Aosta, ac-
cording to which God must exist (in reality) simply because the idea of God as the perfect
being (in the mind of men) cannot lack the attribute of existence.
39See chapter 1 for a succinct discussion of Neoclassical models with heterogeneous
agents.
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In their setting, in forming expectations agents switch from one rule of thumb
to another (e.g. from adaptive to fundamental expectations) depending on
the relative “fitness ” of the rules. As a consequence, heterogeneous expec-
tations can survive and co-exist: the aggregate or average expectation is a
weighted sum of the individual expectations.
We will elaborate on these issues in depth in the next chapter. In the
following section we will provide a very simple introduction to the effects of
heterogeneous expectations in a macroeconomic setting similar to the one
discussed above. This discussion will pave the way to a brief introduction to
modelling expectations in macroeconomic ABMs.
4.7 Heterogeneous Expectations: A very sim-
ple introduction
4.7.1 Heterogeneous biased expectations
Suppose there is a continuum of agents of unit mass. Let’s denote with πeit+1
the expectation (the “belief” hereafter) taken in t of inflation in t+1 by agent
i, i ∈ (0, 1). We can model the individual expectation in very general terms
as follows
πeit+1 = f (πt, αi) (4.46)
where πt is the current value of inflation and αi is the individual bias. For
simplicity, we assume that the function f(., .) is the same for all the agents,
so that expectations are heterogeneous only because of the bias. We assume
the individual bias is distributed on the support (−αL, αH) with mean α and
variance σ2α. In the following we will refer to α as the collective bias. By
construction, the average expectation < πeit+1 > – which we will denote with
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πet+1 hereafter – is:
40






The average expectation is a function of πt and of the mean and higher
moments of the distribution of αi.







The mean and the variance of the distribution of the bias are shift parameters
of the function.
For simplicity suppose that the function f(., .) is linear in πt and takes
the following simple form:
πeit+1 = πt + f(αi) (4.49)
We assume that if the bias is positive (negative), the agent expects inflation
in t+1 to be higher (lower) than inflation in t.41
The average expectation in this case is




(4.50) is the equation of the EX schedule in figure 4.7. The intercept of
this schedule on the x-axis is affected by the mean and the variance of the
distribution of the bias.
As usual, the True Value (TV) schedule is represented by the inflation
40We can linearize (4.46) around the average bias by means of a Taylor expansion:
πeit+1 ≈ f(πt, α) +
∂f(πt, α)
∂α





(αi − α)2 (4.47)
Taking the expected value of the expression above and recalling that E(αi − α) = 0 and
E(αi − α)2 = σ2α we obtain (4.48).
41In symbols: f ′(αi) > 0, f(αi) > 0 if αi > 0, f(αi) < 0 if αi < 0, f(0) = 0.
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equation (4.17) which we report here for the reader’s convenience:
πt = aµ+ bπ
e
t+1 (4.51)
We now have a system consisting of (4.50) and (4.8). The solution of this
system yields equilibrium – i.e., consistency – between (i) the way in which
actual inflation is determined by average expected inflation according to (4.8)
and (ii) the way in which average expectations are determined according to
(4.50). However, individual expectations will not be model-consistent as we
will show below.
In equilibrium, actual inflation in the presence of heterogeneous expecta-
tions is








where π∗ = φ
φ−1µ and ψ =
σ+φ
k(φ−1) . Therefore, expected inflation in equilib-
rium is








Actual and expected inflation do not coincide because of the bias. They
are the coordinates of the intersection H between the TV and EX schedules
(see 4.7). Since H does not lie on the FE schedule (the 45 degree line),
expectations are not fulfilled. More precisely, given our assumptions, they
are systematically greater than actual inflation.
Of course, this is only the starting point of the analysis, which may be-
come more interesting if one departs from the assumption that the bias is
given. The bias can be endogenized, for instance, by considering the complex
relationships between the bias and current inflation. This analysis, however,
is out of the scope of our introduction.
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Figure 4.7: Heterogeneous expectations
4.7.2 A convenient special case: Two types
In order to dig a little deeper into this issue consider an extremely simplified
setting in which the population consists only of two types of agents: “high”
and “low”. The high type holds a belief characterized by a positive bias +∆.
Symmetrically, the low type has negative bias −∆. Hence πeHt+1 = πt + ∆
and πeLt+1 = πt −∆.42
Let’s denote with ω the fraction of positively biased agents in the pop-
ulation. The collective bias, i.e. the weighted average of the optimistic and
the pessimistic bias is ω∆ + (1 − ω)(−∆) = ψ∆ where ψ := (2ω − 1). By
42In this simplified setting we assume that the expectation is linear in the bias. There-
fore, only the collective bias will play a role in determining the average expectation. Due
to linearity, higher moments of the distribution of the bias will not play any role.
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construction, the average expectation is
πet+1 = πt + ψ∆ (4.54)
(4.54) is the equation of the EX schedule in this simple example. It can
be represented as in figure 4.7 reinterpreting the intercept on the x-axis as
ψ∆ and assuming that ω > 0.5 (so that the intercept is positive).
Superimposing the usual TV schedule, one can compute the coordinates
of point H in this simplified setting. The solutions are
πH = π∗ + ψ∆ (4.55)
πeH = π∗ + (1 + ψ)∆ (4.56)
Expectations are always individually biased and the individual error is
constant and systematically negative (positive) for the positively (negatively)
biased individuals. If the fraction of positively biased agents were also con-
stant, then ψ would be constant and the aggregate bias would also be con-
stant. The economy would settle in H with actual inflation systematically
lower than expected inflation.
If we assume that agents can switch from a positive to a negative bias
and viceversa, however, the population of heterogeneous agents can change
over time. Suppose for instance that the fraction of positively biased agents
exceeds 0.5 (and becomes therefore the majority) if their bias has been con-
firmed, i.e. if actual inflation is greater than past inflation:
ω =
λ(πt − πt−1) + 1
2
(4.57)
In this case, it is easy to see that ψ = λ(πt − πt−1). Hence the average
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expectation equation becomes:
πet+1 = (1 + λ∆)πt − λ∆πt−1 (4.58)
Plugging the average expectation equation (4.58) into the inflation equa-








It is easy to see that the steady state of (4.59) is πH = π∗. Imposing the
following restriction: λ∆ < 1−b
b
< 2λ∆ the steady state will be stable.
When the economy is in the steady state, expectations are fulfilled when
averaged across agents. The individual bias, however is still present. How is
this possible? The reason is very simple: the composition of the population
in the steady state is such that the aggregate bias of the positively biased
individuals is offset by the aggregate bias of the negatively biased ones. In
fact in the steady state ω∗ = 0.5. Expectations are heterogeneous and biased
at the individual level but they are collectively unbiased.
Graphically, when ω = 0.5 the EX schedule coincides with the FE sched-
ule. Apparently people hold correct expectations, but this is true only on
average: half of the population is of a high type and half of the low type.
4.7.3 Heterogeneous adaptive expectations
Let’s now introduce heterogeneous adaptive expectations. As in subsection
4.7.1 we consider a continuum of agents of unit mass. The i-th agent updates
her expectation according to the following adaptive rule:
πeit+1 = ρiπt + (1− ρi)πeit (4.60)
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ρi is the individual error correction coefficient. We assume the individual
coefficient is distributed on the support (0, 1] with mean ρ. Averaging across
agents we get πet+1 = ρπt + π
e
t− < ρiπeit > where the last term is the ex-
pected value of the product of the individual coefficient and the individual
expectation in period t.
Notice now that < ρiπ
e




t where cov (ρi, π
e
it) is the
covariance between ρi and π
e
it. Hence, the average expectation equation can
be rewritten as
πet+1 = ρπt + (1− ρ)πet − cov (ρi, πeit) (4.61)
Heterogeneity is captured by the covariance between the individual ρi and
the individual πeit, but the latter is in turn defined as in (4.60) (lagged one
period). Hence the covariance of ρi and the individual π
e
it can be recast in
terms of variance and higher moments of the distribution of ρi and of past
values of inflation. Dynamics can indeed be very rich.
4.8 Heterogeneous expectations in ABMs
In a complex economy and in the presence of cognitive and informational con-
straints on individual rationality it is straightforward to assume that agents
hold heterogeneous expectations, i.e. they form expectations following dif-
ferent heuristics. This is the most obvious point of departure in building
expectation formation in ABMs.
In principle, there is no limit to the creativity of the researcher: since
the principle of full rationality is not disciplining economic theorizing, any
forecasting heuristic is in principle admissible. This is of course a drawback
of the AB methodology which goes under the name of wilderness of bounded
rationality.
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In our opinion, the consequences of this problem may be mitigated by
assuming that only few forecasting rules are actually adopted, as experi-
mental evidence suggests. The obvious candidates are Adaptive Expectations
(discussed in the previous section) and its variants. For example, one can
incorporate the inertia of the variable to be forecast into the expectation
formation mechanism by augmenting static expectation with the second dif-
ference of the variable:
πeit+1 = πt + λi(πt − πt−1). (4.62)
Depending on the magnitude of the tuning parameter in (4.62), we get:
• a “weak trend-following” rule if 0 < λi < 1
• a “strong trend-following” rule if λi > 1.
Along similar lines, following a well known behavioural insight one can
model expectations based on the “anchoring and adjustment heuristic”:
πeit+1 = λiπ
av
t + βiπt + (πt − πt−1) (4.63)
where πavt is a moving average of past values of π. Besides AE, other formu-
lations based on linear filters such as extrapolative/regressive expectations
have been used in the literature.
As an example, let us consider an agent-based macro-model in which, in
order to buy consumption goods, each household visits only a (small) subset
of firms – i.e. households do not explore the entire space of purchasing
opportunities – so that each firm has some market power on its own local
market. In other words, there are as many local markets as there are firms.
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The firm has to set individual price and quantity under uncertainty.43
The firm knows from experience that if it charges higher prices it will get
smaller demand but it does not know the actual demand schedule (i.e. how
much the consumers visiting the firm would buy at any given individual
price). The firm, in fact, observes only the current willingness to pay of
the visiting consumers, who change from time to time. Hence the firm is
unable to maximize profits setting the marginal cost (which is known) equal
to the marginal revenue (unknown). The best the firm can do consists in
setting the price as close as possible to the average price level – a proxy of
the price set collectively by its competitors44 – and production as close as
possible to expected demand in order to minimize involuntary inventories (in
case of excess supply) or the queue of unsatisfied customers (in case of excess
demand).







where desired output is anchored to expected demand
Y ∗it+1 = Y
e
it+1. The firm’s information set in t consists of (i) the average price
level Pt and (ii) excess demand
∆it := Y
d
it − Yit (4.64)
where Y dit is actual demand and Yit is actual output in t. ∆it shows up as a
queue of unsatisfied customers if positive; as an inventory of unsold goods if
negative.
Notice that ∆it is a proxy of the forecasting error εit := Y
d
it−Y eit where Y eit
is expected demand formed in t− 1 for t.45 If there is a positive forecasting
43In the following, we borrow heavily form Assenza (2015).
44As usual in a monopolistic competition setting, the single firm assumes its price is
weighted almost zero in the average price level
45∆it coincides with εit iff production plans are fulfilled, i.e. Y
∗
it = Yit. Production
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error (i.e. under-estimation of demand), then there will be a fortiori excess
demand (a queue of unsatisfied customers). If there is a negative forecasting
error (i.e. over-estimation of demand), then there will be excess supply (in-
voluntary inventories) only if the negative error is greater in absolute value
than the discrepancy between expected demand and actual production. This
will be the case, of course, if the discrepancy is sufficiently small.46
Given this information set, a firm can decide either to update the current
price or to vary the quantity to be produced, not both.47
The decision process is based on two rules of thumb which govern price
changes and quantity changes respectively. These rules are represented by
simple adaptive algorithms. The price adjustment rule is:
Pit+1 =
Pit(1 + ηit) if ∆it > 0; Pit < PtPit(1− ηit) if ∆it ≤ 0; Pit > Pt (4.65)
where ηi is a random positive parameter drawn from a distribution with
support (0, η̄).48
The sign of ∆it and of the difference Pit−Pt dictate the direction of price
adjustment but the magnitude of the adjustment is stochastic and bounded
by the width of the support of the distribution. This is one of the main
sources of randomness in the CATS model. We also assume that the firm
plans, however, may not be fulfilled: actual production Yit can differ from desired quantity
Y ∗it if constraints on the availability of capital, labour and funding inhibit the attainment of
the desired scale of activity. In symbols: Yit ≤ Y eit. Therefore ∆it = εit + (Y eit−Yit) where
the expression in parentheses is a non-negative discrepancy between expected demand and
actual production.
46Notice that goods are not storable: involuntary inventories cannot be carried over
from one period to the next. Therefore they cannot be employed strategically to satisfy
future demand. They play, however, the very useful role of an element of the information
set available to the firm when setting the price and the quantity for the future.
47This is a simplifying assumption, which makes coding less cumbersome.
48The distribution from which the idiosyncratic parameter is drawn is the same for all
the firms and is time-invariant.
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will never set a price lower than the average cost (which includes not only
the cost of labour and capital goods but also interest payments).49
The firm sets the desired quantity Y ∗it+1 at the level of expected demand
Y eit+1. Hence the quantity adjustment rule can be conceived also as an algo-
rithm for changing demand expectations:
Y ∗it+1 = Y
e
it+1 =
Yit + ρ1[Pit>Pt]∆it if ∆it > 0Yit + ρ1[Pit<Pt]∆it if ∆it ≤ 0 (4.66)
where ρ is a positive parameter, smaller than one.
1[Pit>Pt] is an indicator function equal to 1 if Pit > Pt, 0 otherwise. Analo-
gously, 1[Pit<Pt] is an indicator function equal to 1 if Pit < Pt, 0 otherwise.
The sign of ∆it and of the difference Pit−Pt dictate the direction of quantity
adjustment. Notice, however, that the magnitude of the adjustment is not
stochastic but determined by excess demand. If we assume that the discrep-
ancy between expected demand and desired production is negligible, so that
excess demand coincides with the forecasting error, we can interpret (4.66)
as a standard adaptive mechanism to update demand expectations. By iter-
ation, as it is well known, desired production in t+1 will be determined by
the weighted average of past quantities with exponentially decaying weights.
4.9 Conclusions
In this chapter we have focused on (i) the role of uncertainty in shaping
microeconomic behavior and (ii) the role of expectation formation in deter-
mining macroeconomic outcomes. As to (i), in a risky context, i.e. when
49While the attainment of the desired scale of activity is constrained by lack of capital,
labour or finance, there are no obstacles to setting the desired price provided the price
emerging from (4.65) is greater than the average cost.
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the environment is uncertain in a measurable way, agents replace the un-
known true value of variables (which are necessary to decision making) with
their probability distribution and carry on the usual optimization routines.
In a straightforward extension of this framework to a multi-period setting,
agents form rational expectations of future variables. The cognitive and in-
formational requirements of RE, however, may be out of the reach of agents
characterized by bounded rationality. In this case, an adaptive mechanism
may be a satisficing heuristic to form expectation.
As to (ii), in the history of macroeconomic thought, AE – proposed by
Friedman in the debate over the Phillips curve – have been rapidly wiped
out by the RE revolution. This methodological principle has been and still
is almost always respected, even if the debate has raged with alternating
successes between New Classical and New Keynesian economists. Of recent,
skepticism on the appropriateness of RE in macroeconomic models is gaining
ground both inside and outside the mainstream.
In a complexity setting, it is straightforward to assume that agents adopt
“satisficing” heuristics also when they must form epectations. AE are formed
on the basis of simple rules processing signals that come from the environ-
ment and the behavior of other agents. No effort in improving knowledge or
changing behavior is carried out. In building ABMs, researchers generally
adopt one sort or another of adaptive schemes. A natural extension would be
to imagine models whose agents explore their environment and modify their
behavioral rules, according to some learning process. This will be explored
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5.1 Introduction
The fundamental building blocks of every agent-based model are agents.
From a general point of view, in order to build an agent-based model, four
main issues need to be addressed: (i) the nature of the agents; (ii) the list
of variables describing their state; (iii) the list of the actions the agents can
perform; (iv) the structure of their interaction with other agents. In what
follows, we will discuss the first three points, while the last will be deeply
analyzed in the next Chapter.
A peculiar feature differentiating agents in agent-based models from those
of mainstream models is their autonomy of action. Indeed, agents in a
rational-expectations-cum-equilibrium model behave according to rules that
are not independent of what the others are doing: in any situation, their ac-
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tions depend on some variable that is determined by the behavior of the entire
system. In a typical market model, for instance, a firm must know the actual
market price (i.e. market-clearing price) in order to decide its production
level, and this price is determined by the interplay of all the agents populat-
ing the economy. Hence, agents’ actions are mutually dependent through the
equilibrium state or, differently stated, the actual implementation of actions
depends on the outcome of actions (outcome ⇒ actions). As this simple but
representative example clarifies, mainstream models are dynamically incom-
plete since no mechanism for out-of-equilibrium dynamics is provided. Thus,
the central problem characterizing a decentralized market economy, i.e. the
coordination problem, is left aside. On the contrary, the character of au-
tonomy in agent-based model consists in the existence of a set of behavioral
rules allowing agents to take decisions in any situation, independently from
what the others are doing and without a central Auctioneer intervenes as a
deus ex machina in determining some sort of equilibrium state. The imple-
mentation of actions is not dependent of the outcome of actions. Of course,
the final outcome generally will depend on the whole system of interactions
among the agents, implying the possibility of individual rationing in case of
coordination failures, but this is not an obstacle to the implementation of au-
tonomous decision-making. In fact, what makes this possible is that agents’
actions directly influence only other agents’ variables, and not also their own
variables. To clarify the point, let us imagine a consumer wanting to buy a
good from a shop. If the good has already been delivered, the consumer will
buy, otherwise it won’t. The outcome (purchase or not) of consumer’s ac-
tion clearly depends upon the action taken by the shop (deliver or not), but
the consumer’s very action (try to buy) does not: actions and outcomes are
separate, and this is exactly an instance of what out-of-equilibrium means
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(actions ⇒ outcome). The attribute of agents’ autonomy, therefore, makes
agent-based models the natural candidate to simulate the dynamical evolu-
tion of a decentralized, and not necessarily coordinating, market economy.
The dynamical evolution of the economic system depends on the behav-
ioral rules followed by agents. Where do behavioral rules come from? Agents
in real economies are intentional subjects, i.e. they have mental representa-
tions of the environment, have well definite objectives and act in the attempt
of achieving them on the basis of their information set and of their capabil-
ities. Behavioral rules in the real world, therefore, must be related to the
cognitive processes that guide actions. Accordingly, in this Chapter we focus
on agents’ rationality, behavioral rules and learning processes.
5.2 Full and bounded rationality
Since its first appearance in the works by Adam Smith, modern Political
Economy has basically configured as a theory aimed at understanding the
outcome of the interaction among self-interested agents operating under com-
petitive conditions. It is important to stress that the notion of rationality
embodied in this theory is simply related to a vague idea of “pursuance of
self-interest”, that is to a mere tendency towards the matching between pref-
erences and opportunities. Thus, no aspect of optimality was supposed to
characterize individual decision-making. Consequently, in giving explana-
tions of economic behaviors large place was found by psychological inquires
about human “moral sentiments”.
This early concern about psychological foundations of economic theory
started fading after the advent of Marginalism at the fall of XIX century. Fas-
cinated by the success of classical mechanics, marginalist school borrowed its
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analytical tools in the attempt of edifying a theory of a perfectly predictable
human behavior. Economics was then pushed in the direction of ever in-
creasing degrees of mathematical formalism, which eventually became the
centerpiece of economic disciplines, while any psychological content was lim-
ited to only few axioms, whose plausibility was all but undisputable. The
loose notion of rationality characterizing classical Political Economy mutated
in the so-called ’full rationality’ paradigm, which constrained the fickle and
inconsistent human being’s behavior in the straightjacket of the concept of
homo oeconomicus, a Laplacean demon provided with omniscience and in-
fallibility. Moreover, the same concept was applied with great ease not only
to human beings, but also to any other economic agent, being it a bank, a
manufacturing firm or a government.
The standard model of economic decision-making, therefore, rests on a
set of hypotheses that may be epitomized in the following three propositions:
1. agents are fully informed about the environment;
2. agents are consistent, in the sense that between two alternatives they
choose the best one (according to some criterion);
3. deciding agents encounter no limit of time and computational power.
In any model of rational choice, goals are given as a prior and are em-
bodied into a well-defined objective function (utility for consumers, profits
for firms), which allows the economic agent to always carry out consistent
choices. In addition, economic agents are supposed to choose, from all the
possible alternatives, the one entailing the achievement of the maximum of
their objective function; in a word, agents optimize. Moreover, the full ra-
tionality assumption is maintained even in the context of risky choice that is
investigated by the Subjective Expected Utility theory. To summarize, the
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full rationality perspective adopted by neoclassical economics reduces to the
following postulates:
1. preferences are well-defined;
2. information about events or probability of events is perfect;
3. agents optimize.
The well-known product of these assumptions is the picture of a suspi-
ciously smart individual. It is therefore natural to ask whether the above
claims are a good representation of human behavior when immersed in real
worlds - which by their very nature are complex systems because of multiple
interactions of many heterogeneous agents.
Since the second half of the XX century, Herbert Simon challenged the
neoclassical view of human decision making pioneering a line of research on
the psychological foundations of actual economic behavior, suggesting that
human minds are characterized by bounded rationality because they suffer
of some sort of cognitive limitation, both in the amount of available infor-
mation and in the ability of processing it in the correct way. In the wake of
Simon’s work, two strictly interdependent strands of investigation developed:
experimental economics, whose research is aimed at empirically testing neo-
classical theoretical predictions by means of laboratory experiments (from
theory to data), and behavioral economics, whose objective is to employ the
available empirical evidence about human behavior in order to work out new
and more realistic representations of economic decision-making (from data
to theory). More recent is the advent of neuroeconomics, which exploits the
modern techniques of brain scanning to derive new insights about human
economic behavior relating actions to brain activation areas.
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We have now to characterize the concept of bounded rationality in deeper
details, starting by a clarification of what it is not. In first place, bounded
rationality is not an “optimization under constraints”, and is not even an in-
ferior form of rationality: it is not a mistake or a deviation from theoretical
norms. Bounded rationality, in practice, must not be confused with the in-
telligence that may characterize irrational decision-makers. On the opposite,
it is the kind of rationality that necessarily characterizes real agents when
called to face problems in real environment. In fact, advocates of bounded
rationality focus their analysis on the procedural rationality, that is on the
very process of how agents materially make choices given their preferences
and the perceived opportunities offered by the structure of the environment,
while neoclassical theory ignores the actual implementation of the choice and
concentrates only on the prediction of the best outcome, which fully rational
agents are supposed to attain (substantial rationality). In other terms, to be
procedurally rational means to adopt a method to possibly find a satisficing
solution for a given problem (Simon, 1987), while to be substantially rational
means to know the best solution of the problem. But optimizing rational-
ity guarantees the correspondence of substantial and procedural rationality if
and only if all the consequences of alternative actions can be consistently con-
ceived in advance, at least in a probabilistic sense. In such an ideal situation,
optimizing behavior is sufficient to give a good representation of mental pro-
cesses, regardless of the actual implementation of decisions. But for complex
systems like real economies this possibility is generally ruled out, because
the dynamics produced by an interactive population gives rise to uncertainty
that can not be reduced to risk. As a consequence, in similar situations
real economic actors do not possess well-defined models of the environment
surrounding them, and the degree of rationality we can realistically ask our
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agents should decline.
In large complex economies, deductive means of reasoning are inapplica-
ble or ill-defined; instead, individuals build internal mental models to repre-
sent the world, learn from the outcomes of previous choices, and extrapolate
from the particular to the general. Simply stated, agents employ some form
of induction. Thus, in large interactive systems, individual decision pro-
cesses become unavoidably adaptive, that is adjusted in the light of realized
results, and the search for actions aimed at increasing individual perfor-
mance stops as soon as a satisficing solution has been found. Adaptation
is a backward-looking, sequential, path-dependent phenomenon and is based
on quick, resource-saving heuristics. Bounded rationality, consequently, is
the evocative term used to label decisional processes of ecologically rational
adaptation, that is processes of selective adaptation providing outcomes that
are not necessarily optimal, but which give the opportunity to survive most
of the times in a given environment.1
All in all, while the rational agent model “is about how to make good
decisions”, bounded rationality “is about trying to predict what people actu-
ally do”. Since there is only one way to be “fully rational”, while the ways of
not being fully rational are infinite, a complete theory of bounded rationality
does not exist and, consequently, many models of bounded rationality can
be generated. For instance, instead of assuming a given set of alternatives,
which the deciding agent picks from, one can postulate a process generating
the alternatives. Instead of assuming a given and known probability distri-
1Mainstream economics also recognized real agents’ cognitive limitations, but rejected
bounded rationality as irrelevant and still retained the full rationality hypothesis on the ba-
sis of Friedman’s notorious as-if argument, stating that the survival-of-the-fittest mecha-
nism would let only optimizing firms to survive at equilibrium. A simple counter-argument
to Friedman’s claims is based on the observation that in any environment individual full
rationality is not a necessary condition to survive; at most, it is only sufficient to be slightly
smarter than the others.
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bution of choice outcomes, one can introduce some mechanism allowing the
estimation of the probabilities or the deployment of some strategy to face the
uncertainty without assuming the knowledge of the probabilities. Finally, as
an alternative to the assumption that agents can maximize their utility func-
tion, one may postulate a decision strategy giving only satisfactory outcomes.
Models of bounded rationality cannot be, therefore, universal strategies to
be used as general-purpose tools, but rather they are unavoidably context-
dependent, fast and frugal heuristics. Nevertheless, some regularity exists as
the literature on experimental and behavioral economics show.
5.2.1 Empirical microfoundations of individual behav-
ior
While discussing the concept of bounded rationality we have already pointed
out how major contributions in detecting failings of neoclassical theory came
especially from cognitive psychology, behavioral and experimental economics,
and recently from neuroeconomics. Agent-based modelers can benefit from
the results of these disciplines that contribute to the development of alterna-
tive schemes for the representation of bounded rational individual decision-
making.
Cognitive psychology is principally concerned about the activities of judg-
ment and choice, assuming that at the basis of human decision-making two
different cognitive processes coexist: intuition and reasoning. While reason-
ing is a voluntary, slow, controlled, serial and effortful cognitive process, on
the opposite intuition is a fast, associative and effortless mechanism produc-
ing automatically spontaneous judgments (or thoughts) just as if they were
perceptions. The neoclassical picture describing economic decision-making
is uniquely based on reasoning, while in reality most of decisions (and the
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economic ones are not an exception) are typically based on intuitive judg-
ments, with reasoning simply relegated to the task of monitoring the quality
of judgments produced by intuition. Thus, cognitive psychology offers a
strong empirical support to the bounded rationality arguments, offering at
the same time useful bases for constructing alternative behavioral models.
One of the central assumptions for economic theory is that of well-defined
preferences, which can be considered a valid hypothesis whenever preferences
are independent of the context. But several experiments by cognitive psychol-
ogists demonstrated that often the opposite is true because of the so-called
framing effect. As we will see, framing effects are pervasive and cause prefer-
ences to be in many cases ill-defined, or dependent on the context in which
they are originated.
Intuitive judgments depend on accessibility, that is the easiness with
which particular mental contents come to mind (Higgins, 1996). Accessibil-
ity, on its turn, is a feature of human mind influenced by the framing of the
object being observed. Changes in the framing may induce the accessibility
of different intuitive judgments, which consequently trigger a different evalu-
ation of the problem. Thus, framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)
make preferences context-dependent, and constitute a violation of the ’pref-
erence invariance’ property (Arrow, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986),
which basically states that preferences are not affected by variations of irrel-
evant features of options and outcomes. How the context may imply differ-
ent preference structures by affecting accessibility will be illustrated below
through a series of examples. Each example at one time shows both a failure
of neoclassical assumptions and a possibility for alternative bounded rational
behavioral models.
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Framing effect. Many experiments have demonstrated that people actu-
ally evaluate risky decision outcomes framing the problem in terms of gains
and losses, showing that the carriers of utility are changes in wealth and not
levels of wealth as assumed by subjective expected utility theory. When a
problem of risky choice is stated (framed) in terms of changes, people show
clear risk aversion, but when the same problem is represented in terms of
levels, a weak attitude to risk-taking emerges. On the basis of the evidence
that changes are relatively more accessible than absolute values, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) proposed a model of risky choice called Prospect The-
ory. It states that individual preferences are described by a value function,
which is increasing and concave with respect to gains, decreasing and convex
with respect to losses and zero at the origin, where it also displays a kink.
Alternative theories of risky choice aimed at relaxing or removing the orig-
inal axioms of expected utility theory are the weighted utility theory (Chew
and MacCrimmon, 1979), the expected utility without the independence ax-
iom (Machina, 1982), the regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), and
rank-dependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1982, 1993).2
Reference points. Another powerful example of framing effect is given by
the case of reference-dependent evaluations in risky contexts. Human per-
ception is biologically designed to favor the accessibility of changes and dif-
ferences instead of levels (Palmer, 1999). Hence, reference-dependence means
that perception is usually based on an anchoring reference value that is used
as vantage point: the perceived attributes of a focal stimulus reflect the con-
trast between that stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimulus.
A simple example is the following one. Consider three buckets of water char-
2See also: Chew et al. (1987) and Yaari (1987).
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acterized by different temperatures: the left one contains cold water, the
middle one contains tepid water, and the right one contains hot water; con-
sider that the left hand of a person is immersed in the hot bucket and the
right hand in the cold one; after initial intense sensations of cold and heat,
these sensation wanes; when both the hands are immersed in the middle
bucket, the experience is heat in the left hand and cold in the right hand.
The violation of the rationality axiom of ’irrelevance of irrelevant alterna-
tives’ constitutes further evidence of the importance of reference points in
decision-making. There are in fact cases in which decision is a problematic
task because the options at stake differ by features that are not easily com-
parable - that is the decision cannot be taken because of a lack of reference
points. In the first step of a classic experiment conducted by Tversky, under-
graduate students are called to decide between renting room A, cheap but
far away from the university, and renting room B, expensive but close to the
university. The choice is not so obvious because the characteristics of the
rooms (cost and proximity to the university) are difficult to compare with
each other, and in fact the sample of students splits equally between A and
B, signaling an objective difficulty in deciding. In a second step, A and B
are flanked by a third option, room C. The characteristic of room C is to be
patently worse than A, because more expensive and more distant from the
university. According to neoclassical precepts the addition of C should be
irrelevant, but Tversky discovered that most of the students now prefer room
A, whose attributes are more easily comparable with those of C. Since most
of respondents find hard to opt between A and B, adding option C induces
students to implicitly restate the problem into a choice between A and C only.
Hyperbolic discounting. Another example we show, witnessing how ref-
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erence points may have a role in shaping individual preferences, is the phe-
nomenon of time-inconsistency detected in the intertemporal choice problem.
In mainstream models where agents are called to trade off costs and bene-
fits that occur at different periods, usually it is assumed that future events
are discounted by the exponential factor 1/(1 + r)t, where r is a constant
rate. Such a formulation assures preferences being always consistent along
time since same time windows exhibit same discounting factors, regardless
of their absolute position in time. However, since the first experiments by
Thaler (1981), also confirmed by later studies (e.g. Benzion et al., 1989;
Holcomb and Nelson, 1992; Pender, 1996), a hyperbolic time discounting
function, at a rate 1/(1 + kt), has proved to fit experimental data better
than the exponential model. The main property of hyperbolic discounting
is to have a discount factor r, which is decreasing in time. In fact, same
time windows show different discounting according to their absolute position
in the time horizon; for example, discounting between period t and t+1 is
larger than discounting between k+t and k+t+1 with k > 0. This char-
acteristic entails, therefore, time-inconsistency in people’s preferences since,
when future become near future (i.e. the time window approaches the mo-
ment of decision taking), its discounting becomes more and more dramatic,
producing an “immediacy effect” according to which present time is dispro-
portionately preferred. Thus, people with hyperbolic discounting have the
systematic tendency to change their mind as the time goes by.
Mental accounting. The next example of framing effect (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) constitutes a violation of the neoclassical prediction ac-
cording to which wealth is ’fungible’, a property making irrelevant the source
of the wealth. In the experiment a group of consumers had to suppose of
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having purchased in advance the tickets for a theater show at the price of 10
$, later discovering, at the time of the show, to have lost them. A second
group of consumers, instead, had to imagine of losing a 10 $ bill while going
to the theater to buy the tickets. Then, the components of both groups were
asked to declare whether they would have attended anyway the show. Ac-
cording to the full-rationality theory, the two groups should have given the
same answer, since losing a 10 $ worth ticket is equivalent to losing a 10 $
bill because the effect on the budget constraint is equivalent. Nonetheless,
almost all the people from the group supposing the loss of the ticket replied
that they would have not gone to the show, while the 88 % from the other
group announced that they would have attended the show in spite of the loss
of the 10 $ bill. The authors explained such result introducing the concept of
“mental accounting”, according to which people are incline to organize their
expenditures in mental categories such as ’food’, ’entertainment’ or ’general
expenses’. For the two groups the economic value of the loss (10 $) is the
same, but its framing is different. In fact, it is likely that those people losing
the tickets behave as if they debit the loss into the mental count ’entertain-
ment’, while the others to the count ’general expenses’. Hence, for the first
group the loss of the ticket makes the cost of the show to rise from 10 to
20 $, a cost which many respondents find excessive, while for the others it
remains to 10 $.
Risk attitude. A famous instance of framing effects is given by the ’Asian
disease problem’, which offers a striking example of violation of the prefer-
ence invariance property assumed by neoclassical economics. The problem is
stated as follows (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981):
“Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an un-
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usual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved;
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?”
If the problem is presented in this version, most of respondents are in
favor of program A, indicating risk aversion. The same dilemma is then
submitted to another sample of respondents in an alternative but logically
equivalent form:
“If Program A’ is adopted, 400 people will die;
If Program B’ is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody
will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.”
A neat majority of respondents now prefers program B’, showing risk-
proclivity. Although the two versions of the problem bear exactly the same
informative content (A=A’ and B=B’), they evoke different ideas and emo-
tions and induce opposite choices. The reason resides in the difference of
framing that causes the problem to allow for a dissimilar accessibility of
judgments in respondents’ mind. In fact, since certain options are generally
over-weighted because their outcome is easier to evaluate, program A will be
disproportionately attractive and preferred to program B because it makes
easily accessible the positive image of saving 200 people for sure. Besides,
for the same reason of over-weighting of certain outcomes, program B’ is
preferred because program A’ calls to mind the negative image of a condem-
nation to sure death for 400 people; as a consequence, respondents accept
the gamble embodied in program B’ in the hope of avoiding a grim fate to
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400 people. According to the full-rationality paradigm, if A is preferred to
B, then A’ must be also preferred to B’. But, as experimentally proved, this
is not the case. Therefore, even though far from being a proof of irrationality
of people, this example shows how preferences may even be reversed by the
particular accessibility of sentiments and intuitions triggered by the framing
of the context.
5.2.2 Agents’ behavior and heuristics
Even when preferences are well-defined, not always people show the kind
of rationality that is supposed by neoclassical economics to characterize hu-
man behavior. This is true in at least two meanings. As already stated,
in complex environments adaptive behaviors based on “rule of thumbs”, or
heuristics, become the standard. As is logical, this is true in the judgment
process too. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) in fact argue that people rely
on a limited number of heuristic methods to overcome the operational com-
plexity of tasks such as assessing probabilities and deducing environmental
features. But there is also another difficulty that weakens the descriptive
ability of the full-rationality paradigm: people display the tendency to er-
roneously interpret the facts that are relevant to a problem of choice, and
often their errors are systematic. Generally, heuristics are efficient because
they represent quick and parsimonious decisional rules that help to survive
in every-day life and, in this sense, they are ecologically rational. But when
used in more complex problems or when the available decisional time is mini-
mal, they are often misleading and incorrect. Kahneman and Tversky (1974)
identify some practical rules used in judgment:
• The first one is “availability”. In general people estimate the frequency
of an event on the basis of the ease with which analogous events are
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remembered. Experiments show that people are inclined to deem the
cases of killings more frequent than the cases of suicide not because
killings actually are, but because they strike people’s mind much more.
Consequently, killings are more available to memory.
• The second heuristic is “representativeness”, which works when people
are called to estimate conditional probabilities. The task of estimating
P (sampleA ∈ classB) is carried out simply on how well the sample
represents the class, without considering how large the class is. Suppose
to evaluate whether a shy man is a seller or a librarian. Since librarians
are shy more often than sellers, one is more inclined to say that the shy
man is a librarian. But this evaluation is likely to be incorrect because
it does not consider that in the population there are many more sellers
than librarians. The heuristic of representativeness is then at the root
of the so-called base rate fallacy3.
• The third heuristic is “anchoring”, a widespread strategy used in eval-
uating a given situation which consists in choosing an initial reference
point and then in adjusting the evaluation as new information becomes
available. The principal drawbacks of anchoring are that the reference
point may be totally independent from the object of evaluation, or that
the final judgment tends to be too much closely related to it.4
Furthermore, some contributions (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al.,
2001; Slovic et al., 2002) highlight the role of emotions in shaping agents’
behavior and thus economic choices. For instance, Slovic et al. (2002) intro-
duce “affect heuristics” to describe how the decisional process is affected by
3This mistake simply amounts to confound conditional with marginal probabilities.
4The most common biases produced by these heuristic of judgments are non-regressive
prediction, neglect of base-rate information, overconfidence and overestimates of the fre-
quency of events that are easy to recall.
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the emotions associated with objects or the mental images of those objects.
The influence of particular feelings/affective reactions or moods are typically
experienced at the unconscious level and may shape agents’ behavior with-
out them are aware of it. Through repeated interactions, agents may learn
how to automatically react to stimuli and can develop a set of automated
(and implicit) actions, thus resulting in fast decisions (as opposed to more
elaborated and slow decisions based on logical reasoning).
In order to develop a consistent set of behavioral rules followed by a
bounded rational agent, who try to make inferences from the real world un-
der constraints of limited time, limited knowledge, and limited computational
capabilities, it is useful to discuss the notion and the content of a specific vi-
sion of bounded rationality proposed by Gigerenzer et al. (1999), the adaptive
toolbox, which collects a set of heuristics based on three premises (Gigerenzer
and Selten, 2001b):
• Psychological plausibility. The aim is to develop a model of the actual
behavior of humans (or animals) based on their cognitive, emotional,
and behavioral characteristics.
• Domain specific. The toolbox provides a collection of heuristics that
are specialized rather than general (as in the case of Expected Utility
Theory).
• Ecological rationality. The success of heuristics is based on adaptation
to the structure of the environment (both physical and social).
Heuristics are composed of building blocks with three main functions: search
a direction, stop search, and make a decision. In more details, we have the
following rules whose combinations give rise to heuristics:
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• Search rules. Searching information or alternatives is modeled as an
adaptive procedure that is repeated until it is stopped.
• Stopping rules. They terminate searching procedures whenever a sat-
isfactory condition is reached, preventing search rules from wasting
limited resources.
• Decision rules. Once search is stopped and a certain amount of in-
formation has been gathered, a simple decision rule is applied. It may
include the adoption of social norms, cultural habits or well-established
conventions.
For example, think about a population of firms and workers that interact
in a spatial labor market:
• Consider that the worker j has a reservation wage wj and visits firms
from the nearest to more distant firms; this is a search rule.
• The agent visits a certain number of firms in her neighborhood until
the distance is not larger than 100 Km; this is a stopping rule.
• Based on previous rules, the worker j has a list of firms, each offering
a given wage; now, two cases can be considered in the decision rule:
1. there is at list one firm for which the offered wage is higher than
the reservation wage plus transport costs (tc); then, the worker
j decides to accept the wage wi paid by the firm i for which the
difference wi− (wj + tc) is the highest in the list of observed firms;
2. in the other case, the worker j prefers to be unemployed, given
that the offered wage by firms does not cover the reservation wage
augmented by the transport costs.
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The combination of the three rules – search, stopping and decision rules
– gives rise to a heuristics that guides the behavior of an agent who wants
to be employed by a firm in her neighborhood, gaining a wage that is above
the reservation wage and also cover the transport costs.
5.3 Learning
In general, learning is the object of study by different disciplines such as
psychology and pedagogy but, in recent years, it is more and more capturing
the attention of economists. For our scopes, it is necessary to understand
when learning gains a prominent role for economic theory, what are the
objects of learning and how it can be embodied in economic models.
As already stated, once the hypothesis of perfect information is removed,
some sort of bounded rationality becomes the normal status and, conse-
quently, artificial agents have to be modeled with some sort of limitation
in their cognitive and decisional capabilities. Moreover, agents may be al-
lowed to change their attitude and their knowledge through some learning
mechanism.
As a consequence of limited information, the typical situations where
learning may occur are those in which:
• agents have a limited or even a wrong comprehension of their environ-
ment;
• they master only a subset of all the actions that can be conceived in
order to face a given situation;
• they have an imprecise understanding of their own goals and prefer-
ences.
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From this categorization it immediately follows how theoretical models may
tackle the issue of learning formalization. Their scope of investigation in-
volves the exploration of world state-spaces modeling the learning process at
different levels of abstraction. We can classify the objects of learning in the
following order:
1. models of the world : learning is modeled as a search for more satisfac-
tory representations of the functional structure of the environment in
which the agent is operating;
2. parameters within a given model : in this narrower case, it is assumed
that the model of the world is given in its functional structure, and that
learning amounts to an inferential process on the true value of some
unknown parameter, as in Bayesian or statistical learning;
3. actions : learning assumes a constant or even irrelevant representation
of the world, and amounts to choose from a list of different possible ac-
tions those conveying more satisfaction, as in simple stimulus-response
models of learning;
4. realized outcomes : the process of learning is modeled in a reduced form
being just represented as a dynamic process in the space of realized out-
comes (as in models of economic growth with technological progress).
The order of classification reflects different degrees of abstraction in the way
of modeling the learning process. Instance (1) is the deepest representation
of learning since it deals with the very agent’s cognitive process. Of course
it may imply the other three cases, because learning in the space of world
representations involves also the possibility of parameter estimates or the
choice of actions. Finally, instance (4) is the most abstract representation of
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learning since it is assumed that the problem of modeling the actual cognitive
processes is already solved from the start, and learning is simply represented
in a reduced form.
Given the underlying object of learning, we can trace another distinction
of learning processes according to the restrictions imposed on the domain in
which learning dynamics can occur. A closed learning process takes place
whenever the assumption of a ’Small World’ is retained, that is when agents
are supposed to hold in mind from the start a finite and complete list of
all the things that are possible objects of learning. This is the case of an
adaptive learning, which typically finds its representations in evolutionary
games. Conversely, more realistic open-ended learning dynamics become the
norm in truly evolutionary environments, where not only adaptation but also
discovery and persistent emergence of novelties are involved.
So far we have shown when learning becomes a relevant issue for eco-
nomic theory and what its manifestations are. Hence, it is now necessary to
understand how learning could be actually implemented in economic mod-
els. In the literature on agent-based models several kinds of representation
of human learning process have been employed. Most of these learning cri-
teria have been developed as optimization tools in uncertain environments,
where the maximization of very rugged objective functions could not be at-
tained through ordinary differential calculus. However, it must be empha-
sized that the relationship between learning theory and agent-based modeling
is twofold:
• from one side, an agent-based model can be used as a computational
laboratory in order to test the effectiveness and the implications of
learning rules;
• on the other side, learning mechanisms can be implemented in agent-
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based models as agents’ behavioral rules in order to increase their de-
gree of realism.
The way in which agents learn depends on the amount of information
and on their ability to process it. Therefore, the choice for the most suit-
able representation of their forma mentis has to be based on environmental
and agents’ characteristics. If the model contemplates a situation of perfect
information, then nothing hosts that agents can be conveniently supposed
to be ’optimizers’; on the contrary, if the environment is a poor supplier of
information and agents are unsophisticated, the best way to represent their
learning behavior will be necessarily simple and adaptive. As recommended
by behavioral and experimental economics, in order to make a good choice
it is fundamental to take into account the results emerging from laboratory
experiments with human beings and minding, in particular, the discrepancies
between them and the predictions of mainstream economic theory.
Since agents can learn individually on the basis of their own past history
only, or they might be involved in some social learning process occurring
when interaction is at work, in what follows two kinds of individual learning
will be reviewed, both applicable in agent-based models: statistical learn-
ing, recently developed in the bosom of mainstream economics, and fitness
learning, whose first appearance can be traced back to 1920s Skinnerian psy-
chology. Afterwards, a section is devoted to a brief sketch of social learning.
Finally, a comparison between individual and social learning is provided.
5.3.1 Individual learning 1: statistical learning
The statistical learning literature suggests to incorporate a learning behav-
ior in expectation formation in order to limit the hyper-rational intelligence
of agents (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). The starting point is to assume
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bounded rationally agents allowed to learn the parameters of the model by
acting as econometricians who run regressions to improve their knowledge
when called to forecast unknown variables. In this way the forecasting rule
must be explicitly expressed as a dynamical econometric model representing
the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) of the forecast variables. Recalling the
above categorization of learning, this is precisely an example belonging to
the second type. The second step is to allow adaptation of expectations as
soon as new data become available to agents. In formal terms, the prediction
pet is supposed to be a function of a data set Xt
pet = Φ(Xt, θt−1),
where function Φ(·) is the PLM and θt−1 is a vector of previously estimated
unknown parameters. Finally, the specification of an updating rule for the
estimates θt−1 – like, for instance, recursive least squares – completes the
adaptive forecasting apparatus. At least in simple cases of closed learning
dynamics, statistical learning leads models to converge to some Rational
Expectations solution, thus providing a sort of asymptotical justification to
rational expectations. Besides, it can help in solving the problem of multi-
plicity of equilibria. For example, in the cobweb context, if agents estimate
prices by computing the sample mean from past values, it is possible to show
that learning expectations will converge over time to their RE counterparts.
Obviously, the statistical learning approach raises several questions. Even
if we affirm that agents are in origin bounded rational, we must admit that
they can learn from their own mistakes, possibly behaving as a rational agent
at the end of a learning process. But we must also note that an easy criticism
to these learning procedures is that they usually require that the agents own
the high skills of an econometrician. Another question is the following: are
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we sure that learning procedures always promote convergence to the same
equilibrium of the perfect foresight assumption? Departing from the case of
simple linear systems, the answer is often negative as, for example, showed
Bullard (1994). He considers a quite simple and standard two periods OLG
model and shows how even the assumption that the agents are able to use a
least square regression to estimate an unknown value of a parameter; such an
assumption is not enough to always ensure convergence to the perfect fore-
sight equilibrium. He calls this kind of learning dynamics, which is different
from the convergence to the rational steady state, as Learning Equilibria, be-
cause they are exclusively generated by the adopted learning mechanism. In
other words, what Bullard shows is the possibility of self-fulfilling mistakes.
Learning equilibria can also emerge as consequences of further relaxing
the degree of rationality. For example, once it is assumed that agents behave
as econometricians, they may well face the same kinds of problems in choos-
ing the most appropriate specification of their statistical representation of
the “real” world, with the consequence that this model may be wrong. This
is an instance of learning of the first type, where agents need to learn the
model of the world. One major problem in choosing the model is the proper
consideration of all the variables that are actually relevant to the process
being forecast: agents start by using a particular conditional mean for the
predicted variables, and can change it if it is rejected by data, but nothing
makes it sure the correctness of the variable choice. This depends on the ini-
tial conditions of the forecasting procedure: when agents start predicting a
process with an over-parameterized model that includes more variables than
necessary, they can learn over time to get rid of the irrelevant ones. But
if, on the contrary, they are estimating the conditional mean of the process
employing a model which disregards some of its relevant variables, agents
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are in general not able to detect the misspecification of the model because
the regression residuals are orthogonal to the variables included in their in-
formative set, and they might induce the model to converge towards what
is called restricted perception equilibrium (RPE). In econometric jargon this
is a problem of endogeneity, which can be also determined by other forms
of model misspecification. A particular type of RPE is one that character-
izes a situation in which a non-linear process underling the dynamics of the
economy is predicted by means of a linear model. When the mean and the
correlations in the data generated by the true non-linear process coincide
with those predicted by the linear model, the equilibrium is reached.
5.3.2 Individual learning 2: fitness learning
Within the fitness learning approach, two broad classes of learning proce-
dures can be identified (Duffy, 2006): reinforcement models and evolutionary
algorithms.
Reinforcement models
Rooted in Skinnerian behaviorist psychology and first appeared in math-
ematical psychology studies, reinforcement, or stimulus-response, learning
finds its rationale in the so-called Thorndike’s ’law of effect’, which basically
states that actions that in the past have proven to be relatively more (less)
successful have higher (lower) probabilities to be played again in subsequent
periods. An agent that employs reinforcement learning is therefore called to
experiment how much utility he can gain from the use of different possible
actions, attaching to each of them a probability of reutilization that increases
with the acquired payoff. As a by-product, actions that are not sufficiently
experimented from the beginning are then less likely to be played over time.
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An important feature of reinforcement learning is that it requires from agents
very low levels of rationality, since no information about other agents’ be-
havior or environmental characteristics is demanded: only knowledge of a set
of actions and of individual past history is necessary. From an optimization
viewpoint, reinforcement learning is therefore able to attain local optima if
the environment is stable, since iterated experimentation correctly reveals
actions’ payoffs.
One of the first applications of reinforcement learning procedures to the
modeling of economic behavior is Arthur (1991). In this model, agents are
supposed to be endowed with a fixed set of possible actions. To each action i
at time t a “strength” sit, or fitness, or propensity, is assigned; this strength
is the cumulated of all past payoffs earned by action i and determines the





Ct is a normalization factor tuning the speed of learning. Whenever action
i brings a relatively higher payoff, its probability of reuse increases through
the strength sit; therefore, this payoff-based increase of probabilities is inter-
preted as if the agent were understanding the goodness of action i.
Numerous variants of reinforcement learning procedures have been pro-
posed and applied in order to match different experimental data. For in-
stance, Roth and Ever (1995) borrow from Arthur the general apparatus





where j denotes all the actions different from i. Other versions instead employ
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More sophisticated approaches include the possibility for agents to learn
actions’ payoffs by observing other agents’ behavior as well, or to use more
advanced inductive techniques as Q-learning,5 which is closely related to dy-
namic programming.
The work by Brock and Hommes (1997) represents a cross point for
bounded rationality, expectations and reinforcement learning, since it is one
of the first examples of modeling heterogeneous expectations as the endoge-
nous outcome of a decision problem in which agents, in a cobweb context,
have to choose a predictor, i.e. a function of past history, from a set of al-
ternatives on the basis of costs and benefits.
Reinforcement learning in the brain
Models from computer science have demonstrated to be useful in modeling
how biological decision making systems learn to assign values to actions. Re-
inforcement learning theory has also been informed by recent mechanistic
approaches in cognitive neuroscience, which searches for a formal model of
how organisms acquire complex behaviors by learning to obtain rewards and
to avoid punishments (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Glimcher et al., 2009;
Rangel et al., 2008; Sutton and Barto, 1998). In behavioral and cognitive
neuroscience, reinforcement learning has been employed as a theory of mo-
5See Section 5.3.2.
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tivated action, i.e. actions resulting from computation of ’value’, and also a
model how the brain ’decides’ what actions to take. In contrast to economic
theories assuming the existence of a unitary system for estimating the value
of alternative actions, models of reinforcement learning posit the existence of
three competing systems for action control. Modern versions of reinforcement
learning specify how different action control systems, which are embodied in
contrasting neural networks and functions, can be independently or jointly
activated to control action (see Vlaev and Dolan, 2015).
Researchers have identified three control systems for action: a goal-directed
(or “model-based”) controller, a habitual (or “model-free”) controller, an in-
nate (or “Pavlovian”) controller. The key insights is that in contrast to a
unitary-utility approach, the utility of competing actions need not be inte-
grated across systems to form a unitary estimate prior to the initiation of
action: rather each system can itself initiate action.
Goal-directed actions require the most complex information processing,
because they are based on an explicit model of the structure of the environ-
ment, which requires a representation of the contingency between the action
and the outcome(s) and a representation of the value of each outcome. Goal-
directed actions require three core computational processes:
• valuation (costs and benefits) of outcomes (outcome value),
• probabilistic estimation of the contingency between the action and the
outcome (action-outcome contingency learning), and
• planning which incorporates those calculations and engages in model-
ing and searching through decision trees containing sequences of state-
action-outcomes in order to calculate the optimal sequence of actions
(i.e., involves representing explicit models of the world or the organ-
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ism).
Therefore, goal-directed action control learns the transition structure of the
environment separately from the outcome values (the latter makes goal-
directed actions sensitive to the current motivational state of the organism).
There are different of ways a model-based system could operate. For example,
Daw et al. (2005) offer a possible implementation. In such models, learning
is modeled as a Markov decision processes, in which experience is structured
as a set of trials, with a set of end or terminal states where a decision episode
can end. This process is also represented as a decision tree system. Usually,
outcomes (rewards) are delivered only in terminal states. Choice in such tree
systems depends on scalar values that represent predictions of the future
utility of executing a particular action at a given state. Thus, for example, if
the outcome is devalued, the tree system can use that information to guide
action at distal states, because action values are derived by considering what
future states would result. Note that the agent may start without knowing
the exact marking process, and this process can also change over time; which
is why those models are known as ’reinforcement learning’ i.e. the agent has
to learn the process and find the optimal course of action. Therefore, key
difference between this computational approach and the standard Expected
Utility is that the former acknowledges that fully optimal choice in unknown
Markov decision process is computationally intractable; and therefore may
rely on approximations.
In computational terms, according to Daw et al. (2005), a Markov decision
process comprises sets S of states and A of actions, a ’transition function’
T (s, a, s′) ≡ P (s(t+1) = s′|s(t) = s, a(t) = a) specifying the probability that
state s’ will follow state s given action a, and a ’reward function’ R(s) ≡
P (r(t) = x units | s(t) = s) specifying the probability that reward is received
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in terminal state s. The state-action value function Q(s, a) is the expected
probability that reward will be received, given that the agent takes action a in
state s and chooses optimally thereafter. This process is formally represented
with a recursive function:
Q(s, a) ≡
R(s) s is terminal(a = )∑
s′ T (s, a, s
′) ·maxa′ [Q(s′, a′)] otherwise
Habitual actions are stimulus-response associations learned through re-
peated practice and rewards in a stable environment. Habits are instrumental
responses based on adaptive state-action contingencies or associations (also
known as operant conditioning), thus avoiding the need to compute the ex-
pected outcomes. Habitual model-free learning is most often described with
temporal difference equations. Basically, the habitual system needs to solve
two problems (e.g., see Rangel et al., 2008). First, given a policy π (it spec-
ifies the action that the animal takes in every state), it needs to compute
the value of taking every action a in every state s. This is given by a model
known as Q-learning:
Qπ = E[rt+ γrt+1 + γ
2rt+2 + γ
3rt+3 . . . |st = s, at = a, at+1 = π(st+1, . . .)]
where rt+k denotes the reward that is received at time t + k and γ > 0
is the discount rate (this equation can also be written in a recursive form of
course). In order to learn Qπ(s, a), the habitual system uses Q̂(s, a) as an
estimator of Qπ(s, a). To make sure that Q̂(s, a) becomes a good estimate of
the value function, the models define a prediction error:
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δt = rt + γ ·maxa′ [Q̂(st + 1, a′)]− [Q̂(st, at)]
that measures how close the estimate is to satisfying the equation for
Qπ(s, a) above. If δt > 0 the value of the action is overestimated; if δt < 0
the value is underestimated. One can then use the prediction error to update
the estimates of the action values as follows:
Q̂(st, at)← ˆQ(st, at) + ηδt
where η is a number between 0 and 1 that determines the learning rate/speed.
This model guarantees that, under specific technical conditions, the esti-
mated action values converge to the values produced by the optimal action
policy (i.e., the agent can learn the optimal choice policy by following the
algorithm and selecting the actions with the largest values).
It is important to note that similarly to the tree system, habitual con-
trol depends on scalar values (predictions of the future utility of a particular
choice/action at a particular state); but contrary to the tree system, if an
outcome is devalued, the habit system’ values are insensitive to such changes
because the values are stored scalars. In this sense, habitual learning is
model-free, because the agents do not need to know the transition function
or the reward function. Habit learning explains various behavioral condition-
ing phenomena (see Dolan and Dayan, 2013), such as blocking, overshadow-
ing, inhibitory conditioning, and also disorders of compulsivity (Voon et al.,
2015). The beauty of those models is their computational simplicity, given
that the agent does not need to keep track of long sequences of rewards to
learn the value of actions.
Innate actions are evolutionarily appropriate responses to specific prede-
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termined stimuli, although associative learning allows organisms to deploy
them in response to other stimuli – such behaviors are also known as un-
conditioned and conditioned Pavlovian responses respectively (Mackintosh,
1983). Thus, Pavlovian learning of state-outcome contingencies allows or-
ganisms to learn the predictive value of a state/cue, which reflects the sum
of rewards and punishments expected to occur from it (see Seymour and
Dolan, 2008). Such value expectancies can instigate two fundamental types
of evolved reactions:
• approach (designed to decrease the distance between the organism and
a feature of the environment using responses such as locomotion, grab-
bing, consumption, fighting, mental approach/focusing), and
• avoidance (responses aim to increase the distance by moving away,
flight, freeze, mental avoidance).
Note that even though some of those specific actions can be employed in
goal-directed behaviors (e.g. animal defending a held resources may employ
cost-benefit planning), the signature of innate actions is their automaticity
regardless of whether or not they lead to immediate reward in the given situ-
ation. Such innate actions can underpin a surprisingly wide range of human
behaviors that have important consequences, such as overeating, addiction,
obsessive-compulsive behaviors, and opting for immediate smaller rewards at
the expense of delayed larger rewards (see Dayan et al. (2006)).
Formally, the value of Pavlovian action (approach or avoidance) is the
value of the state v(t), i.e. it requires learning of the Pavlovian contingency,
the predictive value of the state i.e. the mean reward, learned as v(0) = 0,
and
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v(t+ 1) = v(t) + η(r(t)− v(t))
where r(t) is the reward delivered on trial t, and η is a learning rate. This
is an instance of the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) rule, which is also found in
temporal difference learning (Sutton, 1988). Note that Pavlovian also does
not really refer to a way of doing computations as much as the flexibility
permitted in learned relationships between stimulus, action, and outcome
(action is often innately determined) (see Dayan and Berridge, 2014, for a
model/tree-based version of Pavlovian values).
There is also emerging evidence about the neural interactions between
habits and goal-directed control (Dayan et al., 2006). Habits require ex-
tensive experience including schedules of reinforcement involving single ac-
tions and single outcomes, which implies that behavior must be initially
goal-directed and gradually becomes habitual over the course of experience.
This view is supported by explicit evidence for the transfer from dorsome-
dial to dorsolateral over the course of training (see Dolan and Dayan, 2013,
for review). This is further supported by evidence that instrumental learn-
ing tasks always involve model-based and model-free processes (Collins and
Frank, 2012).
In contrast to a unitary-utility approach, the utility of competing actions
need not be integrated across systems to form a unitary estimate prior to
the initiation of action: rather each system can itself initiate action. A good
demonstration of this is that innate and instrumental systems can come into
conflict, and in animals there is a limitation to the extent that evolution-
arily incongruent actions can be reinforced. For example it is not possible
to fully condition pigeons instrumentally to withhold a key peck in order to
gain access to a visible food reward: they continue to peck the key, being
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unable to withhold the innate pecking response despite the fact that it is
never reinforced (Williams and Williams, 1969). By contrast, although the
three systems are theoretically capable of producing action independently
and according to their own criteria, they are not mutually exclusive, for ex-
ample where Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning are congruent there is
evidence that appetitive conditioned stimuli strengthen instrumental behav-
ior, an effect known as Pavlovian Instrumental Transfer (Talmi et al., 2008;
Dickinson and Balleine, 2002).
The interaction between the three-systems adds considerable explanatory
power over and above a unitary decision process, accounting for a greater ar-
ray of real-world choice phenomena (Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Story et al.,
2014; Vlaev and Dolan, 2015). The three-system approach is therefore ca-
pable of uniting the interpretation of a variety of additional effects with
relevance to economic choice.
Less common than reinforcement learning are the belief-based learning
algorithms. The major difference is that in the latter case agents recognize
they are engaging in a game with other players. Actions are then a best
response to their beliefs, which must be updated according to past histories.
The need of considering other players’ data makes belief-based models more
demanding as far as agents’ memory is concerned, and this may explains why
they are less frequently used in agent-based models, where huge collections
of data are usually generated.
In general, both reinforcement and belief-based learning models have




A shift of perspective, from the individual to the collective, is the charac-
teristic of the second class of learning procedures. Inspired by biological
principles, they are aimed at discovering the process of diffusion of a set of
strategies inside a population of agents. Therefore, evolutionary algorithms
are best suited to model the collective behavior of a population of agents
than individual behaviors and, in fact, the most conspicuous shortcoming is
their difficult interpretation.
Widely used in game-theoretic literature, the simplest class of evolution-
ary algorithms is that of replicator dynamics. The focus is not on how an
individual makes practice with a fixed set of strategies, but on how their
use spreads across the population. The idea informing replicator dynamics
is basically the same behind reinforcement learning: strategies whose fitness
is above average see their proportion in the population increase according to
some recursive updating rule. As an example, consider the following differ-
ential equation:




where xi is the fraction of type i in the population (the elements of the
vector x sum to unity), x = (x1, . . . , xn) is the vector containing the distri-
bution of the different types that composes the population, fi(x) provides
the fitness of type i, and φ(x) is the average fitness of the population (given
by the weighted average of the n types’ fitness).
Originally developed by Holland (1975) as optimization stochastic tools,
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genetic algorithms have become more and more popular in modeling hu-
man behavior in multi-agent systems after their implementation by Sargent
(1993). In spite of a great variety of algorithms, a typical structure can be
identified:
• the objective function, whose optima have to be searched by the genetic
algorithm, must be specified, together with the parameters and their
admissible values;
• the possible parameter vectors are defined as strings of length L: thus,
each element of the string represents a particular value for a parame-
ter. Since in principle the number of possible strings could be infinite,
generally researchers work with a finite N -sized population of strings;
• the performance of each of the N strings of length L is evaluated using
the objective function;
• finally, mimicking biological processes, N new strings are generated
from the old ones until some criterion is satisfied.
The final process of generation is the characterizing element of genetic
algorithms and needs some clarification.
• First, imitating the Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest, a sample of N
strings is randomly drawn from the initial population, with the only
condition that its average performance is above the average perfor-
mance of the population.
• Second, pairs of strings are randomly picked from the sample, which
then undergo two operations, typical of DNA:
– crossover, which cuts and recombines two strings in order to get
two new strings,
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– and mutation, which randomly changes the value of some element
of the strings in order to add new information.
• Finally, the recombined and mutated new N strings are then evaluated
using the objective function.
Genetic algorithms, as well as their close relative genetic programming
(Koza, 1992), are affected by a general ambiguity of interpretation. For ex-
ample, the N individual strings may be thought as representing the actions of
N interacting individual agents. Alternatively, one can imagine a single agent
experimenting different possible decisions that are represented by the strings.
Another typology of evolutionary algorithms is given by the classifier
systems (Holland, 1986). At half way between reinforcement learning mech-
anisms and genetic algorithms, classifier systems are best interpreted as mod-
els of individual learning. Their basic structure consists of four parts (Duffy,
2006):
1. a set of if-then decision rules (the classifiers);
2. an accounting system devoted to assessing the strength of classifiers;
3. an auction-based system determines which classifiers are to be used;
4. a genetic algorithm which is used to introduce new classifiers.
For some examples on genetic algorithms and classifier systems (see Booker
et al., 1989).
5.3.3 Social learning
By introducing genetic algorithms, we have already noticed their ambiguous
interpretation, as they can be also thought as a whole population trying
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to collectively learn some optimal behavior, rather than as an individual’s
learning process.
In this Section we deal with collective, or social, learning from the stand-
point of the individual agent: we mean that social learning is intended as
the process through which single agents elicit information from the others,
determining the spreading of private information to the whole population.
Within this context, social learning requires a particular form of interaction
among agents (see next Chapter): observation. The immediate consequence
of observing others’ behavior is a process of information transmission among
individuals (observational learning). This kind of interaction usually takes
place in a network structure, where agents directly interact with each other;
in other cases it is an average behavior or information to be observed (mean-
field type interaction).
Observational learning can take many forms:
• The strongest, but also the least realistic, especially in a competitive
market environment, is that of directly observing others’ private infor-
mation: as an example, a firm may come to knowledge of the prof-
itability of a new technology from its competitors, if they know.
• More plausible than this is the observation of the signals received by
others : in the same example, a firm may observe realized profits of
those competitors that have adopted the new technology.
• Finally, the simplest and most likely form of observation is the mere
watching of the actions undertaken by others : if competitors are adopt-
ing the new technology, the firm may deduce that it is convenient to
do so.
Observation of actions can logically lead to imitation, or to its oppo-
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site: contrarianism). When agents face “strong” or Knightian uncertainty,
in the sense that risks related to different scenarios cannot be calculated,
they tend to conform to the opinion of the “rest of the world”, according
to the presumption that it is better informed; in this way, the behavior of
a society of individuals, each of which trying to imitate others, leads to
a sort of “conventional” view (Keynes, 1937).6 Though imitative behavior
shapes individuals’ decisions in many situations, this does not exclude that
agents can follow a contrarian (or anti-coordination behavior) resulting in
more profitable actions. Indeed, we should consider that contrariety is per-
vasive in human experience and that, as stressed long ago by Niels Bohr,
contraria sunt complementa, i.e. contraries are complement (Kelso and En-
gstrom, 2006). Therefore, while some forces may act to coordinate actions,
anti-coordination behaviour may also arise and influence collective dynam-
ics. Moreover, while imitation leads to homogeneity, the presence of both
imitation and contrarianism preserves the heterogeneity of agents’ behavior.
Far from being an irrational individual attitude, imitation naturally emerges
under strong uncertainty. In the context of limited information and bounded
rationality, imitation can be interpreted as an ecologically rational rule-of-
thumb for saving time and costs in decision-making. In spite of this, imitation
can give rise to herding, an inefficient collective behavior where the rate of
social learning is generally low. The most extreme case of herding is given by
the so-called informational cascade, a pathological process of blind imitation
where no one is learning anymore. Herding and informational cascade have
often been proposed as explanations for the emergence of irrational specula-
tive bubbles in financial markets (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992;
6Recent advances in neuroscience have highlighted the neural basis of imitation
through the discovery of “mirror neurons” in monkeys (Rizzolatti et al., 1988) and in
humans (Rizzolatti et al., 1996).
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Welch, 2000).
In contexts where uncertainty can be reduced to risk, as in a game the-
oretic framework, the rational learning of an unknown state of nature is
generally based upon a Bayesian updating of beliefs. In contexts of true un-
certainty, as in agent-based models, observation itself becomes an individual
choice: agents must be endowed with rules for deciding who to observe and
how to exploit the observed information. As an example, the agents may
observe a subset of the population and then imitate the behavior of the one
attaining the best relative performance (imitate-the-best). Imitation can be,
therefore, not only a consequence of observational social learning, but also a
very deliberate activity of the agents within their behavioral strategy.
5.3.4 Individual vs. social learning
Consider the following example of a standard Cournot oligopoly game (Vriend,
2000). There are n firms producing the same homogeneous goods and com-
peting in the same market. The only decision variable for each firm i is
the quantity qi to be produced. Production takes place simultaneously for
all the firms and, once firms sell the output in the market, in the aggre-
gate Q1 =
∑
i qi, the price P is determined based on the (inverse) demand
P (Q) = a+ bQc, where a, b, and c are positive parameters. Assume that the
production costs are such that there are negative fixed costs K, whereas the
marginal costs are k. We can imagine that firms happen to have found a well
where water emerges at no cost, but each bottle costs k, and each firm gets
a lump-sum subsidy from the local town council if it operates a well. Given
these assumptions, each firm might be willing to produce any quantity at a
price greater or equal to k. A firm wants to produce a level of output that
maximizes its profit. If the firm does not know the level of optimal output,
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it can try to learn a level of output which is ’good’. As suggested by Vriend
(2000), we can employ a genetic algorithm in two ways:
• social or population learning : the genetic algorithm is a rule that char-
acterizes the population of firms which look around, tend to imitate,
and re-combine ideas of other firms that appeared to be successful;
the more successful these rules were, the more likely they are selected
for the process of imitation and re-combination, where the measure of
success is given by the profits associated to each rule;
• individual learning : instead of being characterized by a single output
rule, each firm now has a set of rules in mind, where each rule is again
modeled as a string, with a fitness measure of its strengths or success
(the profits generated by that rule when it was activated) attached.
Each period only one of these rules is used to determine the output
level actually supplied to the market; the rules being more successful
in the recent previous periods are more likely to be chosen; this is
also known as a Classifier System (as already seen above). Therefore,
instead of looking how well competitors with different rules were doing,
a firm now checks how well it had been doing in the past by using these
rules itself.
As for the results of the computational exercise proposed by Vriend (2000),
social learning quickly converges to a higher and less volatile level of output,
while individual learning leads to lower and more volatile output. Due to
a “spite effect”, the population of firms tends to converge to the Walrasian
output (that emerging for a “very large” n). Under social learning, in fact,
given that if the output is below the Walrasian level it happens that the rules
of firms producing at the higher output levels are selected to be reproduced,
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while the rules of firms producing at the lower output levels are selected
when output is above the Walrasian level. Instead, in the case of individual
learning, the different production rules that compete with each other do not
interact, given that each firm actually applies only one of the production
rules, and the spite effect does not affect social learning at the level of the
population.
However, individual and social learning represent two extreme forms of
learning, while various intermediate levels of learning are possible: for in-
stance, a population can be characterized by different types of agents that
interact with each other but that learn only from agents of the same type.
5.4 Conclusions
In this Chapter we discussed some basic issues regarding the nature of agents,
the variables that shape their state, and the actions they can perform. The
relatively recent wave of studies in cognitive psychology, behavioral eco-
nomics, experimental economics and neuroeconomics highlights the falseness
of mainstream economics in assuming full rationality as a guide to individual
behavior. Bounded rationality can be considered as an alternative behavioral
paradigm for economic agents, as opposed to the neoclassical hypothesis of
constrained maximization. Indeed, in a complex environment in which infor-
mation is limited and incomplete, the behavior of agents tends to be based
on heuristics, that is relatively simple rules of decision that agents use to try
to reach a satisfying choice. Moreover, agents may learn from their behav-
ior and from the interaction with other agents and the environment. When
we consider the economy as a whole, we must consider that agents can di-
rectly interact with other agents when taking decisions or learning about the
160
working of the economy. The interaction of heterogeneous agents can lead
to complex dynamics at the level of the whole system. For this reason, the
macro level can be different from the simple sum of micro entities. This is
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6.1 Introduction
It is a fact of life that the preferences, information, and choices – hence the
behavior – of an agent affect and are affected by the behavior of the agents
she interacts with. In fact there is a two-way feedback between individual and
aggregate behavior: agents’ interaction affects the evolution of the system as
a whole; at the same time the collective dynamics which shape the social
structure of the economy affect individual behavior.
For example, consider the case of the adoption of a new technology by
initially uninformed consumers. Each agent, based on her preferences, may
have some ex-ante evaluation about the quality of new products introduced
in the market. However, by interacting with their peers, agents may gather
fresh information about the new product and, eventually, they may decide
whether to buy it or not. This influences the adoption rate of the product,
which can be in turn exploited by other consumers as a parameter to be
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employed when subsequently considering whether to buy the product or not.
Therefore, individual decisions may be affected by agent interactions, then
impact on the aggregate state of the system, which can in turn feed back to
individual behaviors.
Traditionally, economic theory has largely overlooked the importance of
interactions among economic agents. In standard economic theory, interac-
tions are treated as externalities or spillovers. In general equilibrium theory
(GET), the presence of externalities is often treated as a pathology of the
model, leading to possible non-existence of equilibria. Therefore, in the model
is often assumed that externalities do not simply exist, i.e. that agents only
interact indirectly through a non-agent, that is prices, whose role is to aggre-
gate individual information. Hence, in GET agents are totally disconnected,
dots living in a vacuum without any connections (links) between them.
To appreciate the importance of externalities in mainstream economics,
one has to resort to game theoretic models. In this setup, agents interact
directly with all the other agents in the game. Interactions are captured via
strategic complementarities: the payoff of any single agent depends directly
on the choices made in the game by all the N−1 other agents. This configures
a scenario completely at odds with the one portrayed in GET, namely one
where agents live in a fully connected world, where they are linked with
anyone else.
In reality, however, interaction structures may be very distinct from the
ones employed in these two extremes. Agents may indeed interact with sub-
sets of all the other agents, and these sets of ’relevant others’ may be strongly
constrained by geography (i.e., interacting with your neighbors) or social
norms. Interactions may also change across time, both exogenously (e.g.,
because agents change their geographical or social location) or endogenously
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(i.e., agents may decide not to interact with others anymore). Understanding
how this dynamics is intertwined with that describing the state of the system
becomes therefore critical in order to gain a better knowledge of economies.
In this chapter, we will examine the relationships between agents estab-
lished by their interactions – a distinctive feature of ABMs which we have
emphasized in chapters 2 and 3. We will go in depth in dissecting the vari-
ous ways and means of interaction among agents in section 6.2. In sections
6.3 and 6.4 we will present and discuss some modeling building blocks using
network theory, which is a powerful set of formalisms that are particularly
well suited to model interaction structures in ABMs.
6.2 Modeling interactions
Different approaches may be adopted to describe the connections among
agents: interaction may be local or global, static or dynamic, direct or indi-
rect, deterministic or stochastic, exogenous or endogenous.
Local interaction characterizes models in which agents interact with a
neighborhood consisting of a subset of the agents’ population. This may be
due to transaction costs, geographical distance – as in the locational model by
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) – or closeness in characteristics, as in Gilles
and Ruys (1989) (see Kirman, 1994). When these costs become negligible,
interaction becomes global: individual behavior depends on the behavior of
the entire population. In such a case, before taking a decision, agents may
collect information about each and every distinct decision made by the other
agents in the population, or, more often, respond to some average behavior
of all the other agents.
When interaction is local, there are at least two ways to model interac-
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tion structures. On the one hand, if agents can be assumed to be able to
potentially reach any other agent in the population, but only interact with a
few of them in any period, one may use the metaphor of a random graph. In
a random graph, as in Kirman (1983) and Ioannides (1994), the partner(s)
of an agent are picked at random. This may describe a case where agents do
not have preferred partners with whom to interact, and simply make random
encounters or phone calls to other agents in order to gather the information
they need.
On the other hand, local interaction may be constrained by geography or
social norms. In that case, a stochastically or deterministically determined
subset of the population will form a neighborhood of the agent.1
The rule defining the set of interacting agents (the structure of interac-
tions) can be exogenous – when agents cannot change the interaction over
time – or endogenous, e.g. when an agent is able to choose to interact with a
specific neighbor or not. When interaction rules are exogenous, the modeler
can choose to describe them in a deterministic or stochastic way.
In deterministic case, the more convenient way to model local interactions
is via a lattice structure. Agents can be placed on the nodes of a lattice,
i.e. a homogeneous and regular graph where each node has a fixed number
of links. Lattices are characterized by their dimension. One dimensional
lattices are simply lines, where nodes are connected only with their left and
right neighbors.
In order to avoid the fact that agents at the boundaries of the line would
only have one neighbor, one may connect the left and right boundary of the
lattice obtaining a circle, whee all nodes have exactly two neighbors (see
1In Chapter 2 we have shown the effects of local interaction in Schelling segregation
model. In a complex environment, where information and cognitive capabilities are scarce
(i.e. in a bounded rationality setting) local interaction is a more realistic modeling device
than global interaction.
166
Flexibility of ACE/EV Paradigm (4/5)
• Interactions
 Interaction structure described by a graph
 Lattices
Figure 6.1: Left: A one dimensional boundary-less lattice. Right: A two-dimensional
lattice with boundaries.
Figure 6.1, left). In a one-dimensional lattice, interaction structures can
only differ by their size. Indeed, one can assume that instead of interacting
with left and right neighbors only, each agent has indeed a certain radius
of interaction even larger than one. In this way, one can suppose that each
node can interact with, say the k agents to the left and to the right in the
circle, thus allowing for a larger overlap of agent interaction sets. Of course,
when k becomes larger or equal than N/2 (N being the number of nodes)
one recovers a situation where each agent interacts with all the others.
Two dimensional lattices are instead checkerboard-like structures, where
each node is connected to its four nearest neighbors (north, south, east and
west), (see Figure 6.1, right). This of course does not apply to nodes on the
edges and on the corners, who have respectively three and two neighbors. In
order to solve this problem, one can think to fold the east and west side of
the lattice together, thus obtaining a cylinder-like object, and then join the
two circle-shaped edges of the cylinder to obtain a torus, see Figure 6.2.
The case where agents interact with their north, south, east and west
neighbor is called a Von-Neumann neighborhood. This is equivalent to the
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Figure 6.2: From a two-dimensional lattice with boundaries to a two-dimensional
boundary-less lattice (torus).
Flexibility of ACE/EV Paradigm (4/5)
• Interactions
 Lattice useful to describe local (spatial) interactions
 Playing with different neighborhood structures
Figure 6.3: Von Neumann (left) vs Moore (right) neighborhoods in a two-dimensional
lattice.
introduction of a Manhattan norm on the lattice – where the distance be-
tween any two nodes is given by minimum number of edges that must be
travelled in order to go from one node to another one – assuming that agents
only interact with partners that lie 1 step away. More generally, one can de-
fine Von-Neumann neighborhoods by assigning a certain interaction radius
r ≥ 1 and assume that agents interact with partners lying not farther than
r, see Figure 6.3.
An alternative way to model neighborhoods in a two-dimensional lattice
is to assume Moore neighbors. This starts from the definition of a norm
where the distance between any two nodes is equal to the minimum differ-
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ence between their x (horizontal) and y (vertical) coordinates. A Moore
neighborhood is then defined assuming that agents only interact with other
agents distant less than a certain radius r. In case r = 1, one has that each
agent will interact not only with its north, south, east and west partners as
in the Von Neumann case, but also with agents located north-east, north-
west, south-east and south-west, thus leading to a 8-person neighborhood,
see Figure 6.3. Note that Moore neighborhoods have larger overlaps, whilst
Von Neumann sets are largely much more non-overlapping.
When local interactions are modeled stochastically, on the contrary, one
can assume that agents, in each time period, may choose a certain set of
others with whom to interact, but they do so with a certain probability. For
example, agents may draw in each time period a number k = 1, 2, . . . , N−1 of
other agents completely at random, or based on some exogenous information
about the structure of the economy and their state (i.e. with probabilities
inversely depending on the geographical distance between agents, or on some
variable that measures the similarity or dissimilarity between agents accord-
ing to some socio-economic characteristics).
Another important distinction is between direct and indirect interactions.
Direct interaction occurs when the choice of each agent is affected by the be-
haviors of other agents – for instance because payoffs change as a consequence
of the choices made by other agents, or via expectations thereof; or alterna-
tively through a search and matching mechanism in a fully decentralized
market setting. Agent interactions are indirect when they are mediated by
a variable or a mechanism which transmits the effects of agents’ behavior,
e.g. the price mechanism, via aggregation of individual actions. In the Gen-
eral Equilibrium model, for instance, interaction is only indirect as agents
(buyers and sellers) exchange information with all other agents (at no cost)
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through the Walrasian auctioneer during the tatonnement process. Trans-
actions among agents will be carried out only when the “price vector” is
consistent with market clearing; transactions at “false prices” (that is, prices
that do not clear the market) are ruled out by construction. The Walrasian
auctioneer guarantees the general equilibrium of the economy through a cen-
tralized mechanisms of information elaboration and dissemination.
Finally, the structure of interactions is static when the set of neighbors is
determined once and for all, or dynamic, when it evolves over time depending
on model assumptions, as in the case of endogenous evolving networks. It
must be noted that in the dynamic interaction case, the structure of inter-
actions can change exogenously (e.g., because the modeler introduces some
exogenous shocks or rule that changes from time to time the relationships
among the agents), or endogenously, when within the model it is assumed
that agents hold some behavioral rules that allow them to decide whom to
interact with on the basis of the status of the system.
The “best” approach to model agents’ interaction simply does not exist:
“the choice of a model should depend on ’circumstances’ to be modeled in
a broad sense, and on the purpose of the model.” (Vriend, 2006). In the
following we will overview the most popular interaction structures.
6.2.1 Local exogenous interaction
We start describing the mechanisms of interaction when the structure of
inter-linkages is local and exogenous, i.e. agents interact with a subset of all
the others, and interactions are determined ex-ante and not modifiable by
the agents. We begin with cellular automata, a useful metaphor that illus-
trates how complex behavior can arise from simple rules and basic interaction
structures. We then introduce local games on lattices. Finally, we discuss
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applications of local interactions in economics.
Cellular Automata
A cellular automata (CA) is perhaps the simplest as possible dynamic model
of interaction between agents that can be conceived (Wolfram, 2002). In
its basic implementation, it describes a population of N agents or cells, dis-
tributed on the nodes of a 1-dimensional lattice without boundaries (i.e. a
circle). Time is discrete and agents can be in one out of two possible states,
say “on” or “off”. Each cell only interact with two neighbors, the one at
its left and the one at its right. At time t = 0, each cell is initialized in
one of the two possible states. From then on, at each time t > 0 every cell
has the option to update its status, independently on all the others, using a
deterministic behavioral rule. A rule is simply a map that transforms cur-
rent local configurations, i.e. the state at time t − 1 of the agent that is
called to update its choice and the states at time t− 1 of its two neighbors,
into the next state of the agent itself. Rules are therefore lookup tables that
associate a response to each possible local configuration. In the setup just
described, a rule is therefore a map that to each of the possible 23 = 8 local
configurations, associates either “on” or “off”. Thus, the space of all possible
rules in this case is 28 = 256. It is easy to see that the cardinality of this
space explodes if we allow cells to be in S > 2 states and to interact with
S > 2 nearest neighbors. Simulation of this simple model easily generates
complex behavioral patterns. Indeed, there exists a large region of the space
of rules where the long run behavior of the system, i.e. the configuration of
cell states in the lattice, evolves in a way that is neither chaotic nor simple,
and produces unpredictable patterns that lie at the edge of chaos. Hence, the
take-home message of this class of models is that complex aggregate behav-
171
ior can be generated by a very simple model where agents behave myopically
and directly interact with their neighbors.
Local Games on Lattices
The cellular-automata model introduced in the last section is an extremely
streamlined description of a dynamic system populated by agents that take
decisions and interact. Indeed, behavioral rules are simply mechanistic maps
that convert local configurations in a response. No strategic considerations
are made by the agents when making their decisions. To allow for more
strategy in a context where agents interact dynamically with their nearest
neighbors, one may simply assume that agents are still placed over a lattice
but they play non-cooperative bilateral games with each neighbor (Fagiolo,
1998). More precisely, suppose that a 2 by 2 symmetric stage-game payoff
matrix is given, for example that of a coordination game where agents must
choose between two actions, say A and B, knowing that their payoff will be
larger if they play the same action of their opponents. One may therefore
assume that agents are initially endowed with either A or B, and from then
on they are matched with their neighbors to play the bilateral game just
described. Agents may then decide which action to actually perform in the
current period by best replying to the current local configuration, i.e. they
may choose A or B depending on which one delivers the total maximum payoff
against the actions played at time t − 1 by each of the neighbors. Suppose
that in each time period only one agent may possibly revise its choice. It
will change only if by doing so it better coordinates its action with those of
its neighbors, otherwise it will stay put. It is therefore instructive to study
which one will be the long run state of the system. Will the system converge
to a coordinated equilibrium where everyone will play A or B, or are mixed
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equilibria likely to emerge? The answer to this question depends on both
the stage game payoffs, assigning the reward that agents get if they play A
(resp. B) if their opponent plays B (resp. A) and the way payoff ties are
resolved, i.e. which action is chosen if the total payoff to A from interacting
with the neighbors is exactly equal to that of B. Indeed, if ties are resolved
by tossing a coin, i.e. choosing at random between A or B, it can be seen
that the system will surely converge to a state where everyone play either
A or B. However, which action will be selected in the long run depends on
its risk efficiency, i.e. on the average payoff it delivers against itself and the
opposite action. The action that does best on average will be selected.
Economic Applications
In economics, earlier contributions on how to model interactions among a
large number of heterogeneous agents are based on a stochastic approach,
which has originally been proposed to assess the role of direct interaction in
a General Equilibrium framework. As noted by Hommes (2006), stochastic
interaction may lead to complex collective dynamics.
Exogenous local interactions have been introduced in a pioneering con-
tribution by Föllmer (1974), who studies the dynamics of an exchange econ-
omy in which agents have stochastic preferences as proposed by Hildenbrand
(1971). The novelty of Follmer’s approach with respect to Hildebrand is
that the probability law that governs individual preferences depends on the
behavior of agents in a neighborhood which is defined ex ante and is not
changing over time. In such a framework, local interactions may propagate
through the economy and give rise to aggregate uncertainty causing large
price movements and even a breakdown of equilibria. Agents in the Föllmer
model are placed on lattices and interact with their nearest-neighbors in a
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homogeneous (i.e. all agents have the same number of neighbors and they
are spread uniformly across the space) and symmetric way (i.e. if agent i
affects agent j, also j affects i).
In a stylized model of a supply chain, Bak et al. (1993) show that small
shocks can cause large fluctuations when producers hold inventories of goods
and they locally interact with each other. In this case, agents are located on
trees or chains, describing different layers of the economy (i.e. from producers
of basic goods to consumers) and interactions are asymmetric. Agents in bot-
tom layers are affected by the choices of upstream agents (i.e. their suppliers)
but they do not affect them, as they only influence the choice of downstream
agents (i.e. whom they sell to). However, even though interactions natu-
rally go from upstream to downstream sectors of the economy, small shocks
that are originated downstream (e.g. at the level of final demand) may well
crawl up and be diffused throughout the whole economy via the amplifying
effect of local interactions. Indeed, if interactions structures are deep enough,
small shocks that can initially affect a smaller number of agents and then die
away, may resonate through the system and trigger mechanisms lead more
and more agents to eventually revise their state, thus generating avalanches
that can potentially affect the whole system. Interestingly enough, the size
of such avalanches is unpredictable in the model and can range from very
small to very large magnitudes. In particular, very large avalanches are not
exponentially rare, but their probability decays with a power-law shape, a
pattern that we have encountered (and will encounter) many times in this
book.
Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) show that local interaction among produc-
ers may lead to a financial collapse. In their simple model, firms are located











Figure 6.4: The network structure of the economy in Delli Gatti et al. (2006): downstream
firms (circles), upstream firms (triangles) and banks (squares).
the same time a downstream firm with respect to firm i-1 and an upstream
firm for firm i+1. A bank provides credit to all the firms in order to finance
production. If an upstream firm cannot repay the loan, also the downstream
firm may go bankrupt and so on, in a vicious circle of defaults.
Delli Gatti et al. (2006) build on this framework in a model (see Figure
6.4) where downstream firms (producers of consumption goods) are con-
nected to upstream firms (producers of intermediate goods) through “trade
credit” (whereby the latter finance the provision of intermediate goods to
the former), all firms are connected to banks through “bank credit” (to fi-
nance labor costs), and banks are connected through the “interbank market”
(to manage liquidity). Credit interlinkages spread financial distress and may
facilitate bankruptcy avalanches.
In the case of global interaction, each agent can interact, or is likely to
interact, with all other agents. For instance, Feldman (1973) describes an
economy in which agents may make Pareto-improving transactions through
pairwise interactions generated by random matching, without a central price
signal. A “static equilibrium” can be computed for this class of models.
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In the model of Diamond (1989) a multitude of buyers and sellers interact
through pairwise transactions and the “law of one price” no longer holds; on
the contrary, a distribution of prices emerges. The absence of a Walrasian
auctioneer generally prevents the attainment of a Pareto optimum.
In the presence of externalities, the interaction among different agents
may affect aggregate results leading to complex collective dynamics. This is
the case of herding. For example, in the game-theoretic model proposed by
Banerjee (1992) agents are located on a segment and make decisions sequen-
tially. Each agent makes her choice on the basis of a “private” signal and a
“public” signal which consists of the previous choices made by other agents.
The Nash equilibrium of this game can be socially inefficient if the popula-
tion is large enough: for example, all clients end up at the worst restaurant.
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) notice that, after a while, cumulated actions con-
tain so much information that the single agent has an incentive to ignore
his own information and an “informational cascade” starts. Kirman (1993)
observes a similar dynamic pattern in the evolution of two strands of opin-
ion in a population. Other examples of global interaction over an exogenous
network structure can be found in models describing the adoption of new
technologies when the profitability of a technology depends on the number
of firms that already adopted it (David, 1985; Arthur, 1990).
Some typical structure emerging out of exogenous interaction, as the star,
the circle or a “small-world”, will be explored in Section 6.3. Let us now
discuss endogenous interaction.
6.2.2 Endogenous interaction
There are different ways of describing endogenous interactions in ABMs
(Vriend, 2006). In a multi-agent setting markets may be characterized by pro-
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curement processes (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006) which generally take the form
of decentralized search and matching. Procurement processes are market-
specific and can take the form of auctions, negotiated markets or pairwise
bargaining markets, characterized by different buyer-seller relationships (see
Kirman, 2010). Due to the absence of any exogenously imposed market-
clearing mechanism, the economy may self-organize towards a spontaneous
order, which is generally characterized by emerging properties such as self-
sustaining growth and fluctuations, endogenous crises, persistent involuntary
unemployment, unsold production, or credit rationing. In what follows, we
survey a few examples of endogenous interaction patterns in ABMs. These
range from Schelling segregation model to self organization of trade in actual
markets, all the way to artificial societies like the Sugarscape, and ABMs of
the labor and credit market, and of the macroeconomy.
Residential patterns in Schelling’s model. Schelling (1971) proposes a pi-
oneering ABM – succinctly presented in Chapter 2 – in which residential
patterns (with neighborhood segregation) emerge from agents’ interaction.
There is a finite number of agents located on a bounded lattice (a grid).
Each cell can be occupied by only one agent at a time and each agent can
interact only with the agents located in the eight cells around it (Moore
neighborhood). The agent’s preferences are defined by the number of similar
or dissimilar neighbors where similarity is defined according to a predeter-
mined criterion, e.g. race or ethnicity. For instance, we can assume that
the agent is satisfied with her position if at most 50% of her neighbors are
dissimilar. Starting from an initial spatial allocation of agents, all unsatisfied
agents (in a random order) move to the nearest empty location looking for
a satisfactory position. After a time step, a new list of unsatisfied agents is
compiled and the whole process of searching preferred locations is iterated
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again. Iteration goes on until no agents want to move anymore. The final
outcome is a steady state spatial allocation which exhibits a segregated resi-
dential pattern: segregation emerges from agents’ interaction which, in turn,
is influenced by the dynamic evolution of agents’ locational choices.
Interaction-driven macroscopic patterns in Sugarscape. Imagine a very sim-
ple artificial economy in which sugar is the only commodity and agents need
sugar to survive. The spatial dimension of Sugarscape (Epstein and Axtell,
1996) is a torus, i.e. a lattice without bounds. Each cell can be occupied by
only one agent at a time and each agent can interact only with the agents
located in the four cells around it (von Neumann neighborhood). At each site
sugar grows at a given rate (up to a maximum). An agent which occupies
a site increases its wealth by accumulating the sugar available at that site.
She has a given “information set”, i.e. she can observe how much sugar is
present in different sites, up to a limit. Moreover, agents are characterized by
heterogeneous metabolic rates which determine how much sugar each agent
needs per time step, that is consumption. As a consequence, if an agent has
enough sugar to consume it survives, otherwise it dies (because of negative
wealth). For each time step, agents are randomly ordered and they decide
to move around looking for sugar according to this stochastic list. As in the
case of the residential pattern in Schelling’s model, also in Sugarscape the
overall configuration of agents’ locations evolves over time as agents decide
to move around.
In a slightly more complex environment in which spice is added to sugar,
trade enters the scene. In this case agents directly interact with neighbors
through trade (according to the marginal rates of substitution implied by
agents’ utility functions). Epstein and Axtell (1996) show that decentralized
(bilateral) bargaining among different agents may lead to “market clearing”,
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that is price dispersion decreases over time (without the intervention of an
auctioneer). Many other characteristics may be added to this simple com-
putational framework such as credit, mating, spreading of diseases, combat,
cultural transmission, so building up a complex artificial society.
The self-organization of markets. Kirman and Vriend (2001) provide a model
of the evolving structure of an actual market inspired by an empirical analysis
of the Marseille wholesale fish market. They focus on two features: price
dispersion and buyer-seller loyalty. Before the market opens, sellers purchase
the fish they want to sell during the day, though demand is uncertain. When
the market opens, buyers choose a seller, so forming various queues in the
market hall. Then, sellers sequentially make a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to
buyers at given posted prices. When all queues have been handled, the
(morning) market is over. In the afternoon session, unsatisfied buyers may
choose other sellers, forming new queues, and the process is repeated. Since
fish is perishable and therefore non-storable, when the market closes sellers
get rid of the unsold stock of fish.
In such a framework, sellers follow alternative rules of behaviors based
on their relative fitness (that is, the actual payoff realized when using a
certain rule): better rules are more likely to be used again. The interaction
structure is endogenous because the seller-buyer networks evolve based on
agents’ choices. These choices, in turn, are influenced by the evolution of the
interaction structure. For instance, loyalty can emerge endogenously from
interaction if the fitness of the involved buyer and seller is higher when they
form a partnership.
Vriend (1994) adopts a computational approach to the analysis of buyer-
seller networks based on communication, that is the information agents have
on possible trading partners. Sellers (firms) produce commodities without
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knowing the demand for their products. Then, they (randomly) send (costly)
messages to potential partners. Buyers (consumers) have three options: shop
around randomly, stay loyal to the current supplier or follow one of the
information signals they receive.
Interaction is endogenous because firms choose to reach a target network
of potential partners by advertising. Moreover, consumers may or may not
follow the information signals they receive (depending on the success of past
decisions), so influencing firms’ profit which, in turn, is a signal firms use to
revise their production and advertising strategies. Finally, agents learn from
experience and modify their behavior accordingly, shaping the evolution of
the buyer-seller network. Depending on the distribution of information, a
certain pattern of agents’ interaction prevails and markets emerge as self-
organized structures.
Howitt and Clower (2000) provide another example of market self orga-
nization. Traders follow simple behavioral rules and transactions are coordi-
nated by specialist trading firms that bear the costs of market disequilibrium.
Starting from an initially autarkic situation (in which there are no institu-
tions that support exchange), simulations show that a fully developed market
economy will emerge spontaneously. Moreover, in virtually every case where
a market economy develops, one of the commodities traded will emerge as
a universal medium of exchange (commodity money), being traded by every
firm and changing hands at every transaction.
Economic growth in open-ended economies. To study the determinants of
economic growth in a simple production economy, Fagiolo and Dosi (2003a)
develop the so-called “island model”. In this model, the economy is popu-
lated by a set of stylized entrepreneurs (firms) that produce a homogeneous
good under increasing returns to scale in the number of exploiters of a given
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technology. Technologies are randomly distributed in an infinite lattice and
can be thought as islands with mines on them, from which entrepreneurs can
dig the homogenous product. Each firm can exploit one island in each time
period, but each mine can be exploited by many entrepreneurs simultane-
ously, who therefore produce using increasing returns to scale. Interactions
in this models occur at different scales. First, firms using the same technol-
ogy interact via returns to scale. Second, firms can decide to leave the island
they are exploiting and start exploring the sea (i.e. nodes of the lattice with-
out islands) in search of other, new technologies. During this journey, firms
can receive signals sent by firms working in other islands. If they do so, they
can decide to follow the signal, move towards the island from which the sig-
nal was sent, and start producing there. Finally, when explorers find a new
island, its new productivity (i.e. the amount of product per firm that can
be produced) will increase the more productive the worker was in the past,
which depended also on how many other firms were producing there, i.e. a
sort of interaction from the past. The model is able to produce simulated
time series for the aggregate output that are statistically similar to those
observed in the real-world. Furthermore, the long-run performance of the
economy (i.e. in terms of long-run average growth rate) depends on the rate
of interactions between agents, as well as on other parameters. In general,
there needs to be a balance between the extent to which agents exploit exist-
ing resources in the model and that at which they explore in search of new
technologies in order to attain a high long-run performance. If agents exploit
or explore too much, the economy slows down into a stagnating pattern.
ABMs of the labor market. In ABMs of the labor market – see for instance
Russo et al. (2007) – firms set their demand for labor (and post vacancies
accordingly) on the basis of their desired level of production. Unemployed
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workers send out job applications to firms posting vacancies. Firms may
select applications focusing on some characteristics of the applicants, such as
skill, specialization, productivity, or emphasizing loyalty. Once an applicant
is selected, the worker and the firm bargain over the wage and when they
reach an agreement a match occurs. If job applications are not enough to
fill all the vacancies, the firm hires all the applicants but employment and
production will be set below the desired scale. If, on the other hand, vacancies
are not enough to satisfy all the applications, the firm can reach the desired
scale of activity but some applicants will stay unemployed (Fagiolo et al.,
2004a; Richiardi, 2006; Russo et al., 2007; Neugart, 2008).
ABMs of the credit market. In ABMs of the credit market the key issues
are the determination of the interest rate on loans and the total size and
allocation to borrowers of credit extended by lenders. In some models of a
fully decentralized credit market (see Gaffeo et al., 2008; Grilli et al., 2012,
for example, borrowers contact a given number of randomly chosen lenders
to get a loan, starting from the one which charges the lowest interest rate.
Each lender sorts the borrowers’ applications for loans in descending order
according to the financial soundness of borrowers, and satisfy them until all
credit supply has been exhausted. The contractual interest rate is determined
using an optimization strategy (Delli Gatti et al., 2005) or a rule of thumb
(see Delli Gatti et al., 2008). Along these lines, Delli Gatti et al. (2010)
propose a model to analyze a credit network composed of downstream (D)
firms, upstream (U) firms, and banks. The production of D firms and of
their suppliers (U firms) is constrained by the availability of internal finance
– proxied by net worth – to D firms. The structure of credit interlinkages
changes over time due to an endogenous process of partner selection which
leads to the polarization of the network. As a consequence, when a shock
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hits a significant group of agents in the credit network and agents’ leverage
is critically high, a bankruptcy avalanche can follow. This mechanism can
be regarded as a “network-based financial accelerator”.
ABMs of the Stock market. In ABMs of the Stock market, agents can place
market orders or limit orders for arbitrary quantities (see Chiarella et al.,
2009; Tedeschi et al., 2009). Limit orders are stored in the book and executed
when they find a matching order on the opposite side of the market. A market
order is filled completely if it finds enough capacity on the book, partially
otherwise. The order-driven market mechanism avoids the limitations of the
market maker approach in which there is no explicit trading mechanism.
In fact, the market maker, who is typically risk neutral and endowed with
unlimited liquidity, absorbs excess demand and makes trading always viable,
regardless of its size. For relevant contributions in this field (see Lux and
Marchesi, 2002; Hommes, 2006; LeBaron, 2006).
ABMs of the macroeconomy. Delli Gatti et al. (2011) and Riccetti et al.
(2014) propose a “macroeconomic ABM”characterized by decentralized search
and matching i.e. a macroeconomic framework in which a relatively large
population of heterogeneous agents (households, firms, banks, the govern-
ment and the central bank) interact in four markets (credit, labor, goods
and deposits) according to a decentralized search and matching mechanism.
Agents follow (relatively) simple rules of behavior in an incomplete and asym-
metric information context. Households shop for goods visiting firms and
start buying from the supplier posting the lowest price. Firms set the price
and the quantity to produce on the basis of expected demand. If desired
employment is higher than the actual workforce, they post vacancies. Unem-
ployed household members search for a job visiting firms that post vacancies.
If they need external funds, firms ask for a loan at a bank starting from the
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bank that offers the lowest interest rate.
For instance, in Riccetti et al. (2014) in each of the four markets two classes
of agents interact, on the demand and the supply sides respectively. They
obey the following “matching protocol”: (i) A list of agents is picked at ran-
dom from the population of agents on the demand side – firms in the credit
and in the labor market, households in the goods market and banks in the
deposit market. (ii) The first agent in the list observes a random subset of
potential partners and chooses the one posting the lowest price. (iii) The
second agent on the list performs the same activity on a new random subset
of the updated potential partners list. (iv) The process is repeated till the
end of the list of agents on the demand side. (v) A new list of agents is picked
at random from the population of agents on the demand side and the steps
(i) to (iv) are repeated. 2 The matching mechanism goes on until either one
side of the market is empty or no further matchings are feasible. The pat-
terns of agents’ interaction change as agents made their choices and collective
dynamics feed back to individual decisions, including the choice of the best
partner(s). Accordingly, the pattern of interactions is fully endogenous.
Dosi et al. (2010) explore a different scheme of endogenous interaction in
a context in which innovation is embodied in capital goods. Capital-goods
producers send “brochures” with information on new vintages of machine
tools to a subset of potential customers, i.e producers of consumption goods
who use capital as an input. The latter choose whether to buy new capital
goods or use the existing machine tools of a previous vintage. The two way
2For example, in the labor market, firms (on the demand side) enter the matching
process and have the possibility to employ one worker (on the supply side). In the first
step of the procedure, the first firm on the list of firms, say F1, observes the reservation
wage of a subset of the list of workers and chooses the worker asking for the lowest wage,
say worker H1. The list of potential workers is updated eliminating worker H1 and the
process is iterated.
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feedback between the adoption of new technologies and the volume and com-
position of demand generation suggest the presence of two distinct “regimes”
of growth (or absence thereof) characterized by different short-run output
and employment fluctuations.
Finally, a spatial structure of interaction can be incorporated in a macroe-
conomic ABM. For example, in Dawid et al. (2012) consumption goods are
sold at local market platforms (malls), where firms store and offer their prod-
ucts and consumers come to buy goods at posted prices. In this model, while
market demand for consumption goods is determined locally in the sense that
all consumers buy at the local mall located in their region, supply is global
because every firm might sell its products in all regional markets of the econ-
omy. Labor markets are characterized by spatial frictions determined by
commuting costs that arise if workers accept jobs outside their own region.
Finally, households and firms have access to all banks in the economy and
therefore credit markets operate globally. Accordingly, different assumptions
on the local or global dimension of agent interaction can be explored in order
to understand the interplay between local/regional/global market dynamics.
6.3 Networks: basic concepts and properties
It is always possible to represent, at least theoretically, agents’ interactions
by means of a network or graph.3 Therefore network theory is a useful tool
in order to have an analytical description of the interaction structure in a
multi-agent framework.
There is an obvious link between the conceptual framework of ABMs
3In this book we will use the words “graph” and “network” as synonyms. Graph is
the term mainly used in the mathematical literature (see, for instance, Bollobas, 1998
or Chung, 1997). Among physicists network is more popular (Caldarelli, 2007; Newman,
2010).
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and network theory. Consider for instance a financial or credit network in
which agents are linked by borrowing/lending relationships. In this type of
network it is important to understand how the interaction structure affects
the way in which defaults spread through connections (financial contagion).
Network theory is key in understanding this phenomenon as it provides the
basic mathematical concepts needed to describe the set of interactions among
agents, as well as the tools to analyze the collective, emerging properties of
this set. Interaction patterns, in turn, affect the state and control variables
of the agents.
In fact, one may claim that each ABM maps onto one or more networks
(since the structure of interactions could be either fixed or changing over
time), and the mathematical properties of these networks can be used to an-
alyze and eventually forecast, at least for some variables, the behavior of the
agents in the ABM. For these reasons, the quest for a deeper integration with
network theory has become an important topic in the research agenda of the
ABM literature, with a growing amount of research effort especially devoted
to problems of interaction over fixed networks (Wilhite, 2006) and of endoge-
nous network formation (Vriend, 2006). So far, however, the ABM and the
network literatures have grown along different trajectories. In his well know
book on networks - especially tailored for the economics profession - Jack-
son (2008) makes only a marginal reference to ABMs, while Vega-Redondo
(2007) is entirely silent on the subject in his monograph more oriented to-
wards the physics community. Among the few systematic efforts to better
integrate the two approaches, it is worth mentioning the ambitious theoreti-
cal framework proposed by Potts (2000), which is explicitly geared towards
multi-agent simulation modeling, and relies heavily on network theory. Ac-
cording to Potts (2000), there is an evolutionary common ground shared by
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the different heterodox economic schools, in which evolution is to be under-
stood in its broadest meaning as a process of self-transformation of agents.
In this ever changing process what matters most are connections, since the
latter determine the dynamical behavior of the system as a whole.
When the modeler wants to observe what happens to model dynamics
given an exogenous structure of interaction, a static network may be sufficient
to characterize the local or global interaction among agents. In this case, one
can investigate the impact of the given network topology (or of alternative
topologies) on model results. On the other hand, when the modeler wants to
capture the partners’ choice, an evolving network must be explored. In this
case agents decide with whom they want to interact. Their choices affects
aggregate dynamics and, at the same time, macro properties influence the
social structure of the economy giving rise to a co-evolution of the network
and macro variables.
Two remarks are in order. First, it must be noted that some of the inter-
action structures already introduced in this chapter easily fall in a network
framework. For example, one or two dimensional lattices are particular types
of networks, namely regular networks invariant to roto-translations. They are
regular as all nodes hold the same number of links. They are invariant to
roto-translations as the way in which we move the graph in a higher dimen-
sional space does not change its properties. Second, a distinction must be
made between models of network evolution and the use of network theory
within ABMs. A large literature, mostly grounded in physics, has developed
simple stochastic models attempting to describe and explain how networks
evolve and reach stable equilibrium states as time goes by (Newman, 2010).
Similarly, game-theoretic models have been developed in order to understand
which type of network is going to have efficient properties where agents on
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it must bargain or split a certain amount cooperatively (Jackson, 2008), or
whether some equilibria may be reached when agents play non-cooperatively
and are placed on endogenous or exogenous networks (Vega-Redondo, 2007).
On the contrary, a network formalism can be used in ABMs to micro-found
the structure of agent interactions and their evolution. However, agents in
economic ABMs are typically more sophisticated than simple players in the
game or anonymous nodes in cellular automata. They typically behave in
richer ways, interacting in different markets and performing a number of dif-
ferent tasks (e.g., deciding how much to produce, form expectations, react to
system-level inputs, etc.). Therefore, network theory is an extremely useful
tool in ABMs but can never replace agent-based modeling as such.
Let us now start with some preliminary notions. A network – denoted by
G – is a mathematical object composed by nodes (or vertices, denoted by V )
connected by links (edges, E). In symbols: G = (V,E), where V is typically
assumed to be a subset of N, while E ⊂ N × N can eventually map onto
any subset of RN . For example, let V = {1, 2, ..., n} represent a finite index
set mapping onto individuals connected by acquaintance. Then, we can use
V to represent individuals in a graph, and consequently we represent two
individuals being acquainted by adding to E one element (i, j) with i, j ∈ V
if the corresponding individuals are connected.
In the social sciences, nodes may represent different agents: women, men
(distinguished by age, nationality, wealth etc.), households, banks, firms,
countries etc. Links may represent different social classes, friendship or
professional acquaintance, assets, liabilities etc. Links could have different
weights which represent the strength of the relationship among nodes.4
4The most typical networks have a well-established and codified treatment in graph
theory. Therefore we will introduce only those concepts and terms that are strictly nec-
essary for our purposes and will not get systematically into the details of graph-theoretic
concepts and terminology. A number of rigorous and readable books are now available
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track of which links are present.
While the focus on 0-1 links is restrictive, it is still of significant interest for at least
two reasons. First, much of the insight obtained in this framework is fairly robust, and
so this is a useful starting point. Second, the fact that the value and costs that are
generated by links may di!er across links already allows for substantial heterogeneity
and admits enough flexibility so that a large number of interesting applications are
captured.
A network g is a list of which pairs of players are linked to each other. A network
is then a list of unordered pairs of players {i, j}.
For any pair of players i and j, {i, j} ! g indicates that i and j are linked under
the network g.
For simplicity, write ij to represent the link {i, j}, and so ij ! g indicates that i
and j are linked under the network g.
For instance, if N = {1, 2, 3} then g = {12, 23} is the network where there is a link




Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size 2. G = {g " gN} denotes the set of all
possible networks or graphs on N .
The network gN is referred to as the “complete” network.
Another prominent network structure is that of a “star” network, which is a network
where there exists some player i such that every link in the network involves player i.
In this case i is referred to as the center of the star.12
A shorthand notation for the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing
network g is g + ij, and for the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing
network g is g # ij.
Let
g|S = {ij : ij ! g and i ! S, j ! S}.
Thus g|S is the network found deleting all links except those that are between players
in S.
(2001, 2001b), Goyal and Moraga (2001), and Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001).
12This definition follows Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Subsequently, this term has been used to
refer to a number of variations on such a structure.
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Figure 6.5: Network among 3 nodes.
For this more general setting a functional representation seems straight-
forward. Let li,j be a function whose arguments are vertices and having a
suitable co-domain. For instance with li,j → {0, 1} we represent the relative
frequency of interaction (or any ex-ante probability measure on a suitably
defined interaction space) between i and j. li,j = 1 if the edge between i and
j is in E, otherwise li,j = 0. Moreover, we assume that li,j ≡ lj,i. In this
case, V = {1, 2, 3} with l1,2 = l2,3 = 1 nd l1,3 = 0 yields the graph shown in
figure 6.5.
Within this setting, a convenient representation of a graph is given by
the connectivity or adjacency matrix, C. Each element ci,j of this matrix
stores the image of li,j associated to each point (i, j) of its (finite) domain.
The matrix showed in Table 6.1 reproduces the same network showed in
Figure 6.5.
1 2 3
1 0 1 0
2 1 0 1
3 0 1 0
Table 6.1: Adjacency matrix for the graph of figure 6.5.
Three remarks are in order. First, the elements of the main diagonal in
our example are zero, i.e. no agent links with itself or, in network jargon, the
graph has no self loops. This is not necessarily the best option in all cases.
(Caldarelli, 2007; Goyal, 2007; Jackson, 2008; Newman, 2010; Vega-Redondo, 2007), along
with the classical presentation of Bollobas (1998).
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Second, the off diagonal elements in our example are either zero (the
nodes identified by the corresponding row and column are not linked) or one
(nodes are linked). Some models require multiple edges, which would mean
that the elements of the matrix can take on values (represented by integers)
larger than 1. In this case we talk of a multigraph.
Third, edges in the graph shown in Table 6.1 are undirected. The adja-
cency matrix is therefore symmetric since li,j ≡ lj,i for each i, j ∈ V . An
edge, however, may be directed. A directed edge can be thought as a one-
way road between two points and be represented graphically by an arrow.
A graph characterized by directed edges is referred to as a digraph and is
represented by an asymmetric adjacency matrix.
For instance, by adding to the graph of our example a directed edge
between 1 and 3 – i.e. setting l1,3 = 1 but l3,1 = 0 – we generate a digraph.
The corresponding adjacency matrix is
1 2 3
1 0 1 1
2 1 0 1
3 0 1 0
Table 6.2: Adjacency matrix for a digraph
The context must dictate which representation is to be preferred, since
there are plenty of examples of both symmetric and asymmetric relationships
in the real world. For example, a network representing email messages is
unavoidably directed, since each message goes just in one direction. Instead,
a network representing parental relationships is undirected since two agents
in this network are either related to each other (they are the mother and
father of a child) or not.
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As mentioned above, links can be weighted. Their weight mirrors the
strength of relations among the connected nodes. Returning to Fig. 6.5,
suppose the three nodes represent banks. In this case, the weight of links
can represent the overall value or number of transactions between banks i
and j in a given day. We can define, thus, the weighted adjacency matrix
W , whose elements wi,j represent daily value of transactions among linked
banks. Echoing the matrix setting, we define W of the bank network as
Wi,j =
wi,j if li,j = 10 if li,j = 0, (6.1)
where li,j is the link between banks and wi,j its weight.
So far, we have discussed situations where only one type of relationship
among agents is described. More generally, agents may entertain different
types of interactions at the same time. Going back to the case of social
interactions, individuals may exchange information using different means,
such as personal encounters, phone calls, emails, different direct messaging
services, as well as online social networks. Each distinct interaction channel
would require a different graph to be formally described in terms of networks.
However, all these different linkages may be modeled simultaneously in terms
of a multi-layer network (MLN). A MLN is simply a collection of different
layer networks where nodes remain the same in each different layer. Layers
represent different interaction types and one can think to links in each layer
as having a different color. By aggregating all the layers together, a MLN
representation envisages a graph where between any two nodes there can exist
many (weighted, directed) links, each with a different color, representing the
different interaction types coexisting in the social system.
Going back to a simple network, a network is said to be sparse when
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there are few edges with respect to the number of nodes. Real networks are,
almost without exception, sparse, since the capacity of agents to interact
doesn’t grow proportionally with the dimension of the system. Models of
complex networks generally display this feature, assuming that the expected
number of vertices connected to a given one remains finite as the size of the
network tends to infinity.
In a sparse network, heterogeneous local structures become very impor-
tant in determining the properties of the network. This feature is captured by
the key notion of neighborhood (a notion which we have already encountered
in the previous Sections). The neighborhood ψ(i) of the i-th agent is the
set of agents with whom i has a direct link. Neighborhoods find ubiquitous
application in network theory, especially within the social and economic do-
main. In social-economic systems, individuals tend to link with people they
are close to. A clear manifestation of this phenomenon is shown in the iden-
tification of groups inside the network. These groups can mirror friendship,
loyalty, cooperation or segregation.5
The cardinality of the neighborhood ψ(i) which we denote with ki is the




li,j = |ψ(i)| (6.2)
In digraphs we must distinguish between in-degree, i.e. the number of edges
pointed to some vertex, and out-degree, i.e. the number of edges pointing
5Pioneering research on this subject has been carried out by Jacob Moreno in the
1920s and 30s on the friendship patterns within small groups. Anatol Rapoport (1961)
was one of the first theorist to stress the importance of the friendship graphs of school
children. Milgram’s experiments on the “small-world effect” originated the popular notion
of “six degrees of separation” (Milgram, 1967).
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away from it. In-degree kini and out-degree k
out




lini,j = |ψin(i)| kouti =
∑
j∈ψout(i)
louti,j = |ψout(i)| (6.3)
All networks may be conceived as the outcome of a generative process,
which mathematically takes the form of an algorithm. At this point it is con-
venient to introduce a fundamental distinction between deterministic graphs
and random graphs. The former are the outcome of a deterministic sequence
of steps, while the latter’s development involves one or more stochastic pro-
cesses.
The most important deterministic network structures in economic appli-
cations are
• complete networks : each vertex is connected to all the other vertices;
• star networks : every link ends in a certain agent (the star node);
• wheel networks : agents are arranged as [i1, ..., in] with l2,1=l3,2= ...=
ln,n−1= l1,n=1 and there are no other links.
Panels (a) (b) (c) in figure 6.6 represent these typical network structures
when there are 4 agents. Panels (a) and (b) represent undirected graphs so
that the in-degree is equal to the out-degree. In panel (a), for each node i,
ki = 3; in panel (b) the star node 1 has a degree 3, whereas the other nodes’
degree is equal to 1. Panel (c) represents a wheel i.e. a digraph such that for
each node i, kini = k
out
i = 1.
If a network is random, all the observables defined over it, including the
degree, are random variables, which take their values in agreement with a
specific probability measure. Therefore we can define the probability degree
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A component of g, is a subset C ! N and the set of all links between the members of C
in g, with the property that for every distinct pair of players i and j in C I have j
g"# i,
(equivalently, j $ N(i; g)) and there is no strict superset C ! of C in g for which this is
true. A network g is said to be minimal if the deletion of any link increases the number of
components in g. We can also say that a network g is connected if it has a unique component.
If the unique component is minimal, g is called minimally connected . A network which is
not connected is referred to as disconnected. A network is said to be empty if N(i; g) = {i}
and it is called complete if Nd(i; g) = N\{i} for all i $ N . We denote the empty and the
complete network by ge and gc, respectively. A star network has a central player i such that
gi,j = gj,i = 1 for all j $ N\{i} and there are no other links. A wheel network is one where
the players are arranged as {i1, ..., in} with gi2,i1 = .... = gin,in!1 = gi1,in = 1 and there are
no other links. The wheel network is denoted gw. Figure 2 presents these networks for a






























Two networks g $ G and g! $ G are equivalent if g! can be obtained by a relabelling of
the players in g. For example, if g is the network in Figure 1, and g! is the network where
players 1 and 2 are interchanged, then g and g! are equivalent. The equivalence relation
partitions G into classes: each class is referred to as an architecture. For example, there
are n possible ‘star’ networks, all of which come under the equivalence class of the star
architecture. Likewise, the wheel architecture is the equivalence class of (n " 1)! networks
consisting of all permutations of n individuals in a circle.
We shall say that a network graph is regular if all individuals have the same number of
neighbours, Nd(i; g) = k, for some k $ {0, 1, 2..., n"1}. In this case the number of neighbours
is referred to as the degree of the network.
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Figure 6.6: Different networks’ topologies.
distribution p(k) s th probability that a v rtex chosen uniformly at random
has degree k. In the applied network literature, it is usual to represent
networks by means of the decumulative distribution function (DDF) or –
less frequently – by means of the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
corresponding to p(k).
As we will show, different network topologies have different degree distri-
butions. A well-established stylized fact of real-world networks, however, is
that the degree distribution is generally right-skewed, i.e. it is characterized
by a long right tail of values that are far above the mean. In other words,
there are few nodes with many links (hubs) and many links with few nodes.
Networks whose degree distribution is approximately shaped as a power law
are called scale free.
This property is displayed at best by plotting the DDF. Consider, for
example, the DDF of the in-degree (lender bank) and out-degree (borrower
bank) for the Italian interbank market in 1999 and 2002 (see Iori et al., 2008)
shown on a double logarithmic scale in figure 6.7. The plots show that the
degree distribution is right skewed in both periods since the values follow an
approximately straight line.
There are many properties closely related to the degree distribution.
Resilience, clustering, community structure and assortative mixing can be
counted among the most frequently used in social sciences.
Resilience denotes the robustness of the network’s structure to the re-
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Figure 6.7: DDF of degree for incoming (black dotted) and outgoing (red-solid) links in
1999 (left) and 2002 (right).
moval of nodes. When a vertex i is removed from a network, the average
distance among nodes increases. As this process goes on, ultimately some
nodes will be disconnected. Nodes can be removed in many ways. They may
be attacked randomly or according to some of their intrinsic properties (such
as their degree). Depending on the rules used to remove nodes, the network
shows different levels of resilience.6
Clustering denotes the organization of the network in neighborhoods,
cliques or motifs. In many social networks we find that if node i is linked
to node j and node j to node h, then there is a fairly high probability that
i and h are also linked. This property, therefore, measures the number of
triangles in the network. In the jargon of social sciences, clustering answers
to the question whether a friend of my friend is also my friend. This notion







6For instance, Albert et al. (2000) show that social networks, usually characterized as
scale-free, are remarkably robust to random attacks but extremely vulnerable to attacks
targeted at nodes with the highest degree (hubs). To prove this claim, the authors remove
nodes in decreasing order of connectivity, showing that, as a small number of hubs are
removed, the average distance of the scale-free network increases rapidly.
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is an overall statistical measure of the density of interconnected vertex triplets
in the network.
The concept of community provides a powerful extension of the notion of
clustering, by looking at groups of vertices such that there is a higher density
of links within groups than between them.7 The presence of subsets of highly
interconnected nodes is a key feature of empirically observed social networks.
Usually these communities, which are sparsely interconnected, reflect agents’
preferences and choices. As an example, one might imagine a social network
representing friendship relationships; in this case communities describe how
agents choose their friends, eventually forming distinct social groups among
individuals sharing some common characteristics. Within social networks’
theory, this kind of selective linking, based upon similarity, is called assor-
tative mixing. A classic example of assortative mixing is given by the study
of school integration and friendship segregation in America. Many studies
have shown that students are more likely to become friends of other students
belonging to their own ethnic group (Catania et al., 1997).
One of the characteristics shared by connected agents can be degree itself.
Positive assortativeness (or assortativity), defined as positive degree-degree
correlation, has been detected in many social networks (Newman, 2003a,b).
In this case assortative mixing can be detected by means of the correlation
between some node i’s degree and the average degree of its neighbors, where
7The field of community oriented research is quite heterogeneous and rapidly growing.
For a recent review the reader can refer to Fortunato (2010).
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If knn(k) = {knn,i|ki = k} increases (decreases) with k, there is assortative
mixing (disassortativity), that is high-degree nodes are more likely to be
connected to high-degree (low-degree) nodes.8
6.4 Static and dynamic networks
In this section, we present and discuss different network formation mecha-
nisms. First, we deal with several stochastic processes generating the link
formation mechanism. In this context, we assume that links, after their cre-
ation, do not change over time, so
δli,i
δt
= 0. In this case, the network is
static. Then, we move to describe dynamic processes of link formation. In
this context, the evolution of the link structure is dependent on agents’ ex-
perience from using their active edges, so
δli,i
δt
6= 0. In this case, there is a
continuous feedback mechanism between agents’ behavior and network evo-
lution: agents learn and adapt to a changing environment and this in turn
leads to an evolution of the network structure which, then, feeds back into
the incentives of individuals to form or sever links. In this case, the network
is dynamic.
6.4.1 Static networks
The simplest way to introduce networks within ABMs is to think that the
environment acts as a constraint on interaction, and that agents must learn
how to behave within this constraint. The issue at stake, then, is how eco-
8For a more rigorous treatment in terms of conditional probability see Caldarelli (2007,
par. 1.3)
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nomic outcomes are affected by network structures over which agents make
their decisions. By keeping the interaction environment (here represented by
the network) fixed, we can analyze, either analytically or with the help of
simulations, how state variables9 evolve within that environment. This view
of the environment is common in the sociological literature, where a great
emphasis is put on the networks in which agents are “embedded”(White,
1981; Granovetter, 1985). The relevance of this approach for economics was
outlined by the early study of Baker (1984), who showed that the volatility
of option prices depends on the structure of the communication network in
the market. Many recent contributions have confirmed this findings, ana-
lyzing the many different ways in which network structure affects economic
behavior.10
Random interactions: the Poisson model
Thanks to its simplicity and mathematical tractability, the binomial or Pois-
son model is one of the most popular models of network formation. The
network structure generated by the model is defined random network.
The model is initialized with a set of N isolated vertices. Each pair of ver-
tices is then connected with a given probability q. It is easy to see that,
according to the model, a graph having m links appears with probability
qm(1 − q)M−m, where M = 1
2
n(n − 1) is the maximum possible number
of links for an undirected graph.11 Since, for each vertex, links are added
through N − 1 independent draws with common parameter q, the degree
9State variables may represent many economic indicators, such as agents’ wealth,
knowledge, firms’ output and many more.
10There are models of network structure in foreign exchange markets (Kakade et al.,
2004), in labour markets (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004), communication and infor-
mation (DeMarzo et al., 2003), to name just a few.
11If the graph is directed, the maximum number of links is M = n(n− 1).
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follows a common binomial distribution:
p(k) =
 N − 1
k
 qk(1− q)N−1−k (6.7)
where p(k) is the probability that a randomly chosen node has degree k. As
it is well known, in the limit where N → ∞, the Binomial distribution is










= q(N − 1) ∼ qN (6.9)
The mathematical simplicity of the model comes with a cost. The Poisson
model, in fact, does not feature many properties which are routinely detected
in real networks. For example, the clustering coefficient C is low12 and equal
to q = z
N
. Therefore C tends to zero as the system gets larger and larger.
Moreover community structure and assortative mixing are absent in a random
graph.
On the other hand, one of most well known properties of the Poisson
model is the occurrence of a phase transition in connectivity when q in-
creases beyond a threshold. In fact, at a critical value for q the system
passes from a state in which there are few links and components are small,
to a state in which an extensive fraction of all vertices are joined in a sin-
gle giant component (see Figure 6.8). Crossing the threshold therefore has
12This is because in a random graph the probability of a link between two nodes is
given. Therefore it will not increase if the nodes in question are already neighbors of
another agent
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dramatic effects on whichever interaction process is taking place over the
network, favoring for example coordinated/homogeneous outcomes over un-
coordinated/heterogeneous ones.
Figure 6.8: Poisson random graph with 50 nodes below the phase transition (left) and at
the phase transition (right).
The interaction mechanism underlying the Poisson model is inherently
symmetric. It may be translated in ABM jargon as follows: in every period,
each agent interacts – i.e. she exchanges information, broadly speaking – with
a set of other agents chosen at random from the population. This mechanism
could be interpreted as a stochastic collection of information. The dynamics
generated by this process is not easy to predict. 13
The “Small-World” Model
We have seen that Poisson networks are essentially devoid of local structure.
13When agents interact in complex systems their outcomes are difficult to predict. For
example Ellison and Fudenberg’s (1995) present a model in which random local interaction
generate an inefficient outcome (inefficient conformism)
200
This conclusion is easily extended to the broader class of “generalized random
graphs”introduced by Newman (2003c), which fall outside the scope of the
present book. On the other hand, local structure, for instance under the form
of high average clustering coefficient, is a distinctive property of real-world
social networks. Milgram (1967) designed an experiment in which people
would attempt to relay a letter to a distant stranger by giving the letter
to an acquaintance, having the acquaintance give the letter to one of his or
her acquaintances, and so on. He found that, for the letters that made it
to their target, the median number of intermediate acquaintances was five.
This result became the source of the popular notion of the “six degrees of
separation” between any two individuals in the world.
Milgram’s result implies that in real social networks, distances between
individuals are as low as in a random network, notwithstanding the fact that
most of the interactions, contrary to what happens in random graphs, are
local and high clustered. The so-called “small-world” model of Watts and
Strogatz (1998) explains this paradox with the help of network theory. In
order to describe the model, we must introduce the notion of average path










where di,j is the geodesic distance from node i to j. In the terminology of
network theory, small-worlds exist when a network exhibits both high average
clustering coefficient and low average path length.
The starting point of the “small-world” model is an r-dimensional lattice
with periodic boundary condition 14. If r = 1, this network can be repre-
14A lattice (with periodic boundary condition) is a deterministic network where each
node has a fixed (and equal) number of neighbors, whose value is determined by a distance
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sented as a ring whose vertices are connected to their z closest neighbors, as
shown in figure (6.9-a).
Figure 6.9: Regular graph with n = 25 nodes and z = 3 (left a). Small World graph with
n = 25 nodes and z = 3 created by choosing at random a fraction p of edges in the graph
and moving one end of each to a new location, also chosen uniformly at random. (right
b).
The small-world model is then created by taking a small fraction of the
edges in this graph and “rewiring” them. The rewiring procedure involves
going through each edge in turn and, with probability q, reconnecting that
edge to a new one chosen uniformly at random from the lattice, except that
no double edges or self-edges are included. With probability 1− q, thus, the
edge is not reconnected. When q = 0, the small-world network is obviously
coincident with the original lattice. In this case the clustering coefficient
is C = (3z − 3)/(4z − 2), which tends to 3/4 for large z, which means
that average clustering is non vanishing in the limit of large network size.
The regular lattice, however, does not show the small-world effect, since the
average geodesic distance grows linearly with n. In fact, in this case the mean
geodesic distances between vertices tend to n/4z for large n. When q = 1,
every edge is rewired to a new random location and the graph is almost a
random graph, with typical geodesic distances on the order of log n − z ∼
log n, but very low clustering C ∼ z/n. Via numerical simulation, the authors
threshold d̄. If d̄ = 1, the lattice can be depicted as a grid spanning a r-dimensional space.
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have proved that, between the extremes p = 0 and p = 1, there is a region
in which clustering is high and average path length is simultaneously low. In
this region, a ’small-world’ network configuration finally emerges.
The small-world effect has important implications for the dynamics of
processes taking place on networks. In particular, any coordination process
will be facilitated, thus increasing the likelihood of a coordinated outcome,
since communication across the entire set of agents is made simpler by low
average distances, even if interaction is mostly local. Following this idea, Wil-
hite (2001) has built a simple bilateral search and trade model, comparing by
simulation alternative network configurations with respect to their ability to
deliver a single equilibrium market price under the same trading mechanism.
In this framework, the small-world network is seen as a intermediate config-
uration between purely global (i.e. equivalent to a complete network) and
purely local interaction. Simulation results show that, although the complete
network converges more rapidly to equilibrium than any other configuration,
the small-world network is able to reach equilibrium with a significant sav-
ing of search efforts. Thus small-world networks emerge as a more realistic
configuration for market exchange, since they take into account the fact that
economic agents are willing to economize on search efforts, while on the same
time retaining the efficiency of global interaction.
6.4.2 Dynamic networks
In economics the assumption of static network is satisfactory only as an initial
approximation, since what is most important is the mechanism underlying
link formation, i.e. network evolution. Why do different individuals interact
with each other? Which motivation pushes agents to communicate with
particular individuals and, perhaps, to follow their indications?
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Some agents may prefer to trade with some others according, for instance,
to their geographical position, their loyalty or their popularity. In general,
this means that there is some variable which affects linking probabilities,
introducing a deviation from symmetric models like the Poisson network:
some agents are preferred as partners because of some quality, which may
be network-related or not. In both cases, this quality may be interpreted as
a fitness measure of the agent over the network in question. To illustrate
this idea, in this subsection we are going to present the well known model
of preferential attachment, which employs degree itself as a fitness measure,
along with its generalization to arbitrary fitness measures.
Fitness networks
A classical example of network formation is given by the work of Price
(1965) on citations among scientific publications. In this study nodes are
represented by articles, and a directed edge indicates that article i cites
article j. Let p(k) be the fraction of vertices with in-degree k, i.e. with k
citations. According to the model, new nodes are continually added to the
network. Each new vertex has a certain out-degree (number of cited papers),
which is fixed permanently at the creation of the vertex. The out-degree may
vary across nodes but its average value z is constant over time. The model
finally dictates that the probability of a new article linking to an existing one





where Din stands for the sum of in-degrees across agents, which acts as
a normalization constant. It is possible to show that, under this assump-
tion, the in-degree follows a power-law distribution p(k) ∝ k−a (e. g. Vega-
Redondo, 2007: pp. 67-70), which is a good descriptor of the empirical degree
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distribution found in citation networks, as well as in many other domains.
For instance, Simon (1955) found that the power-law distribution of wealth
could be explained as a consequence of a “rich get richer” process which is
similar to the Price model. Barabasi and Albert (1999) applied an equiva-
lent “preferential attachment” scheme to an undirected network in order to
obtain a growth model for the Web, which has become a widely employed
benchmark in the field of complex networks. Other models, like Dorogovtsev
and Mendes (2001), have removed some of the constraints of the original
Price’s model, e. g. by allowing the addition of new out-going edges from
incumbent nodes or the deletion/rewiring of existing links.
An important generalization of the preferential attachment scheme is pro-
vided by Bianconi and Barabasi (2001). In their model, each newly appear-
ing vertex i is given a fitness value fi that represents its attractiveness and
hence its propensity to accrue new links. It is worth to underline the dif-
ference between preferential attachment and fitness: when one considers a
fitness algorithm it is true that the larger the fitness the larger the degree,
but the converse implication does not hold anymore, since the larger degree
becomes only a consequence of an intrinsic quality. It is easy to see that
fitness based linking lends itself more naturally to economic interpretation
than preferential attachment. For instance, it seems reasonable to expect
that agents entering some market will observe incumbents’ performance or
reputation, and they will accordingly decide to communicate with and/or
conform with the most successful ones.
A simple example of fitness algorithm is implemented by Tedeschi et al.
(2012). In this model, directed links are created and deleted by agents seeking
advice from a single other agent, who is selected as advisor on the basis of
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a fitness parameter given by its wealth. Agents start with the same initial
wealth Wt, but some agents may become richer than others as time goes
by. Agents’ fitness at time t is defined as their wealth relative to the wealth





Each agent i starts with one outgoing link with a random agent j, and
possibly with some incoming links from other agents. Links are rewired at
the beginning of each period in the following way: each agent i cuts its
outgoing link with agent k and forms a new link, with a randomly chosen







Otherwise, he maintains its existing link with probability 1 − pir. The
rewiring algorithm is designed so that successful agents gain a higher number
of incoming links. Nonetheless the algorithm introduces a certain amount of
randomness, and links with more successful agent have a positive probability
to be deleted in favor of links with less successful agents. This randomness
helps unlocking the system from the situation where all agents link to the
same individual.
In table (6.3), left side, we plot one snapshot of the configuration of
the resulting network. The graph shows that few rich agents co-exist and
compete for popularity. Moreover the network is very centralized, with a
small number of rich agents. The topology of the network is different from
that of a Poisson random graph, which would require degrees to follow the
Binomial (or Poisson) distribution, but closer to the topology of real world
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networks, where some agents are found to have a disproportionately large
number of incoming links while others have very few. In fact, Table. (6.3),
right side, shows that the decumulative distribution function (DDF) of the
































































































































































Table 6.3: Network configuration (left side). The decumulative distribution function
(DDF) of the in-degree (right side).
It is important to emphasize that in this model links are re-updated every
time step via the agents’ fitness. In this way, the network topology evolves
and changes during the simulation. This mechanism of links formation allows
authors to study under which assumptions a successful agent endogenously
rises and falls over time, and how imitation affects the network structure and
the agents’ wealth. The evolutionary dynamics is clearly shown in Figure
6.10, where the authors plot the index of the current winner (black solid
line), the percentage of incoming links to the current winner (red dotted

























Figure 6.10: The index of current winner (black solid line), the percentage of incoming
link to current winner (red dotted line) and fitness of current winner (green dashed line).
In fact, as the successful agent acquires an increasing number of links
(red line), one or more of his followers may become richer than the winner
himself, as signalled by the fact that the fitness (green line) of the winner
becomes, at times, smaller than 1. As other agents become rich they start
to be imitated more and more and eventually one of them becomes the new
successful agent.
6.5 Conclusions
Understanding the influence that socio-economic systems has on agents and
the generation of complex environments by heterogeneous individuals re-
quires an exploration of the phenomena which emerge when different types
of agents interact and the influence that the system has on the mechanisms
driving agent interaction. In other words, agent interaction becomes a cru-
cial point to understand how a macro coherent behavior may emerge from
208
individual behavior. Since interaction depends on differences in information,
motives, knowledge and capabilities, this implies heterogeneity of agents and
externalities. Thus economic organization may be achieved in a way that
is parallel and distributed (that is, without a devise acting as a central co-
ordinator). Self-organization, i.e. a process where a structure appears in
a system without a central authority or external element imposing it, is a
possible description of the invisible hand or of spontaneous order. The anal-
ysis of agents’ interaction becomes, thus, the ingredient to understand the
bijective mapping between individuals and environment.
Network theory deals with the structure of interaction within a given
multi-agent system. Consequently, it is naturally interested in the statistical
equilibrium of these systems, to be defined as the stability of probability dis-
tributions of observables, which implies “a state of macroscopic equilibrium
maintained by a large number of transition in opposite directions” (Feller,
1957 356). Following this path, we come close to the idea, championed by
Aoki and Yoshikawa (2006), of reconstructing macroeconomics under the
theoretical framework of statistical physics and combinatorial stochastic pro-
cesses. Not surprisingly, the same methods (which were originally developed
to study systems made of large numbers of interacting micro-units by means
of a set of macro state variables) are now of fundamental importance in the
field of network theory and, for the same reasons, they are expected to take
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the problem of analysing the behaviour of an agent-
based (AB) model. The problem is similar to the one faced by any modelling
methodology: the researcher sets up the rules of the game, but does not know
in advance the implications of those rules. Actually, it is in this a-priori un-
certainty about the model outcomes, and the relationship between the model
outputs and the model inputs, that rests the value of developing a model.
However, the techniques to gain understanding about the model behaviour
differ substantially across modelling methodologies, and they remain quite
under-explored in the AB literature. In nuts, in a simulation model only in-
ductive knowledge about its behaviour can be gained, by repeatedly running
the model under different samples from the parameter space.
The analysis of this inductive evidence has to confront with the a priori
unknown stochastic properties of the model. The easiest case is when, for
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any values of the parameters, the model is stationary and ergodic: in these
circumstances it is generally possible, with a reasonable number of experi-
ments, to characterize both the equilibrium properties of the model and the
adjustment dynamics to the equilibria. On the other hand, non-stationarity
renders the analytical concepts of equilibrium and adjustment dynamics in-
applicable, while non-ergodicity might hinder the same possibility of fully
describing the behaviour of the model. A preliminary analysis to discrimi-
nate between these cases is therefore necessary, and it can only be done by
statistical testing. In the chapter we provide examples of the tests that can
be used to detect both stationarity and ergodicity.
These properties in turn affect the types of subsequent analyses that can
be performed, and the interpretation of the results. The techniques that
are used to describe the relationships between the different variables of the
model are referred to in general terms as sensitivity analysis (SA). Although
a complete survey of these techniques is outside the scope of this chapter, we
briefly describe them and offer an example of how they can be applied to a
specific AB model.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the notion
of statistical equilibria, and discusses the effects of non-stationarity. Our
starting point is the input-output transformation (IOT) function that we
derived in chapter 3
yt = gt(Z0,θ). (7.1)
which relates the initial conditions Z0 = {X0, s} (the initial state of the
system X0 and the random seed s) and the parameters θ to the outcome of
interests y. Section 7.3 surveys the main techniques to gain understanding
of this function, that fall into the broad discipline of SA. Finally, section 7.4
offers our conclusions.
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To proceed in this analysis, a first step is to choose the outcome variables
y to focus on, and the time period. In order to understand the behaviour of
the system, we have to characterize its regularities.
7.2 Long-run and transient equilibria
7.2.1 Definitions
As we have seen at the beginning of this book, in chapter 2, one important
difference between analytical models and AB models lies in the definition
of equilibrium. In analytical models, equilibrium is defined as a consistency
condition in the behavioural equations: agents (whether representative or
not) must act consistently with their expectations, and the actions of all the
agents must be mutually consistent. This is the methodological prescription
of rational expectations which we have examined in chapter 4, and logically
operates at an individual level before action (and interaction) takes place.
Like a man standing on one foot who gets pushed away but manages to
remain poised on his one leg, the system is always in equilibrium, even during
a phase of adjustment after a shock has hit. AB models, on the other hand,
are characterized by adaptive expectations, according to which consistency
might or might not arise, depending on the evolutionary forces that shape the
system. An equilibrium can therefore be defined only at the aggregate level
and only in statistical terms, after the macro outcomes have been observed.
Definition For each statistics yt(Z0,θ), a statistical equilibrim is reached,
in a given time window (
¯
T, T̄ ), if yt is stationary.
Stationarity of yt implies that each observation carries information about
some constant properties of the data generating process (DGP). By station-
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arity, here and in the rest of the chapter, we mean weak stationarity. A
stochastic process yt is (weakly) stationary if E(yt) = µ, that is, its expected
value is independent of t, and if Cov[yt, yt+h] exists, is finite and depends only
on h and not on t. Note the difference between weak and strict stationarity.
Strict stationarity requires that yt has the same distribution for every t, and
the joint distribution of (yt, yt+1, yt+2, ..., yt+h) depends only on h and not on
t. Note that strict stationarity does not necessarily imply weak stationarity,
as finite variance is not assumed in the definition of strong stationarity. An
example of a stationary process is white noise yt ∼ WN(0, σ2), with
Cov[yt, yt+h] =
σ
2 if h = 0
0 if h 6= 0
White noise is stationary but may not be strictly stationary.1 Examples
of non-stationary series are the returns in a stock market, where there is
clustered volatility (the variance changes over time); trend stationary series
that can be transformed to stationary series by subtracting a function of time,
and difference stationary series that can be transformed into stationary series
by first differentiation.
The statistical equilibrium can then be described by the mean of yt be-
tween
¯
T and T̄ , which we denote as µ∗:
µ∗ = E[yt|t ∈ (
¯
T, T̄ )] = g∗(Z0,θ) (7.2)
We then distinguish between two types of statistical equilibria: long-run
equilibria and transient equilibria.
1A Gaussian white noise, where yt is identically independent distributed (i.i.d.) Gaus-
sian yt ∼ N(0, σ2), is strictly stationary.
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Definition A simulation model is said to reach a long-run statistical equi-




T + τ), τ → ∞. On the other hand,
a statistical equilibrium is said to be transient if yt(Z0,θ) is stationary in
(
¯
T, T̄ ) but is no longer stationary in (T̄, T̄ + τ), τ > 0.
Long-run equilibria are stable regularities of the system: once the system
is in a long-run equilibrium, it cannot move out. Because the system is deter-
ministic, for any given value of the initial conditions (including the random
seed) and the parameters, there can be at most one long-run statistical equi-
librium y∗. However, there might be many transient equilibria: for instance,
a model can oscillate between two (or more) transient statistical equilibria.
A hypothetical example of a long-run equilibrium is the “natural” unem-
ployment rate in a model of the labour market, while an example of a tran-
sient equilibrium could be the (supposedly constant) speed of adjustment
to this long-run steady state. Once the model is in the long-run equilib-
rium, period-to-period deviations from the natural unemployment rate are
mainly due to noise, and no further adjustment can be detected: the tran-
sient equilibrium has vanished. Alternatively to the case of a constant speed
of adjustment, long periods of sustained unemployment might take place,
before the unemployment rate eventually sets to its long-run level. If the
unemployment rate were approximately constant during those periods, they
would define (possibly many) transient equilibria. Finally, we might have a
model where the unemployment rate can be either low or high, with random
switches from one (transient) equilibrium to the other. Note that a model can
display both transient and long-run equilibria (as in the speed of adjustment
example), only transient equilibria (the multiple unemployment regimes), or
only a long-run equilibrium (one long-run steady state, but variable speed of
adjustment).
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7.2.2 Uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibria
The condition under which the model, irrespective of the initial conditions,
will always converge to the same statistical equilibria µ∗(Z0,θ) = µ
∗(θ)
is ergodicity of the time series yt. Intuitively, this means that the model
will always exhibit the same type of qualitative behaviour, irrespective of
the initial conditions: therefore, if a (long run or transient) equilibrium is
reached, it will be the same in all simulation runs, given the same values of
the parameters θ. Starting from a different initial state X0 or employing a
different seed s might change the timing of the equilibrium, that is the period
of time over which yt is stationary, but it would not change the equilibrium
level µ∗.
On the other hand, non-ergodic models are sensitive to the initial con-
ditions, including the random seed. This is due to strong persistence in
the underlying processes: the random seed representing the legacy from the
past. Run the model twice, with the same values of the parameters and the
same initial state but different seeds, and the model will display different
transient equilibria, and finally set to different long run equilibria (long-run
steady-state levels).
To continue with our previous example, non-ergodicity implies multiple
unemployment regimes, but in a fundamentally different way from the mul-
tiple transient equilibria of our ergodic example. In the ergodic case, the
model is able to endogenously switch between different regimes (hence the
equilibria are transient) while in the non-ergodic case each regime defines a
parallel universe, with no possibility of travelling across different universes.
Multiple long run equilibria are possible only in non-ergodic models. This
can be an interesting feature of the model, that can open up new possibilities
for policies (which might be able to provide appropriate “reset” events and
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exogenously move the system away from one “bad” equilibrium to a “good”
one).
More technically, ergodicity is a property that concerns the memory of
a process. An ergodic process is characterized by weak memory, so that as
the length of the time series we observe increases, our understanding of the
process increases as well. In a non-ergodic process, by converse, persistence
is so high that little information is provided by analysing a sub-sample of the
process, no matter how long this time series is.







Cov(yt, yt−k) = 0 (7.3)
which means that events far away from each other can be considered as
almost independent. This implies that if some event can happen, by waiting
for long enough it will happen, regardless of what has happened in the past
or what will happen in the future.
If yt is ergodic, the observation of a unique time series provides infor-
mation that can be used to infer about the model IOT function (7.1): the
process is not persistent and in the long run different time series (produced
by the same IOT function) will have the same properties. If the number
of observations of one single time series increases, the information we have
about the IOT function increases as well.
Note that stationarity and ergodicity are different concepts, and one does
not imply the other. A typical example of a stationary non-ergodic process is
a constant series. Consider a process that consists in the draw of a number y1
from a given probability distribution, and remains constant thereafter: yt =
y1 for every t. The process is strictly stationary (yet degenerated since yt is
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extracted from a distribution with mean y1 and variance 0), and non-ergodic.
Any observation of a given realization of the process provides information
only on that particular process and not on the IOT function. An example
of a non-stationary but ergodic process, that will be discussed below, is
yt = yt−1 + ut, ut ∼ N(0, 1).
An implication of the uniqueness of the long-run equilibrium in ergodic
models is that, if the expected value and the variance exist and are finite, the
simulated mean m(θ) converges, both over time and over the replications s
of the simulation, to the theoretical limiting expected value of the underlying







The properties of the time series generated by the model are constant both in
time and across replications: therefore, they can be inferred from the sample
moments. In other words, the simulated mean of y, computed either over
time or over replications, is a consistent estimator of the theoretical limiting
expected value. On the contrary, if yt is stationary but not ergodic, different
long-run equilibria are obtained, for the same values of the parameters, de-
pending on the initial conditions. This can be regarded as a case of multiple
statistical equilibria.
Moreover, the transient equilibria, if any, are also independent on the
initial conditions. However, since the transient equilibria are defined over a
finite period of time, they will inevitably differ when computed for different
initial conditions, and convergence over time is simply not defined. Con-
sider again our example of a constant speed of adjustment to the long-run
2If yt is strictly stationary, any simulated moment —not only the mean— converges
to its theoretical counterpart, if it exists.
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equilibrium. Here yt is the period-to-period speed of adjustment, defined
as yt = |ut−ut−1ut−1 |, with u being the unemployment rate, while m(yt) is the
average speed of adjustment between
¯
T and T̄ .
If we run the simulation for different initial conditions Z0, we obtain
different average speeds of adjustment, irrespective of whether the model
is ergodic or not, simply because each of these averages are computed over
a limited number of simulated observations (the limited length of the ad-
justment process T̄ −
¯
T ). However, if the model is ergodic, the differences
between different runs are not statistically significant, so that we can in-
crease our knowledge of the theoretical limiting moment of the underlying
DGP conditional on the parameters used for the simulation, µ∗(θ), by aver-
aging over the moments ms computed for different seeds (more in general,





The simulated moments are consistent (over the replications) estimators of
the theoretical limiting moment.
Note how flexible and powerful this descriptive apparatus is. For in-
stance, a model can show a long-run statistical equilibrium for, say, GDP.
This means that after an initial adjustment period up to
¯
T , the GDP series
becomes stationary, with constant mean and variance. If the system receives
a transitory shock, it moves away from the statistical equilibrium. However,
once the shock has passed, if the model is ergodic it comes back to the pre-
vious steady state, after an adjustment phase. If we re-run the model and
shock it 100 times, it would always come down to the same equilibrium: we
will say in chapter 9 that this means that the model is well suited for estima-
tion. Moreover, it might happen that during the adjustment process some
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other transformation of the state of the system, for instance the speed of
adjustment to the equilibrium level of GDP, becomes stationary. This new
regularity breaks down when GDP reaches its steady state: it is therefore a
transient statistical equilibrium.
It is possible that a model displays no absorbing equilibrium for a given
variable of interest. To continue with our example, think of the evolution of
GDP, with business cycle fluctuations of different amplitude and duration,
and intermittent crises. This is an interesting case for many AB modellers,
who essentially see the world as a disequilibrium process. Even in such
situations however, it might be possible to find long-run statistical regulari-
ties with respect to some other variable, for instance the distribution of the
length and depth of recessions. Moreover, there might be other regularities
which are only transient, and vanish as the simulated time goes by (think for
example of the effects of fiscal policies on GDP growth, which are very differ-
ent depending on whether the economy is close to full employment or not).
Again, if they are stable enough across different replications, they might be
used to characterise the behaviour of the model (hence for estimation, see
chapter 9). If, on the other hand, the model exhibits no regularities whatso-
ever, no matter how the data are transformed, then one might argue that it is
of limited explanatory (not to say predictive) help: “everything can happen”
is hardly a good theory. So, when AB researchers speak of disequilibrium
or out-of-equilibrium analysis, what they have in mind is really transient
statistical equilibrium analysis of some sort.
To recap, understanding whether a simulated time series produced by the
model is stationary and whether it is ergodic is crucial for characterizing the
model behaviour. The prescription therefore —following Hendry (1980)—
can only be “test, test, test”.
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A number of stationary tests are available and can be performed on the
simulated time series. In the Appendix, we describe as an example a non-
parametric test for the stationarity of given moments of a simulated time
series. Non-parametric tests are in general more suited for AB models, as
they do not impose structure on the IOT function of the model, which at this
stage of the analysis is still largely unknown. Moreover, the limited power
of many non-parametric tests can in principle be overcome by increasing at
will the length of the artificial time series, something that cannot obviously
be done with real data.3
On the contrary, ergodicity is in general not testable in the real data, as
we typically have only one historical time series available. This of course does
not mean that the issue must be ignored in empirical applications: if the real
world (“Nature”) is non-ergodic, using the observed data to make inference
about the real world IOT function, or about the structure of the underlying
DGP, is more problematic. Indeed, it is difficult to claim that Nature is in
facts ergodic and that present events are not affected by (at least some) event
of the past. All the researcher is left with in this case are statements about
the true DGP that are conditional on the realization of these past events.4
In an AB model, the function to be described is the model IOT function;
fortunately, the “veil of ignorance” about this function is much lighter than
with real data, as the model DGP is known, while the real world DGP is
unknown. In other words, the researcher is the God of her artificial world,
although a non-omniscient God: she sets up the rules of the game, but does
not know in advance what the results will be. However, she can re-play her
artificial worlds at will, thus generating new time series that can provide
more information on the behaviour of the system.
3Computing time can of course be an issue, in practice.
4Whether this is satisfactory or not depends on the objectives of the analysis.
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This difference has an important implication: the ergodic properties of a
simulation model are in principle testable, as we can produce as many time
series as we wish, as long as we wish. And they should be tested, as we cannot
content with conditional statements on initial conditions in understanding
our system behaviour: real initial conditions being in some sense legitimized
by history, while the initial conditions chosen by the experimenter being often
more arbitrary.
In the Appendix to this chapter, we suggest an application of the same
non-parametric test used for stationarity for testing ergodicity of the artificial
time series generated by an AB model.
7.2.3 Implications of stationarity and ergodicity
To summarize, if the model is ergodic — with respect to an outcome y and
for given values of the structural parameters θ— each simulated time series
yt can be used to characterize the IOT function, at the given values of the
parameters, once “enough” time is passed to wash away the memory of the
initial conditions. If, in addition, the model is also stationary in a given
time interval, the time series can be used to characterize the (long-run or
transient) equilibria of the system.
On the other hand, if the model is non ergodic, each time series yt is only
informative of one possible outcome, given the values of the parameters.
Then, multiple runs of the model should be used and variation across runs
exploited in order to characterize, in distributional terms, the properties of
the system at the sampled values of the parameters.
A natural question then arises whether it is more convenient to always
treat the model as non-ergodic, and examine the outcomes of multiple runs
–i.e. many “short” time series– rather than only one “long” time series. The
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answer is that it is often important to characterize the equilibrium of the
system, that is its stationary behaviour, possibly after a prolonged phase of
adjustment: analysing “long” time series allow to test for stationarity and
identify the equilibrium.
A second remark concerns the fact that the stationarity / ergodicity anal-
ysis is only valid locally, i.e. for specific values of the parameters: the model
DGP can be stationary or ergodic for some values of the parameters, and
non-stationary or non-ergodic for some other values.5 Hence, in principle
the analysis should be repeated for every sampled point of the IOT func-
tion, assuming by a continuity argument that the results also hold in be-
tween different points in the parameter space. When the form of the model
DGP induces to expect some discontinuity in the behaviour of the system
for specific values of the parameters, these values should be included in the
experimental design and duly explored. More in general, the choice of the
points in the parameter space to be sampled, together with the overall design
of the experiments that are performed in order to gain understanding about
the IOT function, is the focus of sensitivity analysis.6
7.3 Sensitivity analyis of model output
The statistical techniques to analyse the behavioyr of the IOT function are
called sensitivity analysis (SA). SA represents not only the final step in
analysing the model behaviour, but can also be regarded as an essential
step in the model building process itself, since it provides the analytical tools
which allow to simplify the model structure by identifying its nonrelevant
parts.
5See the examples in the Appendix to this chapter.
6See for instance Box et al. (1978); Kleijnen and van Groenendaal (1992).
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More in details, SA can be defined as “the study of how uncertainty in the
output of a model can be apportioned to different sources of uncertainty in
the model input” (Saltelli et al., 2004). Such definition reflects the modeler’s
imperfect knowledge of the system, i.e. imperfect knowledge of the IOT
function. By means of SA the relative importance of the parameters in
influencing the model output can be assessed. This also allows to identify
possible interactions among the input factors and hence critical regions in
the input factor space, with respect to the conditions of most sensitivity of
the model output to some specific factors.
7.3.1 Settings for SA
There exist three main settings for SA, namely factor screening, local SA,
and global SA (Saltelli, 2000).
1. Factor screening aims at designing experiments to identify the most
influential factors in models characterized by a large number of inputs.
Often, only a few input factors have a significant effect on the model
output. Screening experiments can be used to rank the input factors
in order of importance. The experiments are generally one-at-time
(OAT) designs, which evaluate the main effect of changes in single
factors (Daniel, 1973), as well as factorial experiments, which evaluate
both the main effects and the impact of factor interactions.7
2. Local SA focuses on the impact of small variations in the input factors
around a chosen nominal value (base point). It generally assumes linear
7In particular, full factorial designs and fractional factorial designs are commonly
adopted. A full factorial design is applied when the factors assume discrete values and
considers all possible combinations of values across all factors, allowing to assess both the
main effects and the impact of factor interactions. A fractional factorial design consists
of a carefully chosen subset of the experimental runs of the corresponding full factorial
design.
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input-output relationships and involves the evaluation of the partial
derivatives of the output functions with respect to the input factors.
The experiments are generally OAT designs.
3. Global SA involves the estimation of the factor probability density func-
tions, investigates the role of their scale and shape, and allows for the
simultaneous variation of all factors over the whole factor space. The
sensitivity is measured over the entire range of each input parameter.
Global SA is particularly relevant for AB models as linear OAT sensi-
tivities are ill-suited for nonlinear models characterized by high factor
interaction and input uncertainty of various order of magnitude (Cukier
et al., 1973).
7.3.2 Strategies for SA
Different SA strategies may be applied, depending on the setting. Moreover,
given the manifold purposes of SA, a preliminary characterization of its ob-
jectives is essential. In particular, of fundamental importance is the adoption
of the most suitable measure of sensitivity depending on the desired definition
of factor importance. In fact, each importance measure generally produces its
own factor ranking. Most measures rely on variance decomposition formulas
of the model output with respect to the input factors, since the variance is
generally regarded as a proxy for uncertainty.8 In choosing the appropriate
sensitivity measure, a model-free approach should be followed, i.e. choosing
a sensitivity measure which is independent of the model characteristics, such
as linearity, monotonicity, additivity.
Saltelli et al. (2008) describe four basic strategies, together with some
associated sensitivity measures, namely factor prioritization, factor fixing,
8Other measures can also be used, e.g. entropy (Saltelli et al., 2000)
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factor mapping, and metamodeling.
1. Factor prioritization identifies as the most influential the factor Xi
causing on average, keeping its distribution fixed, the greatest reduction
in the variance of the output Y . The associated sensitivity measure is
the first-order sensitivity index Si of Xi on Y , i.e. the average partial





/V (Y ) (7.6)
where X−i indicates all factors but Xi. The numerator represents the
variance, over all possible values of Xi, of the conditional expectation of
Y taken over all factors but Xi. The denominator is the unconditional
variance of Y .
2. Factor fixing aims at simplifying the model by fixing the factors which
do not appreciably affect the output in their range of variation. This
has to be evaluated taking into account both the first-order effect Si,
which describes the direct effect of Xi on Y , and the higher-order ef-
fects, which describe the impact of the interactions between Xi and
the other input factors. The sum of all-order effects due to Xi is called
the total effect ST i and represents a suitable sensitivity measure in this
setting. Considering the case of a three-factor model Y = f(X), where
X = (X1, X2, X3), the first-order effect of X1 on Y is labeled S1; the
second-order effects of X1 on Y are S12 and S13, respectively represent-
ing the effect of the interactions between the couples of factors (X1, X2)
and (X1, X3); finally, the third-order effect S123 measures the impact of
the interaction among all terms. The total effect of X1 on Y is given
by ST1 = S1 + S12 + S13 + S123.
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3. Factor mapping concerns the analysis of critical regions in the output
distribution, such as threshold areas. It aims at identifying the factors
producing realizations of Y into the critical range, rather than those
driving the variance of the model output. A useful mapping method
is the so called Monte Carlo filtering (Rose et al., 1991), which pro-
vides Monte Carlo realizations of Y corresponding to different sampled
points in the input factor space. Next, it filters the realizations into two
subsets depending on whether they belong or not to the critical region.
Then, statistical hypothesis testing is performed to check whether the
two subsets represent samples from the same distribution. An input
factor is identified as important if the distribution functions of the gen-
erated samples prove to be statistically different (Saltelli et al., 2004).
4. Metamodeling, or model approximation, aims at identifying an approx-
imation of the IOT function, i.e. a simple relationship between the
input factors and the model output that fits the original model well
enough. This simplification is due to regularity assumptions that allow
to infer the value of the output at untried points in the input space,
based on information from nearby sampled points. Hence, a surro-
gate model is identified, which contains the subset of the input factors
accounting for most of the output variability. Clearly, this approach
generally misses relevant high-order interaction terms and fails in the
case of heavily discontinuous mapping.
In particular, Gaussian process emulators are often used as surrogate
models. Emulators are particular types of meta-models: more than just
an approximation, they make fully probabilistic predictions of what the
actual simulation model (the simulator) would produce (Santner et al.,
2003; O’Hagan, 2006; Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). Differently from
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Figure 7.1: The output of an emulator. The vertical axis measures the model outcome
y, the horizontal axis measures the model inputs, for instance a parameter θ. Source:
OHagan2006.
regression-based meta-models, emulators are non-parametric interpola-
tors that pass through all the training points: if asked to predict the
simulator output at one of the training data points, an emulator re-
turns the observed output with certainty. Moreover, if asked to predict
the simulator output at a point that has not been sampled (and that
has consequently not being used to train the emulator), an emulator
returns a distribution of possible outcomes, reflecting the uncertainty
over the quality of the approximation. Gaussian process emulators
model this uncertainty under the assumption of Gaussian errors. Fig-
ure 7.1 depicts a standard output of an emulator, where the uncertainty
is reduced as more points in the parameter space are sampled.
This list of SA strategies is not exhaustive and other strategies can be de-
fined, depending on both the specific objective of the SA and further consid-
erations about the model under investigation, e.g. its computational burden,
the number of input factors and their theoretical interactions, other features
such as linearity, monotonicity, additivity.9
9Also, many software products for SA exist; (Chan et al., 2000) offer a brief review of
some of them.
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7.3.3 SA and AB modeling: some applications
The literature provides just a few examples of SA applied to AB model-
ing. Kleijnen et al. (2003) assess the soundness of design of experiments
techniques when carefully applied on a small subset of input factors. As an
example, Happe (2005) and Happe et al. (2006) propose a combined design
of experiment and metamodeling setting applied to AgriPoliS, a spatial and
dynamic simulation model developed to investigate the impact of agricultural
policies on regional structural change. At first, a full factorial design is used
to investigate both the first- and second-order effects of some selected factors
on a target response variable. The stochastic nature of the model is faced by
running a number of Monte Carlo experiments for each experiment. Then,
the simulation output is analysed by both graphical methods and metamod-
eling. In particular, an additive polynomial metamodel is estimated to assess
the statistical significance of the main effects and the two-factor interactions.
A stepwise Ordinary Least Squares procedure is applied to isolate and ex-
clude those factors characterized by low significance levels. Similarly, Lynam
(2002) adopts a fractional factorial design to investigate the mean effects of
a selection of factors in a multi-agent model.
Another SA application to AB modeling is described in Deffuant et al.
(2002). The authors propose an AB model of innovation diffusion to investi-
gate the effects of incentives for the conversion to organic farming in a French
department. They explore the huge parameter space and evaluate factor im-
portance by a decision tree approach (Breiman et al., 1984) on a composite
error, which estimates the deviance between the real and the simulated data
on the number of adopters and their proximity to the initial organic farmers.
In particular, their SA algorithm selects the factors and the values corre-
sponding to the smallest deviance by defining a learning set. It identifies
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the regions in the parameter space which are compatible with the real data.
Hence, this represents an example of SA in the factor mapping setting.
7.3.4 A simple example: SA on a Bass diffusion model
with local interaction
To gain further practical intuition in SA, we illustrate a very simple SA ex-
ercise based on a modified AB version of the Bass diffusion model. The
classical Bass model (Bass, 1969) describes the process of adoption of new
products by the interaction between actual and potential users. In partic-
ular, the probability of adoption for any potential user at time t depends
on an innovation coefficient p, an imitation coefficient q, and the cumulative
distribution function of adoptions F (t), i.e.
Prt(adoption) = (f(t))/(1− F (t)) = p+ qF (t) (7.7)
where f(t) is the probability density function of adoptions, and p + q < 1.
The innovation coefficient p measures an external (advertising) effect, the im-
itation coefficient q represents the internal (word-of-mouth) effect, and F (t)
can be interpreted as a global interaction term. In fact, this is an aggregated
model describing diffusion dynamics in an homogeneous population in a fully-
connected network, where each individual is aware of and influenced by the








and captures the typical S-shaped adoption curve of many products. By
reviewing the empirical work applying the Bass model to new products in-
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troduction, (Mahajan, Muller, Bass, 1995) find the average value of p and
q to be 0.03 and 0.38, respectively, with p often less than 0.01 and q in the
range [0.3, 0.5].
In the original Bass model, every potential customer is linked to all the
others by the function F (t). Alternative formulations of the network struc-
ture yield different diffusion dynamics (Fibich and Gibori, 2010). In particu-
lar, we present the case of a small-world network characterized by an average
number n of bidirectional connections per agent. Thus, the probability of
adoption for the i-th potential user does not depend anymore on the global
interaction term F (t), but on a local interaction term Ai,t, defined as the
share of individuals connected to agent i who have adopted, i.e.
Pri,t(adoption) = p+ qAi,t (7.9)
The analysis of this model is particularly simple because its stochastic
properties are immediate to check: the model is ergodic, with a deterministic
absorbing equilibrium (everybody eventually adopts) which is achieved in
finite time, given p > 0, irrespective of q and n. So, our interest lies in
characterizing how the three input parameters (p, q, n) affect the adjustment
process to the equilibrium, i.e. the adoption dynamics.
The following SA exercise focuses on the effects of the parameters onto
two output statistics Y : the cumulated curve of adoptions and the time of
adoption of the 50th percentile of the population.
Figure 7.2 shows the sensitivity of the cumulated adoption curve at the
variation of one parameter at time around a reference parameter configura-
tion, i.e. p = 0.03, q = 0.4, n = 5 on a population of 1,000 agents. To get rid
of random effects in the generation of the network, average results over 50
runs for every triple of parameters are reported. In particular, the top panel
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shows how adoption drastically speeds up when the effect of the external
influence increases, for values of p sampled in the range [0, 1] by increasing
steps of 0.05; the middle panel illustrates how the adoption dynamics become
more and more similar when the internal influence is higher, for values of q
sampled in the range [0, 1] by increasing steps of 0.05; finally, the bottom
panel shows that the cumulated adoption curves are quite indistinguishable
for an average number of connections per agent greater than 6, for integer
values of n sampled in the range [1, 30]. Hence, n seems to have the weak-
est effect on the adoption dynamics of the population (for large n), while p
somehow the strongest (for small p).
Similar results are obtained when analysing the OAT effect of the param-
eters on the average time of adoption of the 50th percentile over 50 runs. In
fact, the bottom panel of figure 7.3 shows a flat distribution for values of n
greater than 6. Moreover, the impact on the adoption speed of high values of
q is quite similar, while the 50th percentile adopts in no more than 2 periods
for values of p greater than 0.2.
However, the results of an OAT analysis are local, i.e. they are gener-
ally strongly influenced by the chosen reference point, and give no informa-
tion about the eventual impact of the interactions among inputs. In order
to overcome this limitation, a global analysis is performed by evaluating a
metamodel Y = g(X) on artificial data generated by allowing all parameters
to change. The metamodel imposes a relationship between the inputs X and
the output Y with an arbitrary functional form g, which crucially includes
interaction terms (Kleijnen and Sargent, 2000). As an example, we perform a
multivariate analysis on 1,000 parameter configurations, obtained by random
sampling the inputs from uniform distributions. In particular, p is sampled
in the range [0,0.2], q in [0,0.8] and the integer n in [1,30].
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time 50 Coeff. Std.Err.
p -417.18 11.25 ***
p2 2824.05 125.46 ***
p3 7264.88 410.95 ***
q -32.31 2.64 ***
q2 28.86 7.52 ***
q3 -14.66 6.19
n -0.41 0.08 ***
n2 -0.02 11.25 ***
n3 0.0003 0.0001
pq 107.44 4.57 ***
pn 0.92 0.12 ***
cons 30.86 0.51 ***
*** Significant at the .01%
Table 7.1: Metamodeling: OLS regression on 1,000 different parameter configurations,
obtained by random sampling from uniform distributions in the range p [0,0.2], q [0,0.8],
n [1,30]. In order to get rid of random effects, the time of adoption of the 50th percentile
is averaged over 50 runs. Adjusted R-squared = 0.84.
The preferred specification is an OLS regression of the average time of
adoption of the 50th percentile on a third order polynomial of the innovation
coefficient, the imitation coefficient and the average number of connections
per agent, plus the second-order interaction terms between p and q and be-
tween p and n (the remaining second-order and third-order interaction terms,
qn and pqn, turn out to be non significant at the 90% confidence level). Given
that pq and pn are strongly significant (see table 7.1), the OAT analysis con-
firms to have just local implications.
Moreover, this metamodeling exercise allows us to quantify and compare
the impact of variations in the parameter values. Starting from our reference
point (p = 0.03, q = 0.4, n = 5), a 20% increase in the value of p lowers the
average adoption time of the 50th percentile of about 11%; the same increase
in n lowers the adoption time of about 2%, while a 20% increase in q causes
a 8.7% variation in the output.
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Furthermore, the exercise confirms a weak impact of variations in n when
n is high, e.g. a 20% increase when n = 20 yields a 2.4% decrease in the
average adoption time of the 50th percentile.
7.4 Conclusions
The discussion above should warn against the use of AB models as an “easy”
way of model building that simply allows to bypass the difficulties of deriving
analytical results. Indeed, given the higher complexity of AB models (which
precludes the derivation of analytical solutions), one has to expect a lot of
work to understand their behaviour. To sum up, four stages are involved in
the analysis of an AB model:
1. definition of the output variable(s) of interest, Y ;
2. design of an appropriate experimental design, with the definition of the
points in the parameter space to be explored;
3. analysis of the stationarity / ergodicity properties of the system at the
chosen points;
4. sensitivity analysis of the output variables Y with respect to other
variables of the model X and of the structural parameters θ.
These steps should not be necessarily undertaken in the order specified
above, as there may be feedbacks so that loops might become necessary: for
instance, SA could be used to simplify the model structure (the model DGP),
which in turn might affect the choice of the output variables Y and the design
of the experiments. Similarly, finding that the system is non-ergodic might
imply the need to reconsider the design of the experiments, with a higher
attention to the effects of the initial conditions.
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Unfortunately, such a complete analysis of the model behaviour is very
rarely done in the literature. In particular, stationarity is often simply
checked by visual inspection, ergodicity generally disregarded, and sensitivity
analysis at best implemented with a local OAT approach around a baseline
configuration. True, global SA strategies with extensive testing for station-
arity and ergodicity at every sampled point are very difficult to implement in
large and complex models, computationally burdensome and characterized
by many output variables. On the other hand, OAT designs around one cen-
tral configuration (or a limited number of combinations) of the parameters
are generally easier to understand, and reduces the need to test for ergodic-
ity and stationarity, given the appropriate continuity assumptions: the tests
can be performed at pre-specified intervals of the variable that is allowed to
change, assuming that the results also hold for the other sampled values in
between.10
These difficulties notwithstanding, the importance of proper formal anal-
ysis of AB models should not be downplayed, if the methodology has to gain
full respectability among the scientific community. Jointly considered, the
techniques reviewed here retain a fundamental role in building and analysing
simulation models; they represent a compelling procedure in model develop-
ing, providing tools that map the input factor space into the prediction space
and back, as well as techniques to evaluate alternative model structures and
the relative importance of each input factor.
10This can also be done with multi-dimensional designs; however, the identification
of an adequate neighborhood of the tested points in which the continuity assumption is
supposed to hold becomes more complicated.
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Figure 7.2: OAT analysis: average cumulated adoption curves over 50 runs, obtained by
varying p in the range [0 : .5 : 1] (top panel), q in [0 : .5 : 1] (central panel), and n in
[1 : 1 : 30] (bottom panel). Reference parameter configuration: (pqn) = (0.030.45), 1000
agents.
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Figure 7.3: OAT analysis: average time of adoption of the 50th percentile over 50 runs,
obtained by varying p in the range [0 : .5 : 1] (top panel), q in [0 : .5 : 1] (central panel), and





7.A A stationarity test for AB models
The test which we propose to check stationarity is called Runs Test (or Wald-
Wolfowitz test). The Runs Test was developed by Wald and Wolfowitz (1940)
to test the hypothesis that two samples come from the same population.
In particular we employ an extension of the Runs Test to check the fit of
a given interpolating function (Gibbons, 1985). Suppose that we have a
time series and a function of time that is used to describe its trend. If the
trend function fits the time series well, the observations should be randomly
distributed above and below the function, regardless of the distribution of
errors. The Runs Test tests whether the null hypothesis of randomness can
be rejected or not. Given the estimated function, a 1 is assigned to any
observation above the fitted line, and a 0 to any observation below the fitted
line. Supposing that the unknown probability distribution is continuous,
there is a 0 probability that a point lies exactly on the fitted line (if, by
accident, it does happen, the point has to be disregarded). The process is
then described by a sequence of ones and zeros that represents the sequence
of observations above and below the fitted line. The statistics we use to
test the null hypothesis is the number of runs, where a run is defined as “a
succession of one or more identical symbols which are followed and preceded
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by a different symbol or no symbol at all” (Gibbons, 1985). For example in
the sequence 1,0,0,1,1,1,0 there are 4 runs: {1},{0,0},{1,1,1} and {0}. The
number of runs, too many or too few runs, may reflect the existence of non-
randomness in the sequence. Following the notation of Wald and Wolfowitz
(1940), we define the U -statistic as the number of runs, m as the number of
points above the fitted function and n as the points below the fitted function.
Under the null hypothesis of randomness around the trend, the mean and







(m+ n)2(m+ n− 1)
. (7.11)
The asymptotic distribution of U , as m and n tend to infinity (as the
observations tend to infinity) is a normal distribution.11
To sum up, the Runs test tests the hypothesis that a set of observations
is randomly distributed around a given fitting function; it tests whether the
function provides a good representation of the observed data. The idea is
to use the test described above to check the stationarity of a time series
produced by the AB model. The first step is to divide the time series into








If the moment is constant, then the “window moments” are well explained
11The derivation of the finite sample properties and of the asymptotic distribution of
U can be found in (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1940) and in (Gibbons, 1985).
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by the moment of the same order computed over the whole time series (“over-
all moment”). Here is where the Runs Test is used: if the sample moments
are randomly distributed around the “overall moment”, it is concluded that
the hypothesis of stationarity for the tested moment cannot be rejected. A
strictly stationary process will have all stationary moments, while a station-
ary process of order m in this framework means that the first m non-centered
moments are constant.
To run the test we have to choose the length of the artificial time series
to be analysed, together with the length of the windows. Under the null
hypothesis, longer windows imply a better estimation of the subsample mo-
ments, but at the same time they imply fewer windows (given the length
of the time series) and a worse approximation of the distribution of runs
toward the normal distribution. The trade off can be solved by using long
series and long windows, a solution which is often feasible in AB models (the
only drawback being increased computational time), while it is generally not
at hand with real data.
To describe the properties of the test, we check the stationarity of the
first moment (mean) of an autoregressive function of the first order:
yt = θyt−1 + εt (7.13)
with θ = 0 (strictly stationary, figure 7.A.1 (a)), θ = 0.99 (stationary,
figure 7.A.1 (b)), and θ = 1(non-stationary, figure 7.A.1 (c)), and εt a random
error with uniform distribution U(−1, 1).12
We show experiments with different window length s (1, 10, 50, 100, 500,
1000, 5000, 10000) using a time series of 100,000 observations/periods. The
12The experiment with θ = 0.99 is shown to “test” the test in an extreme case, where
the null and the alternative hypothesis are nearly indistinguishable from each other.
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performance of the test is evaluated, for every window length, over 100 Monte
Carlo replications of the stochastic process. By changing the length of the
windows we change the number of sub-samples (since the length of the time
series is fixed).
Figure 7.A.1 shows the sensitivity of the test to different sample length.
The null hypothesis is that the first moment is constant, and in turn that
the sub-time series moments are randomly distributed around the overall
first moment. We set the tolerated probability of a type I error equal to 0.05:
hence, we expect to reject the null hypothesis when the null is true in 5% of
the cases; this happens with both θ = 0 and θ = 0.99. It is interesting to
note that the length of the windows has no influence in the case of a strictly
stationary process. In particular, since every observation has the same dis-
tribution, the stationarity can be detected even when the window length is
equal to one. However, if θ = 0.99, longer windows are needed to detect the
stationarity property in order to allow the sub-time series to converge toward
the overall mean; in other words more observations are needed to obtain a
good estimation of the sub-sample moments. Non-stationarity is also simple
to detect; the test has full power (it can always reject the null when the null
is false) for all the window lengths but the ones that reduce the number of
windows under the threshold of good approximation of the normal distribu-
tion (the test can detect non-stationarity as long as the number of samples
is higher than 50).
As an additional experiment, we analyse a time series produced by an
AR(1) process as in eq. 7.13 with θ = 0, but with an error term that is
distributed as U(−1, 1) in the first part of the time series and as U(−8, 8)
in the second part. Figure 7.A.2 shows the distribution of the sub-sample
moments around the overall moments. The test (correctly) does not reject
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stationarity for the the first moment, while it refuses the null hypothesis for
the second moment.
The experiment shows the flexibility and the limits of the test. If the
length of the time series and the number of windows are properly set, the
test is highly reliable, with a power approaching 1. In case non-stationarity
is found, standard methods may be used to transform the series in stationary
ones (for example detrending or differentiating the series); the non parametric
test can then be used on the transformed series.
7.B An ergodicity test for AB models
The test described below is a test of ergodicity of the moment of order m,
where we test its invariance between different replications of the same DGP.
To this aim, the Runs test is used again, but this time in the original ver-
sion presented in Wald and Wolfowitz (1940) to test whether two samples
come from the same population. Using the notation of Wald and Wolfowitz,
suppose that there are two samples {at} and {bt}, and suppose that they
come from the continuous distributions fa(a) and fb(b). Let Z be the set
formed by the union of at and bt and arrange the set Z in ascending order
of magnitude. Eventually, create the set V , that is a sequence defined as
follows: vi = 0 if zi ∈ {at} and vi = 1 if zi ∈ {bt}. We define a run as in the
previous section, and use the number of runs, the U -statistic, to test our null
hypothesis fa(· ) = fb(· ). In the event that the null is true, the distribution
of U is independent of fa (and fb). A difference between fa(· ) and fb(· ) will
tend to decrease U . If we define m as the number of elements coming from
the sample {at} (number of zeros in V ) and n as the number of elements in
Z coming from the sample {bt} (number of ones in V ), m+n is by definition
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the total number of observations. Under the null, the mean and the variance
of the U-statistics are (7.10) and (7.11), if m and n are large, the asymptotic
distribution of U is Normal with asymptotic mean and variance.13 Given the
actual number of runs, U , computed over the two samples, we reject the null
hypothesis if U is too low (we test U against its null distribution with the
one-tailed test).
The aim here is to use this test as an ergodicity test, supposing that the
process has already passed a stationarity test. Intuitively, if the process is
ergodic the “horizontal” distribution of moments within one (long enough)
time series should be the same as the “vertical” distribution of moments
between different time series, created by different replications of the model.14
To test the ergodicity of a given moment one long time series is therefore
created and divided into sub-samples. As in the previous section, think of
100,000 periods for the entire time series, divided into 100 sub-samples of
1,000 periods each. The first sample of moments used for the Runs test
(say {at}) is formed by the moments of the 100 sub-samples of this (long)
time series. For the second sample of moments (say {bt} ) we create 100
new time series (by running each time the simulation model with a different
random seed, or with different initial conditions) of 1,000 observations each
and compute the moment of interest in each of them. Given the two samples
of moments we can then apply the Runs test as described above (merge the
two samples, arrange the observations in ascending order and compute the
runs over the sequence of ones and zeros). Under the null hypothesis, the
two samples of moments {at} and {bt} have the same distribution.
13As in the stationarity test we use the exact mean and variance to implement the test.
14Often a replication of a simulation model –an instance of the model producing a
stream of artificial data– is called a “run”. Here, to avoid confusion with the definition of
run used by the Runs test –a sequence of equal values (0 or 1) of an opportunely defined
indicator– we use “replication” instead.
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The moments in the two samples have to be computed over time series
of the same length (in our example 1,000 periods), because, under the null
hypothesis, the variance of the moments depends on the number of observa-
tions over which they are computed. If we used longer time series to build
the second sample we would produce sample of moments with lower variance,
and the Runs test would consider the two samples as coming from different
distributions.
As regards the implementation of the test, particular care should be taken
when the time series under analysis converges during the simulation toward
an asymptotic mean. Suppose that we have a time series that converges to a
long run mean in a given number of periods and then stays around that mean
for ever. In this case, the stationarity test would correctly deem the process
as stationary (with a sufficient long simulation), but even if the process is
ergodic, the ergodicity test will result in a refusal of the hypothesis with the
process being classified as non-ergodic, since in the time series used to create
the second sample of moments the memory of the initial conditions matters
more than in the sub-samples coming from the long time series used to create
the first sample of moments.
As an example, consider a simple AR(1) process yt = 0.99yt−1 +ut, where
ut ∼ N(1, 1). The process is ergodic; it starts from zero and converges toward
the asymptotic mean E(yt) = 100.
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Figure 7.B.1 illustrates the problem: the top and middle panels show the
long time series used to create the first sample of moments and (one of) the
short time series used to create the second sample of moments, respectively;
the bottom panel shows the moments computed from then 100 sub-samples
of the long time series (dots) and the moments computed from the 100 short
15In general, for a process AR(1) yt = θ0 + θ1yt−1 + ut where θ0 represent constant




time series (squares). The different effect of the initial conditions in the two
series is clearly visibile, and creates a convergence problem. The ergodicity
test will find significant differences between the two samples, and detect non-
ergodicity.
If the series converge toward a long run mean, we have to use its stationary
part only for the ergodicity test (we know the series is stationary, at least from
some point onward, from the stationarity analysis). Often, the stationary
part of the series can be identified by simple visual inspection. For example,
to build the second sample we can create a set of time series with 2,000
observations and compute the moments using the last 1,000 observations.
The ergodicity test tells us, for example, whether the first moments of a
series can be used as estimates of the true moment of the IOT. The test have
to be replicated for every moment under consideration.
To check the performances of the test we define the following process:
yt = θyt−1 + ut (7.14)
where ut ∼ N(l, 1). If l is a random variable extracted at the beginning of
the process, the process mimics a situation in which the starting conditions
have an everlasting effect on the process, and it is not ergodic, as different
replications of the process entail different extractions of l. If by converse l is
fixed once and for all, the process is ergodic.
In order to assess the performances of the test, we run 5 experiments
of 100 replications each of the test, in three different settings (θ = 0, θ =
.99, θ = 1), both in the case of an ergodic process (l = l̃ = 0) and in the case
of a non-ergodic process (l ∼ U(−5, 5)).16
16If θ = 0.99, l = l̃ 6= 0 and the starting point is y0 = 0 the process generates time
series as in figure 7.B.1: we may therefore reject ergodicity even if the process is ergodic.
To solve this convergence problem, as already discussed, we compute the moments of the
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Figure 7.B.2 shows the result. When the process is ergodic (top panel),
with θ = 0, θ = 0.99 the test suggests non-ergodicity in about 5% of the
cases (this is the chosen level for the type I error). However, if the process is
non-stationary, θ = 1, the test (erroneously) always rejects ergodicity: this is
due to the fact that the test cannot distinguish between non-ergodicity and
non-stationarity.
The bottom panel of figure 7.B.2 shows the results for of a non-ergodic
process, where an initial random draw determines the asymptotic mean of
the process. The test can detect non-ergodicity with power 1.
To further clarify how the test works, figure 7.B.3 shows the two samples
of moments used for the test for an ergodic (top panel) and a non-ergodic
(bottom panel) process. Simple visual inspection confirms that the two sam-
ples come from the same distribution in the case of an ergodic process, but
not in the case of a non-ergodic process (the dots come from the first sample,
while the squares come from the second sample).
Of course, a process may be ergodic in the first moment but non-ergodic
in the second moment or in other order moments.
To analyse the performance of the test with respect to ergodicity in second
moments we use the same framework as before (eq. 7.14) with ut ∼ N(0, l),
extracted at the beginning of the process. We consider the case of l ∼ U(1, 5)
for a non-ergodic process (the variance of the error changes across different
replications), and the case of l = l̃ = 1 for an ergodic process.
To test the second moment we simply have to build the first sample using
the second moment of the 100 sub-samples of the long time series, and the
second sample using second moment of the 100 short time series. The test is
exactly as above except for the fact that we are comparing second moments.
second sample (the moments of the 100 replications of the model) by creating time series
of 2,000 periods and computing the moments only in the last 1,000 observations.
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Figure 7.B.4 is the analog of figure 7.B.2, and shows the performance
of the test on the second order moment of an ergodic (top panel) and a
non ergodic (bottom panel) process. Only the case of θ = 0 is considered,
corresponding to strictly stationarity, as with θ → 1 (e.g. θ = 0.99) the
variance of an AR(1) process tends to infinity 17: the test always detects non-
ergodicity when the process is non-ergodic (full power), and rejects ergodicity






Finally, note that when the process is non-ergodic in the second moment
but ergodic in the first moment, as in the bottom panel of figure 7.B.4, the
ergodicity test on the first order moment (mean) gives between 20% and 30%
of non-ergodicity results. This is because the different variance of the error
implies a different variance in the first moments, so despite the fact that the
different processes have the same mean, the test detects that “something is
wrong”.
For completeness, we report the analog of figure 7.B.3 for the second
moments (figure 7.B.5).
17more observations are needed in this case to regain full power
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(a) Strictly stationary process (θ = 0)
(b) Stationary process (θ = .99)
(c) Non-stationary process (θ = 1)
Figure 7.A.1: Rejection rate for the null hypothesis of stationarity (%).
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Figure 7.A.2: The dots are the sub-sample moments, the line is the overall moment. The
first moments are randomly distributed around the overall mean (above). The second
moments are not randomly distributed around the overall moments (below).
Figure 7.B.1: The long process (above), a short process (middle) and the moments com-
puted from the sub-samples of the long process (points) and the moments computed from
the short processes (squares).
250
Figure 7.B.2: The performance of the ergodicity test. In the top panel the process is
ergodic. In the bottom panel the process is non ergodic. One experiment is made by
testing 100 times the same process using different random seeds. The experiment is made
5 times for each setting. The graphics displays the number of times the test reject the null
hypothesis of ergodicity.
Figure 7.B.3: The test checks whether there is a significant difference between two samples
of moments: one coming from sub-samples of a (long) time series produced by a single
replication of the simulation model (dots) and the other coming from (short) time series
produced by multiple replications of the simulation model (squares). Top panel: an ergodic
process. Bottom panel: a non-ergodic process.
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Figure 7.B.4: The performance of the ergodicity test on second moments. In the top panel
the process is ergodic. In the bottom panel the process is non ergodic. One experiment
is made by creating 100 instances of the same process with different random seeds. The
experiments has been done 5 times.
Figure 7.B.5: The test checks whether there is a significant difference between two samples
of moments: one coming from sub-samples of a (long) time series produced by a single
replication of the simulation model (dots) and the other coming from (short) time series
produced by multiple replications of the simulation model (squares). Top panel: an ergodic
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8.1 Introduction
Generally speaking, validation involves a judgment over the ‘quality’ of a
model. How “good” model A is? Is it “better” or “worse” than model B? A
model can be good from a certain point of view and bad, or inadequate, from
another one. Also, validation is not necessarily a 0-1 pass test: the criteria
can be continuous.
The validity of a model can be defined as the degree of homomorphism
between a certain system (the model) and another system that it purportedly
represents (the real world system).1
1See Vandierendonck (1975); Bailey (1988). As the criterion for validity, homomor-
phism is more appropriate than isomorphism, because the goal of abstraction is to map
an n-dimensional system onto an m-dimensional system, where m < n. If m and n were
equal, the systems would be isomorphic.
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Model validation can be defined along different dimensions.
First of all, no model exists without an underlying theory. A first di-
mension of validation therefore is concept validation, i.e. the validation of
the model relative to the theory: is the model consistent with the theory on
which it is based? This is common to both analytical and computational
models. The latter however need an additional level of validation (Stanislaw,
1986): program validation i.e. the validation of the simulator (the code that
simulates the model) relative to the model itself.
Second, models can be evaluated against real data. This is empirical val-
idation. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the techniques
of empirical validation of ABMs in economics. It requires (i) the choice of
the relevant empirical indicators (so that the theoretical framework can be
validated relative to its indicators) and (ii) the validation of the empirical
true value relative to its indicator.
Empirical validation is often the basis for theory validation – the valida-
tion of the theory relative to the simuland (the real-world system).2
Empirically validating an ABM means, broadly speaking, “taking the
model to the data”, in the form of empirical and/or experimental data, his-
torical evidence or even anecdotal knowledge.3
Empirical validation may concern the model inputs and/or outputs. In-
put validation refers to the realism of the assumptions. There are two classes
of inputs of an ABM. The first one consists of structural assumptions con-
2This is not always the case. Philosophical theories for instance are often not testable
in the data.
3A large literature has been developed on empirical validation of simula-
tion models in other social sciences, computer science, engineering, etc.: for
an introduction, see Leigh Tesfatsion’s web site on empirical validation at
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/empvalid.htm. For some examples of alter-
native empirical validation techniques in simulation models, see Klejinen (2000); Sargent
(1998); Barreteau (2003).
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cerning the behavior of the agents or the pattern of their interactions. Ex-
amples include a particular bounded-rationality rule that we assume agents
follow (e.g. a mark-up price setting rule); or a peculiar type of network (for
instance, a small-world) governing the interactions among agents.4 Empiri-
cally validating the structural assumptions of an AB consists in using data
to understand if these assumptions are in line with the behaviors and inter-
actions of real-world agents populating the economy that we want to study
(e.g. an industry or a market). Of course, the actual implementation of the
model may differ according to the particular parameters that fine tune the
structural assumptions, e.g. the mark-up parameter or the clustering-path
length ratio in a small-world network.
The second class of inputs consists of parameters and the initial conditions
for all relevant micro and macro variables.
Output validation means checking whether the model generates “plausi-
ble” implications, that is whether the model delivers output data that re-
semble in some way real-world observations. Note that output validation is
a joint test on the structure of the model and the values of the parameters.
This explains why and how input and output validation are connected. In-
deed, output validation can be used to refine the parameters of the model:
this is called calibration or estimation.5 Estimation is an attempt to make
the behavior of the model as close as possible to the real behavior; output
validation is a judgment on how far the two (still) are. A model where the
parameters have not been properly estimated and are, for instance, simple
4These structural assumptions are more specific than the basic modeling choices – e.g.
the type of agents that populate the model economy and the choices these agents have to
make – which are the object of concept validation.
5In this Chapter, we shall use the terms calibration and estimation substantially as
synonyms. There are however subtle and important differences in the two practices, as we
will discuss in Chapter 9.
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guesses can of course be validated. However, by definition its performance
can only increase should the values of the parameters be replaced with their
estimates.
This chapter mostly deals with output validation. Therefore, in what
follows we shall use the term empirical validation as a shortcut to empirical
validation of the outputs of an AB model, while referring specifically to input
validation where appropriate.
8.2 The methodological basis of empirical val-
idation
Models, in economics as in any other scientific discipline, isolate some features
of an actual phenomenon, in order to understand it and to predict its future
status under novel conditions. These features are usually described in terms
of causal relations and it is usually assumed that a causal (deterministic or
stochastic) mechanism has generated the data that we observe in the real
world.
We call this causal mechanism the ‘real-world data generating process’
(rwDGP). A model approximates portions of the rwDGP by means of a
‘model data generating process’ (mDGP). The mDGP must be simpler than
the rwDGP and, in simulation models, generates a set of simulated outputs.
The extent to which the mDGP is a good representation of the rwDGP
is evaluated by comparing the simulated outputs of the mDGP, M, with
the real-world observations of the rwDGP, R. In what follows, we call this
procedure empirical validation.
Two remarks are in order at this point. First, M represents all the no-
tional simulated outputs of the mDGP, that is those that the model can in
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principle generate by allowing for a full search of its parameter, initial condi-
tion, and seed spaces. Second, the main difficulty with empirical validation
(and with modeling in general) is that the modeler wants to learn something
about the rwDGP, but she can only observe R, a limited number of draws
(often just one) from rwDGP. The learning process has therefore to be, at
this stage, inductive.
Marks (2007) formalizes the assessment of model validity as follows: a
model is said to be useful if it can exhibit at least some of the observed
historical patterns, accurate if it exhibits only behaviors that are compatible
with those observed historically, and complete if it exhibits all the historically
observed patterns. In particular, we can define completeness as M ∩R, and
accuracy as (M−R)/M. Four cases are possible:
1. No intersection between R and M (R∩M = ): the model is useless ;
2. M is a subset of R (M ⊂ R): the model is fully accurate, but (to a
certain extent) incomplete;
3. R is a subset of M (R ⊂ M): the model is fully complete, but (to
a certain extent) inaccurate (or redundant, since the model might tell
something about what could yet happen in the world);
4. M is equivalent to R (M ⇔ R): the model is fully complete and
accurate.
Some key methodological issues are involved in the inductive process de-
scribed above. We will discuss them in the following subsections.
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8.2.1 Tractability vs accuracy
How can we possibly ‘know’ all the different elements of the rwDGP? And
even if we know them, how can we model all the different elements of the
rwDGP? Serious doubts have been raised in the past (for instance by J.S.
Mill and J. M. Keynes) about the possibility of building models that are
fully complete and accurate. In a highly complex world, a fully complete
and accurate model would be a one-to-one map of the world itself!
In order to cope with the complexity of the world, researchers proceed
first by simplifying, i.e. focusing on the relationships between a very limited
number of variables, and by selecting only the relevant historical behavior R.
This process amounts to defining the criteria against which the model is to be
evaluated, and leads to the identification of stylized facts, which are generally
defined in stochastic terms. Thus, a model is eventually evaluated according
to the extent to which it is able to statistically replicate the selected stylized
facts. Second, scientists focus on some causal mechanisms of the rwDGP and
mDGP alone, and abstract from certain entities that may have an impact
on the phenomenon under examination (Mäki, 1992).
A series of open questions remains. How can we assess whether the mech-
anisms isolated by the model resemble those operating in the real world? In
order to isolate such mechanisms, can we make assumptions that are ‘con-
trary to fact’, that is, assumptions that contradict our knowledge of the
situation under discussion?
These dilemmas are strictly related to the trade-off between analytical
tractability and descriptive accuracy. Indeed, the more complete and accu-
rate are the assumptions, the higher the number of parameters in a model,
the higher is the risk of failing to analytically solve the model (and derive
sharp implications from our set of assumptions). By contrast, the more ab-
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stract and simplified the model, the more analytically tractable it is. The
neoclassical paradigm comes down strongly on the side of analytical tractabil-
ity. The AB modeling approach, on the other hand, is willing to trade-off
analytical tractability with some degree of completeness and accuracy.
8.2.2 Instrumentalism vs realism
This brings us to the second core issue of empirical validation: instrumen-
talism versus realism. Realism, roughly speaking, claims that theoretical
entities ‘exist in reality,’ independent of the act of inquiry, representation
or measurement (Mäki, 1998). By contrast, instrumentalism maintains that
theoretical entities are solely instruments for predictions and not true de-
scriptions of the world. A radical instrumentalist is not much concerned with
issues of empirical validation, in the sense that she is not much interested in
making the model resemble mechanisms operating in the world. The radical
instrumentalist does not bother about input validation, by definition, and
is only partially interested in output validation. Her sole goal is prediction.
The ability of the model to replicate past behavior is valued only insofar as
it suggests that it will continue to track the real data in the future. Indeed,
a (consistent) instrumentalist is usually more willing than a realist to ‘play’
with the assumptions and parameters of the model in order to get better
predictions. Economists that have embraced the neoclassical paradigm have
sometimes endorsed purely instrumentalist statements à la Friedman (1953).
8.2.3 Pluralism vs apriorism
The third issue is related to the choice of a pluralist or apriorist method-
ology. Methodological pluralism claims that the complexity of the subject
under investigation and the limitations of our scientific representation natu-
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rally call for different levels of analysis, modeling approaches and assumptions
which may complement each other. Apriorism is a commitment to a set of a
priori assumptions. A certain degree of commitment to a set of a priori as-
sumptions is normal in science. Often these assumptions correspond to what
Lakatos (1970) called the ‘hard core’ assumptions of a research program. But
strong apriorism is the commitment to a set of a priori assumptions (possibly
contrary to the facts) that are seldom exposed to empirical validation (for
instance, general equilibrium and perfect rationality). Theory is considered
prior to data and it is denied the possibility of interpreting the data with-
out theoretical presuppositions. Typically, strong apriorist positions do not
allow a model to be changed in the face of anomalies, and encourages the
researcher to produce ad hoc adaptations whenever the theory in its original
form is empirical refuted. Research programs in this stage of development
have been labeled ‘degenerating’ by Lakatos.
8.2.4 The identification problem
The fourth issue regards the under-determination or identification problem.
In other words: What happens when different models are consistent with
the same empirical data? The issue is known in the philosophy of science
as the ‘under-determination of theory by data’. In econometrics the same
idea has been formalized and labeled as ‘the problem of identification’. As
Haavelmo (1944) noted, it is impossible for statistical inference to decide
between hypotheses that are observationally equivalent. He suggested to
specify an econometric model in such a way that the problem of identifica-
tion does not arise thanks to the restrictions derived from economic theory.
The under-determination problem is also strictly connected to the so-called
Duhem-Quine thesis: it is not possible to test and falsify a single hypothesis in
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isolation. This is because any hypothesis is inevitably tied to some auxiliary
hypotheses. Auxiliary hypotheses typically include background knowledge,
rules of inference, and experimental design that cannot be disentangled from
the hypothesis we want to test. Thus, if a particular hypothesis is found to be
in conflict with the evidence, we cannot reject the hypothesis with certainty,
since we do not know if it is the hypothesis under test or one of the auxil-
iary hypotheses which is at odds with the evidence. Econometricians have
adopted sophisticated tests which are robust to variations in the auxiliary
hypotheses.6 Nonetheless, the Duhem-Quine thesis still undermines strong
apriorist methodologies that do not check the robustness of the empirical
results under variations of background assumptions.
So far, we have discussed issues related to empirical validation that are
common to all types of models in economics. Are there specific problems
that AB modelers have to deal with in validating their models? To ad-
dress this issue, we must recall from chapter 2 some characteristics of AB
models: (i) realistic assumptions about individual behavior, which often in-
volve heterogeneity, nonlinearities, etc., (ii) non-trivial interaction among
agents, (iii) interplay between the micro and the macro level, due to feed-
backs between individual behavior and macro variables, (iv) attention to the
dynamic path of adjustment. Individually or collectively, these features call
for a computational solution of the model. Unfortunately, they also make
AB models potentially difficult to interpret and validate. The higher the
level of heterogeneity of the mDGP, the bigger the set of real-world data we
need to meaningfully compare the simulated data with the observed data, as
under-determination and equifinality arise: different micro structures can be
consistent with the same aggregate data.
6See, for example, Leamer (1978).
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8.3 Input validation of agent-based models
Input validation of an ABM is a crucial step in model building but so far
no explicit and agreed-upon techniques have been proposed to perform such
a task in a coherent way. Validating the inputs of an ABM, in a nutshell,
consists in checking whether the building blocks of the model and its as-
sumptions – concerning for instance agents’ behaviors and interactions – are
in line with the available evidence.
In principle, any practice that is aimed at ensuring that the fundamental
conditions incorporated in the model reproduce aspects of the real system
falls in the realm of input validation. For example, calibrating and estimating
the parameters of the rules describing agent behaviors and interactions, as
well as macroeconomic and model parameters, can be considered as a way to
make the model more realistic and thus validating it at the level of the inputs.
However, parameter calibration and estimation can also be considered as a
way of validating the outputs of the model, as we will discuss in more detail
below. This is because performing parameter calibration or estimation often
involves an assessment of how good the model performs in replicating the
observed statistical regularities concerning the macro variables of interest.
Therefore, to make things simpler, we will not consider parameter cali-
bration or estimation as an input validation technique here. What we are
interested in, on the contrary, is input validation in terms of selecting assump-
tions about the rules of interactions and behaviors of the agents that are in
line with what is observed in reality. As an example, consider a model where
agents are firms that need to set the price of their output. Many different
behavioral rules can be in principle considered. Neoclassical economics mod-
els would prescribe the use of a rule that comes from profit maximization,
depending on the assumptions on market structure. Therefore, in standard
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models the main constraint is a logic one, based on the consistency with
a-priori prescriptions (e.g., equilibrium, maximization, etc.). Conversely, in
AB models the researcher has more flexibility in selecting behavioral rules.
The main constraint is thus empirical: one should choose the rule that is
closer to what the available evidence on behaviors and interactions suggests.
Note that this is (or should be) a very stringent requirement. Indeed,
AB modelers often criticize standard theory because of its alleged unrealism.
For instance, the building blocks of general equilibrium theory, ranging from
full rationality, to the absence of direct interactions among agents and out-
of-equilibrium behaviors, are known to be at odds with what empirical and
experimental research suggests. This is in principle fully legitimate and in line
with Friedman’s instrumentalist approach, which states that assumptions are
a free good: what counts is not their purported realism, which in principle is
impossible to test, but their ability to successfully predict reality. In other
terms, a totally unrealistic model could do its job if it is able to replicate
the observed evidence. This position is harshly criticized by AB modelers,
who instead maintain that good science cannot be done with wrong models.
Only models that are based on assumptions close to reality should be able to
reproduce it, and most of all, explain it. Indeed, suppose that one has a fully
unrealistic model that is able to well reproduce some stylized fact. What
can we learn from it, e.g. in terms of the causal mechanisms that are behind
the observed dynamics? As a result, AB models are often motivated because
of their more realistic underpinnings, e.g. in terms of boundedly-rational
behaviors, local direct interactions, adaptive expectations, and so on. But
if AB models aim at becoming a strong alternative to mainstream ones,
they should be grounded on behavioral assumptions that can be really more
realistic —however defined— than those used in standard theory. Indeed,
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AB models are sometimes criticized from the neoclassical camp as being too
sloppy and fragile in their behavioral assumptions, exactly along the same
lines used by AB modelers in addressing the issues that plague standard
models.
This leads to the foremost importance of performing a serious input val-
idation of AB models. In absence of fully and widely accepted recipes for
performing such a task, the researcher should strive to adopt assumptions
about agent behaviors that are more in line with the empirical evidence than
their neoclassical counterparts. But what does ‘more realistic assumption’
really mean? Experimental evidence can give us a clue. By “experiments”
we typically mean controlled laboratory experimentation with human sub-
jects, with the aim of testing whether in reality humans behave according
to some prescriptive behavioral rules, e.g. those suggested by the rational-
ity paradigm. As discussed in more details in Duffy (2006), experiments
and ABM can have multiple complementarities, the most likely to be that
ABM can be used to explain experimental results. Furthermore, once some
behavioral stable pattern has been identified to be the norm in a certain
simple environment (e.g., a prisoner dilemma game), robots programmed as
artificial agents who behave according to such pattern can be employed in
subsequent experiments, and let playing against human subjects.
However, a further and more important way in which experiments can
complement AB modeling is to provide a basis for input validation. For
example, perfectly rational outcomes are far from being the norm in exper-
iments. Hence we can adopt behavioral assumption which are inconsistent
with perfect rationality and in line with what experimental evidence sug-
gests. Experiments can also shed light on realistic interaction structures
(who interacts with whom) and the functioning of organizations, markets
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and institutions. Therefore, there exist two intertwined ways to have ABMs
and experiments interacting (Heckbert, 2009). First, agent behaviors can be
determined using the results of experiments, so as to create populations of
simulated agents that behave consistently with the participants to the ex-
periment. Second, experiments can help choosing between possible sets of
decision making algorithms, whenever the modeler does not have any partic-
ular idea on which one should be preferred and does not want to introduce
additional degrees of freedom in her/his model. Indeed, as argued in Duffy
(2006), “[C]hoosing simple, parsimonious adaptive learning rules that also
compare favorably with the behavior of human subjects in controlled labora-
tory settings would seem to be a highly reasonable selection criterion”, which
may also be a natural way to comply with a “keep-it-simple-stupid” (KISS)
principle in model building, namely the suggestion not to over-parametrize
the model.
As discussed in D’Orazio and Silvestri (2014), the practice to employ re-
sults from lab experiments as an input to ABM building is still in its infancy.
Some notable examples include the work of Cars Hommes, Thomas Lux and
co-authors (see, e.g., Hommes and Lux, 2013). Using lab experiments, they
show that human subjects tend to display heterogeneous expectations when
asked to forecast price dynamics. Using this piece of evidence, they build a
number of ABMs when agents are endowed by heterogeneous expectations
mimicking those exhibited by human subjects in the experiments, and show
that their interactions can replicate much of the existing evidence on price
dynamics at both micro and macro levels.
Another useful source of information in designing agents’ behaviors and
interactions are of course case-studies and empirical data collected at the
micro level (e.g., studies on firm and consumption behaviors, etc.). Manage-
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ment science can often help the researcher to identify realistic routines as far
as firms and entrepreneurial activity is concerned.
All these sources of information may be employed in building models
where individual behaviors and interactions are —at the very least— more
realistic than those usually assumed in standard models. This could help the
researcher in understanding to what extent the results of standard models
depend on such over-simplifying assumptions.
8.4 Output validation of agent-based models
A number of ABMs mostly engage in purely qualitative theorizing, and
are not empirically validated in any meaningful sense. In a sense they are
thought experiments. There is little rationale in testing such models against
existing empirical data. Notable examples are evolutionary game-theoretic
models (Vega-Redondo, 1996), and Polya urn models (Arthur, 1988, 1994):
only a weak relationship can be established between the micro-macro vari-
ables/parameters of these models and their empirically observed counter-
parts. The focus of such models is the emergence of qualitative aggregate
patterns, such as the emergence of coordination and cooperation. Forecasting
exercises are possible but they typically yield unpredictability. For example,
we can state with certainty that users will lock into one of the competing tech-
nologies in Arthur’s (1994) Polya urn model but it is impossible to know ex
ante which of the competing technologies will be selected. Therefore models
belonging to this class are not frequently taken to the data. Sometime, how-
ever, appropriate extensions/modifications of this model can be empirically
tested. For example, the predictions of an appropriately modified Schelling
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segregation model can be matched with real-world segregation indicators.
Similarly, the outputs of simple technological adoption models based on co-
ordination games may be compared to existing data about market shares of
competing technologies in a certain market.
Even when the model is suited for empirical validation, some basic issues
arise.
A first issue concerns the quality of the empirical data: the most com-
mon reason for under-determination in economics is the incompleteness of
the available data sets.7 Sometimes a model is disregarded on the basis of
existing empirical data but other types of data could provide a better test
and potentially support the model, if they had been collected. There is
a strong conservative tendency in empirical validation, which supports es-
tablished theories and models for which empirical data is readily available,
while putting at a disadvantage new theories and models for which empirical
research has not yet caught up and discouraging the study of qualitative phe-
nomena that are either difficult to measure or are inherently non-measurable
by their very nature.
Kaldor observed that, when hampered by a lack of large, high quality
data sets, we should use stylized facts or statistical regularities to evaluate
models (Kaldor, 1961; Kwasnicki, 1998). By emphasizing the reproduction
(explanation) or prediction of a set of stylized facts, one hopes to circumvent
problems of data availability and reliability. However, in order for empirical
validation to be effective, the stylized facts of interest should not be... too
stylized, i.e. too general. Otherwise, they might not necessarily represent a
difficult test for the model: the model might pass the validation procedure
7The problem of data availability is made worse by the large degrees of freedom AB
models often have. Two points are sufficient to identify a straight line; more data are
needed to discriminate between alternative, non-linear, specifications.
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without providing any effective explanation of the phenomena of interest.
This parallels Brock’s (1999) discussion of ‘unconditional objects’ (another
aspect of the under-determination problem). Empirical regularities need to
be handled with care because they often contain information only on the
stationary (‘unconditional’) properties of the process of interest. They often
provide little information on the dynamics of the stochastic processes that ac-
tually generated them. In this respect, replication does not necessary imply
explanation. For example, many evolutionary growth models can generate
similar outputs on differential growth-rates between countries, technology
leadership and catch-up, even though they differ significantly with respect
to agents’ behavior and learning schemes (Windrum, 2007). Similarly, the
Nelson and Winter (1982b) model replicates highly aggregated data on time
paths for output (GDP), capital, labor inputs and wages (labor share in
output), but these facts can also be replicated by conventional neoclassical
growth models. In the same vein, there might be many different stochas-
tic processes (and therefore models of industry dynamics) that are able to
generate, in the stationary state, a power-law distribution of firm size.8
Supposing the available real data are good enough, the first step in out-
put validation is the selection of appropriate statistics as summary measures
for both artificial and real data. Subsets of the parameter space are then
identified where the statistics computed on artificial data (which depend on
the values of the parameters) are close enough to those computed on the
observed data.
Adopting the terminology introduced in chapter 5, let Yt be some ag-
gregate statistics computed on the state of the simulated system, in a tran-
8One way out of the unconditional objects critique, is to validate not only the macro-
economic output of the model, but also its micro-economic structure. This however re-
quires even greater data requirements.
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sient or absorbing equilibrium, say the unemployment rate. Assume that
the mechanics of the model implies, for a given value of the parameters θ,
a probability of being unemployed for any individual worker equal to u(θ).
Given that being employed/unemployed is a Bernoulli random variable, its
variance is equal to σ2u = u(θ)(1− u(θ)).
By the properties of the sample mean (the Central Limit Theorem), in
large populations of size N the expected value of the unemployment rate at




. (In small samples, the unemployment rate follows a bino-
mial distribution with mean u and variance σ2u.) In other words, given the
stochastic elements of the model, the unemployment rate at time t is a ran-
dom variable, with different realizations in different periods and in different
simulation runs. If we want Y to be representative of the model output, so
that we can use it as a summary measure for comparison with the real out-
put, we must therefore choose N high enough. Alternatively, if the model is
ergodic, we can use the average of the unemployment rate over M simulation
runs, ȲM , which is equivalent to using the unemployment rate of a single run
with M ·N agents.
In this simple case, focusing on the state of the system at one specific
point in time t poses no problems, as the employment status shows no per-
sistence, hence the unemployment rate bears no memory whatsoever of past
values. More in general however, it could be the case that even if the system
is at an absorbing equilibrium, the distribution of Y is not constant over time.
Indeed, as we have seen in chapter 5, (weak) stationarity is defined as the dis-
tribution of Yt having a constant mean and variance, and an autocorrelation
structure that depends only on the number of the lags and not on t. Hence,
the unconditional mean is constant, but the mean of the distribution of Y
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at time t conditional on the past realizations Yt−1, Yt−2, · · · is not constant.9
In this case, focusing on a specific period t might introduce an idiosyncrasy:
to characterize the system then one has to compute an average over many
periods, Ȳ , where the length of the observation period is determined in order
to get rid of the autocorrelation structure in the statistics of interest. This
turns out to be a crucial difference between calibration and estimation, as
we shall see.
Once we have the summary measures for both the simulated (Y ) and
real (YR )output, we must compare them. The second step is therefore the
definition of a distance metric d(Y, YR). This is the loss function for the
modeler, that is, it contains the judgment about ‘how good’ the model is. A
common choice for this function is the quadratic form d(Y, YR) = (Y −YR)2,
which increasingly penalizes the performances of the model as they are more
distant from the observed data. However, the summary measure chosen may
well be multidimensional, that is Y ′ = {Y1, Y2, · · · , YK}. In the example
above, we might be interested in the average income, in the poverty rate, in
the Gini coefficient of income, etc., in addition to the unemployment rate.
The distance function must then specify appropriate weights for the different
summary measures. A natural choice is to use weights that are inversely pro-
portional to the variability of each statistics, so that more volatile statistics,
being less informative on the model behavior, count less. Given that the
variability of the statistics computed on the simulated data can be decreased
at will, as we have seen above, the weights are generally computed on the
real data.
The distance function then becomes
9In addition, given the definition of stationarity, moments other than the first and the
second could be time variant.
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d(Y ,Y R) = (Y − Y R)′W(Y − Y R) (8.1)
where W is best chosen to be a consistent estimate of V (Y R)
−1, as in
the White covariance matrix or, in a time series context, the appropriate
Newey-West covariance matrix.
Recall that Y depends on θ. The distance d provides a measure of the
quality of the model, conditional on the values of the parameters. However,
unless some acceptance/refusal criteria are specified that explicit the biggest
distance the modeler is willing to accept, it is of little use per se. But it
immediately leads to the comparison of different models, or of different spec-
ifications of the same model. In this case the question that the validation
exercise is supposed to answer is not ‘how good’ a model is, but rather ‘is
a model better or worse than another model?’. If we compare different in-
stances of the model with different values of the parameters, this validation
method offers a natural way for the selection of the ‘best’ values of the pa-
rameters, that is calibration or estimation. This will be the focus of the next
Chapter, where we dig in details into the issue of how one can use data to
tune the parameters of the model.
The issue concerning the ergodicity of the rwDGP (with respect to out-
comes Yt) is crucial. If the underlying rwDGP is non-ergodic (as well as
the theoretical mDGP described in the ABM), initial conditions matter. In
theory, to compare the real and simulated data the modeler should identify
the ‘true’ set of initial conditions in the empirical data, generated by the
rwDGP, in order to correctly set the initial parameters of the model. Even
if perfect data existed (which is unlikely), this would be a hard task, as few
real processes have a clearly defined starting point. How far in the past does
one need to go in order to identify the correct set of initial values for the
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relevant micro and macro variables? Possibly well before the data started to
be collected.10
But even when the mDGP and rwDGP are ergodic and stationary, the
problem of correctly setting the time span for analyzing the simulated data
remains. The underlying rwDGP may generate a number of different regimes
(transient equilibria); for instance the same macroeconomic structure may
generate a diverse set of outcomes that include economic depression, full
employment, inflation, hyper-inflation, and even stagflation. If this is the
case, then one is faced with the problem of which sub-sample of the simulated
and observed time-series should be compared in order to carry out model
validation. By incorrectly setting the period over which the model output
is analyzed one can generate a set of simulated output data that describes
a different regime than that found in the empirical data. In this case one
may incorrectly reject a ‘true’ model. Moreover, if –as it is frequently the
case– the modeler sets the simulated data to start at a point where the model
reaches a stationary behavior, one is implicitly assuming that the empirical
evidence comes from a stationary DGP. This may, or may not, be the case.
As a final note of care, we should stress that if the model is to be used
for prediction or policy analysis (that is, in most cases) empirical valida-
tion should not be confused with model acceptance. Is the model able to
make good predictions out-of-sample? Does it take into consideration that
changes in the economic environment (for instance policy changes) might
modify the way individuals behave? Real economic agents not only think in
statistical terms based on past experience (adaptive expectations) but use
current data to forecast the future. In this way, agents are able to respond
to exogenous economic shocks. This intuition was the basis for the rational
10One can still be interested in building a model that describes the particular history
of the non ergodic rwDGP observable in the data.
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expectations critique of Keynesian behavioral models: exogenous shocks al-
ter individual behavior, even when leaving the underlying structure of the
economy unchanged. As a consequence Keynesian theories seriously mis-
predict the consequences of shocks, whereas models that explicitly take into
consideration the micro fundamentals - individual production functions and
utility functions - don’t. The Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) applies even to
empirically validated models. Only structurally correct models should be
given a structural interpretation. The fact that a model is able to replicate
the observed data does not guarantee that it will perform well even when
tracing future data, or counterfactual data.
8.5 Qualitative Output Validation Technqi-
ues
We now turn to the issue of choosing the value of the structural parameters
in order to get a good fit with the real data. Here, output validation is
not a goal, but a mean for the calibration/estimation of the parameters. As
already noticed, what we would like to do here is comparing (possibly an
infinite number of) instances of the model with different parameter values
and choose the one that best fits the data.
As we will be discussing in more details in the next chapter, we almost
never aim at calibrating or estimating a model by means of a unique optimal
choice for all the parameters. We rather look for confidence intervals or ranges
of the relevant parameters. Indeed, a point estimate or calibration of all
parameters is useful for predictive purposes, though probabilistic assessments
of likely outcomes based on estimates of the uncertainty about the ‘true value’
of the parameters should be preferred. On the other hand, when the goal is
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more descriptive, we rather aim at identifying a reasonable (and relatively
small) subset of the parameter space where counter-factual types of questions
can be asked.
Furthermore, the fact that a given parameter set leads to the best fit does
not mean that the model is empirically validated: it can be the case that even
the best fit is not good enough, according to the criteria of acceptance for
the model. In other words, even a wrong model can be calibrated/estimated.
One of the main purposes of calibration/estimation is to address the over-
parametrization problem of many ABMs by reducing the space of possible
‘worlds’ explored by an ABM (Kwasnicki, 1998). This is done through the
use of empirical data, such that the model mDGP resembles as closely as
possible the actual rwDGP that we observe.11
In the rest of this Chapter, and in the one that follows, we review the most
influential approaches to calibration and estimation developed in the AB
literature so far and assess their strengths and weaknesses. Each approach
attempts to put restrictions on the parameters so that the model output
resembles as closely as possible the real output of interest. However, they do
this in different ways.
A rough but useful distinction is between approaches that are mostly
qualitative and those that instead rely on a battery of quantitative meth-
ods to estimate/calibrate the parameters. Whereas the former are based on
observed qualitative similarities between real-world and model outputs, the
latter try to identify the most-likely parameter ranges based on optimization
techniques employing, e.g., explicit metrics between rwDGP and mDGP, as
well as sophisticated search algorithms.
In the remaining part of this Chapter we will briefly review some of the
11For a notable example of calibration on ABMs, see Bianchi et al. (2007, 2008).
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most-employed qualitative estimation/calibration techniques, whereas in the
next Chapter we will deal in details with quantitative approaches.
The history-friendly approach constrains parameters, interactions, and
decision rules of the model in line with a specific, empirically-observable
history of a particular industry.
8.5.1 The Indirect Calibration Approach
Drawing upon a combination of stylized facts and empirical data sets, many
AB modelers have been developing a pragmatic four-step approach to em-
pirical validation, typically referred to as the Indirect Calibration Approach.
This qualitative procedure can be interpreted as a calibration exercise with
respect to unique historical evidence. The indirect calibration approach aims
at replicating some relevant statistical regularities or stylized facts. In the
first step, the modeler identifies a set of stylized facts that she is interested
in reproducing and/or explaining with her model. Stylized facts typically
concern the macro-level (as an example, the relationship between unemploy-
ment rate and GDP growth) but can also concern cross-sectional regularities
(for instance, the shape of the distribution of firm size). In the second step,
the researcher builds the model in a way that keeps the microeconomic de-
scription as close as possible to empirical and experimental evidence about
microeconomic behavior and interactions. This step entails gathering all
possible evidence about the underlying principles that inform real-world be-
haviors (of firms, workers, consumers, etc.) so that the microeconomic level
is modeled in a realistic fashion. In the third step, the empirical evidence
on stylized facts is used to restrict the space of parameters, and the initial
conditions if the model turns out to be non-ergodic.
Suppose, for example, that the Beveridge curve is one of the statistical
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regularities to be investigated. The model must be able to replicate a re-
lationship in which unemployment rates decrease with vacancy rates in the
labor market.12 The researcher should restrict her analysis to all (and only)
parameter combinations under which the model does not reject that hypoth-
esis (at some confidence level). This step is the most sensible because it
involves a fine sampling of the parameter space. It is also computationally
demanding and requires the use of Monte Carlo techniques. Indeed, for any
given point in the parameter space, one must generate a distribution for the
statistics summarizing the stylized facts of interest (for instance, the slope
of the relationship between unemployment and vacancy rate), and test the
null hypothesis that the empirically observed valued can be generated by our
model under that particular parameter combination.
In the fourth and final step, the researcher should deepen her under-
standing of the causal mechanisms that underlie the stylized facts and/or
explore the emergence of new stylized facts (statistical regularities that are
different to the stylized facts of interest) which the model can validate ex
post. This might be done by further investigating the subspace of parame-
ters that resist to the third step, those consistent with the stylized facts of
interest. For example, one might study how the absolute value of the Monte
Carlo average of the slope of the unemployment-vacancy rate relation varies
with some macro-parameter (if any) that governs wage setting and/or union
power in the model. This can shed light on the causal mechanism underlying
the emergence of a Beveridge curve. Similarly, one can ask whether business
cycle properties (for instance, average and volatility of growth rates) change
with the slope of the Beveridge relation. If this is the case, a fresh impli-
cation generated by the model (under empirically plausible parameters) can
12See Fagiolo et al. (2004b) and Richiardi (2006).
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be taken to the data –and further provide support for the AB model under
scrutiny.
Although appealing, the indirect calibration approach is open to criticism
in at least two important respects. First, notice that no attempt is made to
quantitatively set model parameters using their empirical counterparts. This
is mostly because, due to the difficulties of qualitatively matching theoretical
and empirical observations, one is bounded to be as agnostic as possible as
to whether the details of a model (variables, parameters) can be really com-
pared with empirically-observable ones. However, in order for this indirect,
qualitative, calibration procedure to be effective, the empirical phenomena
of interest should not be very general. Otherwise, they might not necessarily
represent a difficult test for the model. If this is the case, the model might
pass the validation procedure without providing any effective explanation
of the phenomena of interest (e.g. no restrictions on the parameter space
would be made). Here the fundamental issue of discriminating between the
‘descriptions’ and ‘explanations’ of reality pops up once more.
The second problem is far subtler, and has to do with the interpretation
of the points belonging to the sub-region of the parameter space (and initial
conditions) that resist the sort of ‘exercise in plausibility’ that one performs
in the third step of the procedure. After a suitable sub-region of the pa-
rameter space (and initial conditions) has been singled out - according to
the capability of the model to replicate the set of stylized facts of interests
in that sub-region - how should one interpret all comparative exercises that
aim at understanding what happens when one tunes the parameters within
that sub-region? This boils down to the problem of interpreting the different
parameter configurations as counterfactuals (see below).
A stream of recent ABM contributions to the fields of industry and
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market-dynamics has been strongly rooted in the four-step empirical valida-
tion procedure just outlined. For example, Fagiolo and Dosi (2003b) study
an evolutionary growth model that is able to reproduce many stylized facts
about output dynamics, such as I(1) patterns of GNP growth, growth-rates
autocorrelation structure, and the absence of size-effects, while explaining the
emergence of self-sustaining growth as the solution of the trade-off between
exploitation of existing resources and exploration of new ones. Similarly, in
a number of papers exploring the properties of the “Keynes meets Schum-
peter” (K+S) model (Dosi et al., 2006, 2010, 2015), an indirect calibration
approach is used to show that the KS model is able to successfully replicate
a huge number of stylized facts related to firm dynamics, the business cycle
and the financial side of the economy.
8.5.2 The History-Friendly Approach
The history-friendly approach offers an alternative to the problem of over-
parametrization. Like the indirect calibration approach discussed above, it
seeks to bring modeling more closely ‘in line with the empirical evidence’
and thereby reduce the dimensionality of a model. The key difference is
that this approach uses the specific historical case studies of an industry to
model parameters, agent interactions, and agent decision rules. In effect, it
is a calibration approach which uses particular historical traces in order to
calibrate a model.
In this approach a ‘good’ model is one that can generate multiple styl-
ized facts observed in an industry. The approach has been developed in a
series of papers, in particular Malerba et al. (1999); Malerba and Orsenigo
(2002). In the first of these papers, the authors outlined the approach and
then applied it to a discussion of the transition in the computer industry from
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mainframes to desktop PCs. In the latter, the approach was applied to the
pharmaceutical industry and the role of biotech firms therein. Here we shall
keep the description of the approach succinct. Through the construction of
industry-based AB models, detailed empirical data on an industry informs
the researcher in model building, analysis and validation. Models are to
be built upon a range of available data, from detailed empirical studies to
anecdotal evidence to histories written about the industry under study. This
range of data is used to assist model building and validation. It should guide
the specification of agents (their behavior, decision rules, and interactions),
and the environment in which they operate. The data should also assist the
identification of initial conditions and parameters on key variables likely to
generate the observed history. Finally, the data is to be used to empirically
validate the model by comparing its output (the ‘simulated trace history’)
with the ‘actual’ history of the industry. It is this latter step that truly
distinguishes the history-friendly approach from other approaches. Previ-
ous researchers have used historical case studies to guide the specification
of agents and environment, and to identify possible key parameters. The
authors of the history-friendly approach suggest that, through a process of
backward induction one can arrive at a satisfactory approximation of struc-
tural assumptions, parameter settings, and initial conditions. Having identi-
fied the approximated set of ‘history-replicating parameters’, one can carry
on and conduct sensitivity analysis to establish whether (in the words of the
proponents of this methodology) ‘history divergent’ results are possible.
The history-friendly approach raises a set of fundamental methodologi-
cal issues.13 First, the approach to empirical validation that is advocated
involves comparing the output traces of a simulated model with detailed em-
13Interested readers are referred to Windrum (2007) for a detailed critique of history-
friendly modeling.
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pirical studies of the actual trace history of an economic system. This does
not move us much further on from ascertaining whether a model is ‘capable’
of generating an output trace that resembles an empirically observed trace.
It is not a very strong test. As we have seen, an individual simulated trace
may, or may not, be typical of the model.
A second issue is the ability to infer backward the ‘correct’ set of struc-
tural assumptions, parameter settings, or initial conditions from a set of
traces –even if we have a model that generates an appropriate distribution of
output traces. Simply stated, there are, in principle, a great many combina-
tions of alternative parameter settings that can produce an identical output
trace. We cannot deduce which combination of parameter settings is correct,
let alone the appropriate set of structural assumptions.
A third issue is the possibility to build counterfactual histories (although
the authors do not themselves engage in this in their papers). For exam-
ple, we need to be able to construct a world in which IBM did not enter
the PC market. This poses a very serious question. Could the PC market
have developed in much the same way had IBM not invented the PC? Can
we meaningfully construct a counterfactual history? As Cowan and Foray
(2002) discuss, it is exceedingly difficult in practice to construct counter-
factual histories because economic systems are stochastic, non-ergodic, and
structurally evolve over time.
Finally, a fourth key methodological issue concerns the meaning of history.
To what extent can we actually rely on history to be the final arbiter of
theoretical and modeling debates? To pose the question another way, can
simulations, in principle, be guided by history? In practice, it is unlikely
that we will be able to appeal to history, either to bear witness, or to act as
a final arbiter in a dispute. This is because history itself is neither simple
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nor uncontested, and any attempt to develop a historically based approach
to modeling faces deep level methodological problems.14
14A well-known example of the contestability of history is evidenced by the ongoing
debate about whether inferior quality variants can win standards battles.15 As Carr








“How absurdly simple!”, I cried.
“Quite so!”, said he, a little nettled.
“Every problem becomes very childish when once it is explained
to you.”
Arthur Conan Doyle. The Adventure of the Dancing Men.
9.1 Introduction
The ultimate test of a theory is its empirical validity, so the question whether
a model “fits the data well” is crucial. In the last chapter, we have intro-
duced some of the many issues involved in model evaluation. Here, we dig
into the problem of tuning the values of the parameters. Moreover, we are
also interested in the values of the estimated parameters for interpreting the
model behaviour, and to perform “what-if type” counterfactual (e.g. policy)
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evaluation exercises. Agent-based (AB) models are in general complex non-
linear models, and can therefore display many different behaviours depending
on the region of the parameters space being sampled. Assessing the perfor-
mances of the model in the right region of the parameters space is therefore
important for model evaluation. Once this region has been identified and the
model deemed appropriate for its scopes, lessons can be learned about what
might happen in the real world if some of the parameters changed, either as
a consequence of some unforeseen developments (scenario analysis) or due
to some specific actions purposefully implemented (policy analysis).
Our goal, broadly speaking, is comparing (possibly an infinite number of)
instances of the model with different parameter values and select those that
fits the data better.
Before going on, a first remark is necessary. Generally, we do not aim at
calibrating or estimating a model by getting to a single optimal choice for
all the parameters. In a frequentist approach, we rather look at confidence
intervals —that is, ranges where the “true” value of the parameters, assum-
ing the model is correctly specified, is likely to lie— while in af Bayesian
approach we focus on the posterior probability distributions for the parame-
ters —reflecting our uncertainty about the parameters values given our prior
knowledge and the information contained in the data. In this chapter we will
provide examples of both approaches.
A second remark is about the fact that it is always possible to find some
parameter set leading to the best fit with the real data, but this does not
mean that the model is empirically validated: it can be that even the best
fit is not good enough, according to the criteria of acceptance for the model.
In other words, even a wrong model can be calibrated/estimated.
Third, there is the issue of the invariance of parameters. What if the
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observed micro and macro parameters are time dependent? One needs to
be sure that the calibrated/estimated parameters are at least slow changing
variables (and, hence, can reasonably be treated as fixed within the time scale
explored by the model). If they are significantly time dependent, then the
researcher needs to go back to the specification of the model and endogenise
some of the parameters or, if s/he prefers to remain agnostic about how they
change, employ appropriate inference techniques which allow time-varying
parameters, as particle filters (not discussed here).
A fourth remark concerns the difference between calibration and estima-
tion. This has been overly debated, with researchers arguing that calibration
(to which different people give a different meaning) is something different
from estimation, while other stress that the two things are basically the
same thing.1 The issue boils down to a matter of convenience. For our
discussion, it is helpful to distinguish calibration and estimation along the
following lines: calibration aims at maximizing the fitness of the model with
the observed data in a distance metric arbitrarily chosen by the modeller,
without bothering about the ‘true’ value of the parameters of the real world
data generating process (rwDGP), or the uncertainty surrounding them; es-
timation aims at learning about the ‘true’ value of the parameters of the
rwDGP, by evaluating the fitness of the model with the observed data in
a carefully chosen distance metric, such that the estimator has well known
(at least asymptotically) properties. Roughly speaking, maximization of the
fitness is a goal in calibration, a mean in estimation. Calibration is meant
to show that the model is plausible –that is, it resembles the real world–
and aims at reducing the number of possible ‘worlds’, one for each combi-
nation of the parameters, that have to be explored in order to understand
1See Dawkins et al. (2001) for an overview.
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the behaviour of the system; estimation assumes that the model is at least
approximately correct –that is, well specified– to make inference about the
true rwDGP.
While some calibration techniques have been presented in the previous
chapter, here we focus only on estimation.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 discusses how
we can choose the real and simulated data on which we perform estimation,
and the basic principles and properties of the data and the model that esti-
mation relies upon. Section 9.3 describes how AB models can be simulated
by means of simulated minimum distance techniques, in a frequentist ap-
proach. Section 9.4 introduces the main issues and techniques in Bayesian
estimation of AB models. Section 9.5 concludes.
9.2 Taking the model to the data
9.2.1 Comparing apples with apples
This section is of crucial importance but it can be kept very short. Let’s
assume that our model is a good description of the unknown rwDGP, for
the specific purposes that we have in mind: that is, the model has passed
a preliminary validation stage (see chapter 8). The behaviour of the model,
however, is dependent on the values of the parameters and on the initial
conditions, which amount to the initial state of the system and the random
seed: yt+1 = gt(X0, s,θ). Estimation is all about comparing the artificial
data produced by the model with the real data, but the model is in principle
able to produce much more data than what is available in the observations.
So, a preliminary choice has to be made with respect to what data to select
from the simulated time series.
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If we could run the model starting from the same initial conditions X0
as observed in the real data, we could simply compare the first T simulated
periods with the corresponding real world observations. However, it is often
very difficult to initialise the model with real world data, especially as these
can be available only in aggregate form. Therefore, a direct, one-to-one
relationship between the artificial data and the real data is lost: there is not
a simulated day ‘t = 16 September 2015’ to be compared with the actual data
for 16 September 2015. The best we can do is therefore selecting subsamples
of the artificial time series that qualitatively resemble the real series, and
then looking at the values of the parameters that make the two series also
quantitatively similar. This often reduces to focusing on some stationarity
properties of the observed data, and select the simulation output so that those
stationarity properties also hold in the artificial data. Loosely speaking, this
ensures that the data for 16 September 2015 are not particularly ‘special’
—they look not too different from the data for 15 or 17 September— so that
they can be meaningfully matched to the selected artificial data, provided
these are also not too ‘special’. In other words, the initialisation problem can
be overcome by focusing on the equilibrium properties of both the real and
the simulated data, where by equilibrium we mean statistical equilibrium,
that is stationarity. Focusing on stationary regimes has also an additional
advantage. Stationary data are, to some extent, interchangeable. It does
not really matter if September 15 is considered before or after September
17, if they both come from a stationary distribution.2 This means that
we can easily summarise them, for instance by taking their mean (on the
contrary, two non-stationary series might have the same mean, but very
different behaviour —for instance, one might trend upwards, while the other
2Stationary data can be serially correlated, but this can often be neglected in estima-
tion, at the cost of increasing the error of the estimates —see below.
287
might trend downwards).
Ergodicity (or lack thereof) is also an important property which should be
considered before turning to the data. In particular, mistakenly considering
a model as ergodic, while in facts it is not, might lead to a significant un-
derestimation of the uncertainty surrounding the estimates. As an example,
think of a non-ergodic model with a long run equilibrium at µ∗ = rθ, where
r is a random variable with mean 1, whose actual value is determined at
model setup —that is, by the random seed. At the risk of being redundant,
let us make clear what this means. The model produces an outcome yt, that
after an adjustment phase becomes stationary, with mean µ∗. Note that
in the stationary state, yt keeps fluctuating around µ
∗ (with a correlation
structure that depends only on the number of lags and not on time). The
model is non-ergodic insofar as the mean µ∗ differs across simulation runs,
for the same value of θ. Suppose now that the model is correctly specified,
and that the specific universe that we observe has a value of r 6= 1. If we
ignore the non-ergodic nature of the model when estimating it, we would
infer that θ̂ = µR, while in facts the ‘true’ value of θ is µR/r.
3 While the
rwDGP can generate many parallel universes, distributed around a “cen-
tral” universe with µ∗ = µR/r, we are treating it as if it were capable to
produce only one universe, centred at µR. Given that we only observe µR,
we cannot remove a bias towards this particular value, but we should at least
recognise that the ‘true’ value of θ could be different from µR, knowing that
the model is non-ergodic.4 Devising a policy based on a precise but biased
estimate of θ might lead to inaccurate predictions. On the contrary, taking
3We assume for simplicity that the observed time series is long enough to drive the
sampling error to 0 (the mean µR is insensitive to new observations).
4Indeed, we can do better than this, and estimate a distribution for the parameter,
though this distribution will be centred on µR and not on µR/r. We will discuss this in
more details in section 9.3.2.
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fully into account the non-ergodic nature of the model helps recognising that
there is an extra source of uncertainty on top of sampling error, arising from
the fact that we do not know from what universe the data we are observing
come from. Moreover, by simulating the effects of the policy taking into
account the full uncertainty around the parameters, we might discover that
the policy is able to move permanently the system to a different equilibrium,
which persists even when the initial conditions are restored (i.e. the policy is
abandoned). To summarise, non-ergodic models are trees which are able to
produce a whole variety of apples, and we should expect many different trees
(instances of the model with different values of the parameters) to produce
something that closely resembles the specific apple that we observe in the
data.
9.2.2 Preliminary tests
Operationally, the discussion of the previous section amounts to say that
we need to understand the properties of a model and the properties of the
data, before engaging in estimation. Stationarity can be easily tested in the
observed data, using one of the many tests available in the literature. If the
data are not stationary, an attempt to making them stationary by looking at
appropriate transformations should be made. Stationarity greatly simplifies
the choice of the artificial data to be considered as the model outcome in
the estimation process, as we can run the model until an appropriate sta-
tionary state (statistical equilibrium) is found, and then disregard the initial
adjustment path. On the other hand, if the observations are not stationary,
we often do not know when to stop the simulation, as the model might in
principle be able to produce something that resembles the observations in
the future.
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Ergodicity, on the contrary, cannot in general be tested in the real data,
unless we observe many instances of the process. For instance, consider the
diffusion of rival technologies with strong network externalities. By observing
many adoption trajectories for different products, we can infer whether they
always lead to the selection of one dominant technology, which drives the
others out of the market. The irreversibility of the process, together with its
stochastic nature, implies non-ergodicity: each technology has in principle
some chances of winning the race, so that outcomes can be very different
even if the initial conditions are the same.
A classic example is the battle between Sony’s Betamax and JVC’s VHF
video standards that started in the mid-1970s. For around a decade these two
standards battled for dominance, while in the end VHF became dominant,
and Betamax disappeared. Presumably, the process is non-ergodic, meaning
that if we could rewind history, and repeat the competition again starting
from exactly the same conditions, we might end up with a very different
outcome, e.g. Betamax winning, or both standards coexisting in the market.5
Note again that the non-ergodic nature of the process lies in the fact
that it has more than one long run equilibrium (which presupposes that the
process is stochastic, to allow the selection of different long run equilibria ).
Quite obviously then, the possibility of learning about the non-ergodic
nature of the process depends on our ability to observe more than one real-
5The reason why VHF won the war has been the subject to intense debate. Arguably,
Betamax was a slightly better technology; however, VHF had a slicker marketing. Other
explanations have pointed to licensing problems between Sony and other companies, VHF
machines being simpler, Sony giving inadvertently a help to its competitors by revealing
key aspects of Betamax technology which were then incorporated into VHS, and even the
fact that pornography was not available on Betamax. Perfectly ‘explaining’ why VHF
won would reduce the adoption process to a deterministic one; following our discussion,
it would be similar to controlling for the random seed. The whole issue of determining
whether the process is ergodic or not would then be pointless, as deterministic processes
are ergodic by nature.
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isation of the process. If we observe only one equilibrium, we cannot learn
about the existence of other equilibria. In turn, observing more realisations
requires considering more technologies, under the assumption that they are
all governed by the same law (that is, they are all instances of the same
stochastic process). This might actually be a problematic assumption. Can
we claim that the battle for internet search engines follows the same process
than the VHF-Betamax war? Google has come close to dominate the mar-
ket, with about 2/3 of the searches, but Bing has climbed up to about 10%
despite being a latecomer, and Yahoo! still has another 10% market share.
It can be argued that network externalities are lower for search engines than
for video formats: it is therefore possible that the process for search engines
is ergodic, while the one for video formats was not.6 But what about operat-
ing systems (OS)? Under the assumption that the diffusion of video formats
and OS (and possibly of many more technologies) are instances of the same
process, and that the initial conditions are approximately the same (e.g. all
alternatives appear at the same time, and no-one is drastically better than
the other in terms of performances, or costs), we could test for ergodicity
by comparing the “equilibrium” market shares in the different markets.7 For
OS, the market is dominated by Microsoft, but Mac has a fairly stable share
(over the past few years) of about 10%. We would then find that the (unique)
diffusion process is non-ergodic, as in the video formats case there is only one
firm who gets all the market, while in the OS there is a coexistence of many
firms.
6We should stress that the fact that there is not a single search engine that has eaten
up all the market does not mean by itself that the process is ergodic: it might be the case
that if history was given a second chance, given the same initial conditions, Yahoo! might
end up having a bigger market share than Google.
7A nonparametric test for ergodicity is proposed in ?, and rests on an application
of the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs test for testing whether two samples come from the same
population.
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The lesson from this discussion is that it is very hard to test for ergodic-
ity in the real data, as history never exactly repeats itself. The assumption
that two observed trajectories are instances of the same underlying process,
and that the initial conditions are the same, is likely not to hold. On the
other hand, ergodicity can easily be tested in the simulated data, as multiple
simulation runs can be performed by keeping all the parameters and initial
conditions fixed, and changing only the random seed. If we had a model of
product adoption in presence of network externalities, we could test it for
ergodicity, for the appropriate initial conditions (e.g. the different techno-
logical features and costs of rival video formats) and reasonable values of the
unknown parameters (e.g. users’ preferences). If the results of the test were
pointing to ergodicity, we could then fix a random seed and proceed with es-
timation. If, on the other hand, non-ergodicity was detected, we should take
this information into consideration in the estimation process, as discussed in
sections 9.3.2 and 9.4.4.
9.2.3 Simulation-based estimation
In AB modelling everything, from ‘solving’ a model to estimating it, must be
done numerically. However, AB models generally involve many parameters
and non-linearities, and this implies that the computational methods that
need to be used are often particularly burdensome. As LeBaron and Tesfat-
sion (2008, p. 249) put it, “the very properties that make ACE [Agent-based
Computational Economics] models so interesting to study can cause empirical
headaches when estimating them”. This has so far deterred estimation, and
harmed the diffusion of the methodology. Fortunately, the development of
computational techniques and the increasing availability of computer power
have made the problem more manageable.
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The diffusion of simulation based techniques in econometrics is rather a
recent trend in econometrics, but it is rooted in a long history of develop-
ments of computational methods.8 Three periods can be identified in this
process. During the first period, before the 1960s, models and estimation
methods were assumed to lead to analytical expressions for the estimators.
The techniques employed made use of linear models with associated least-
square approach, multivariate linear simultaneous equations with associate
instrumental variables approach, exponential families for which maximum
likelihood techniques are suitable.
In the second period, during the 1970s and 1980s, numerical optimiza-
tion algorithms were introduced to derive the estimates and their precision
without knowing the analytical form of the estimators. Among the tech-
niques employed there were non-linear models as limited dependent variable
models, duration models, ARCH, GARCH etc., with optimization of some
non-quadratic criterion functions (log likelihood, pseudo-log likelihood, etc.).
These different approaches, however, still require a tractable form of the cri-
terion function.
Simulation-based methods were introduced only in the third period, dat-
ing back to the 1990s, to deal with criterion functions without simple analyt-
ical expression (for instance because of integrals of large dimensions in the
probability density function or in the moments).
The basic idea with simulation-based econometrics is to replace the eval-
uation of analytical expressions about theoretical (model) quantities with
their numerical counterparts computed on the simulated data. The (sim-
ulated) theoretical quantities, which are functions of the parameters to be
estimated, can then be compared with those computed on the real (observed)
8See Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996) and Stern (1997, 2000).
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data as in any estimation procedure. If the model is correctly specified –and
some technical conditions hold – for large samples the observed quantities
tend to the theoretical quantities, at the ‘true’ values of the parameters.
Because the simulated quantities also tend to the theoretical quantities, the
observed quantities converge to the simulated quantities.
As for econometrics in general, two families of approaches can then be
followed. In a frequentist approach, we look at the values of the parameters
that minimize the distance between the simulated and the observed quan-
tities. The procedure is known in general as simulated minimum distance
(SMD). The method of simulated moments (MSM), indirect inference (II)
and simulated maximum likelihood (SML), among other techniques, all fall
in this general class. The task of comparing real and artificial data involves
the computation of some statistics y both in the real and in the artificial data,
and then aggregated in a unique measure of distance. Clearly, these statistics
have to be computed just once in the real data (which do not change), and
once every iteration until convergence in the artificial data, which depend
on the value of the structural parameters. The change in the value of the
parameters of each iteration is determined according to some optimization
algorithm, with the aim to minimize the distance.9
The other approach is Bayesian. In Bayesian analysis, one starts with
a prior knowledge (sometimes imprecise) expressed as a distribution on the
parameter space and updates this knowledge according to the posterior dis-
tribution given the data. Classical Bayesians still believe in an unknown
‘true’ model, as in the frequentist approach. However, rather than aiming
9Minimization requires that the same series of random draws is used for each iteration
of the simulated model, in order to insulate from the stochastic component of the model.
Lacking this, the minimization algorithm might well get stuck in cycles. Many optimization
algorithms can be used, from simple grid search to genetic algorithms, etc –see Nocedal
and Wright (1999) for an excellent reference book on the topic.
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at identifying the ‘true’ values of the parameters (or a corresponding con-
fidence interval), they use the information contained in the data to update
the subjective beliefs about them. On the other hand, subjective Bayesians
do not believe in such true models and think only in terms of the predictive
distribution of a future observation.
For frequentists (and classical Bayesians), parameters are assumed to be
fixed (at least within a group or condition) and inference is based on the sam-
ple space of hypothetical outcomes that might be observed by replicating the
experiment many times. For subjective Bayesians, on the other hand, pa-
rameters are treated as random quantities, along with the data, and inference
is based on posterior distributions.
9.2.4 Consistency
An important feature that is sought after when choosing an estimation method
is consistency. This property states that as the sample size increases indef-
initely, the estimates converge in probability to the true value of the pa-
rameters, assuming the model is correctly specified: the distribution of the
estimates becomes more and more concentrated, so that the probability of
the estimator being arbitrarily close to the true value converges to one. From
a classical Bayesian perspective, consistency means that the updated knowl-
edge becomes more and more accurate and precise as data are collected
indefinitely.10
As such, consistency can be evaluated with respect to different dimen-
sions: consistency in size means that the estimates converge to their true
value as the observed population grows bigger; consistency in time means
10Consistency is important to subjective Bayesians too, for whom it is equivalent to
intersubjective agreement, meaning that two Bayesian should ultimately have very close
predictive distributions, as the number of observations grows indefinitely.
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that the estimates converge to their true value as the length of the observation
period increases; consistency in replications means that the estimates con-
verge to their true value as more occurrences of the same stochastic process
are observed. With reference to an abstract observations space, consistency
in size (cross-sectional) refers to the height, consistency in time (longitudinal)
refers to the length, consistency in replications refers to the width.
In order to obtain consistency, some conditions have to be met.11 With-
out providing all the details, the basic requirements are (i) that the statistics
used identify the parameters of interest (that is, there is a one-to-one rela-
tionship between the theoretical values of the statistics and the values of the
parameters), and (ii) that the simulated values of the statistics converge to
their theoretical values.
9.2.5 Calibration vs. estimation
As we have seen, taking a model to the data is always done in terms of some
summary statistics which are computed in the data and obtained from the
model, be they some specific data points, cross-sectional averages, longitu-
dinal averages, estimated coefficients of some meta-model which is superim-
posed both to the real data and to the simulated data . These statistics are
fixed in the data, and are possibly dependent on the structural parameters,
the initial conditions and the random seed in the model.
The constraints placed on the statistics used for bringing the model to the
data is what distinguish estimation for calibration. When doing estimation,
we are concerned with the properties of the estimators, and in particular we
care about consistency. With calibration, these issues get overlooked. In
11See Grazzini and Richiardi (2015) for a thorough discussion of the issues involved in
estimating AB models.
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a sense, we could say that estimation is nothing else than more conscious
calibration.
For instance, given that the output of interest is a time series, a natural
criteria would be to compare the two paths yt(θ) (simulated) and yR,t (real),
where θ? is the true value of the parameter θ governing the real and model
DGP. Indeed, this is the essence of the history-friendly approach to calibra-
tion, but it does not guarantee consistency. To see why, consider that this
path estimator is





where we assume for simplicity that both the real and artificial time series
are observed for T periods.
Under the usual regularity conditions, the estimator tends asymptotically
to the solution θ̂∞ of the limit problem:














{V (y) + V (yR) + [E(y)− E(yR)]2}
Consistency requires θ̂∞ = θ
?, a condition that is not satisfied in general.







for y > 0. Then E(y) = θ, V (y) = θ2, and
θ̂∞ = arg min
θ
[θ2 + θ∗2 + (θ − θ∗)2] = θ∗/2 6= θ∗ (9.3)
The reason why the path estimator is inconsistent is that by targeting the
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idiosyncrasies in the data, it goes after the noise, as well as after the signal.
If the noise is highly skewed (as in the case of the exponential distribution
of the example), this results in wrong inference. The problem is exacerbated
if deviations from expected values are big (again, this is the case of the
exponential distribution), whenever the weighting procedure in the distance
measure is not linear in the difference between simulated and real data (in
our example, the loss function is quadratic in the prediction errors). By
appropriately constructing the likelihood of observing the data, rather than
simply taking the distance between the real and simulated the data, the
problem is solved (see section 9.4): sometimes, the devil is in the details.
This example illustrates the difference between estimation and calibra-
tion. Comparing the real and simulated paths is a convenient way to calibrate
a model, but not to estimate it.
Also, the common approach of comparing real and simulated distributions
at a given point in time is in general inconsistent. To see why, let us consider
a simple example. Let yt be some aggregate statistics computed on the
state of the simulated system, in a transient or long run equilibrium, say the
unemployment rate. Assume that the mechanics of the model implies, for a
given value of the parameters θ, a probability of being unemployed for any
individual worker equal to u(θ). Given that being employed/unemployed is
a Bernoulli random variable, its variance is equal to σ2u = u(θ)(1− u(θ)).
By the properties of the sample mean (the Central Limit Theorem), in
large populations of size N the expected value of the unemployment rate




. (In small samples, the unemployment rate follows a bino-
mial distribution with mean u and variance σ2u.) In other terms, given the
stochastic elements of the model, the unemployment rate at time t is a ran-
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dom variable, with different realizations in different periods and in different
simulation runs. If we want y to be representative of the model output, so
that we can use it as a summary measure for comparison with the real out-
put, we must therefore choose N high enough. Alternatively, if the model is
ergodic, we can use the average of the unemployment rate over M simulation
runs, ȳM , which is equivalent to using the unemployment rate of a single run
with M ·N agents.
In this simple case, focusing on the state of the system at one specific point
in time t poses no problems, as the employment status shows no persistence,
hence the unemployment rate bears no memory whatsoever of past values.
More in general however, it could be the case that even if the system is at a
long run equilibrium, the distribution of y is not constant over time. Indeed,
(weak) stationarity is defined as the distribution of yt having a constant
mean and variance, and an autocorrelation structure that depends only on
the number of the lags and not on t. Hence, the unconditional mean is
constant, but the mean of the distribution of y at time t conditional on the
past realizations yt−1, yt−2, · · · is not constant.12 In this case, focusing on a
specific period t might introduce an idiosyncrasy.
Suppose for instance that the unemployment rate displays some degree
of persistence, that is Cov(yt, yt+h) 6= 0. This implies that the observed
unemployment rate at any time t, even if we assume that the real world is
in the long-run equilibrium, is influenced by the past unemployment rate:
the conditional mean and variance of the distribution –conditional on the
past realizations– are different from the unconditional values. If we match
the simulated unemployment rate with the observed rate, we get inconsistent
estimates for the structural parameters θ. If we increase the sample size of
12In addition, given the definition of stationarity, moments other than the first and the
second could be time variant.
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the simulated population, or increase the number of simulation runs, our
estimate of the theoretical unemployment rate u(θ) will become more and
more precise, but the value of θ matching the observed unemployment rate
will converge to something different from the real, unobserved parameter of
the rwDGP. This is, in essence, the problem of many indirect calibration
exercises, indeed of all calibration exercises which involve matching cross-
sectional moments.13 Even when the model is correctly specified, they lead
to inconsistent estimates of the parameters of interest.14
To correctly characterise the system then one has to compute an average
over many periods, ȳ, where the length of the observation period is deter-
mined in order to get rid of the autocorrelation structure in the statistics of
interest. This turns out to be a crucial difference between calibration and
estimation.
9.3 Simulated Minimum Distance
9.3.1 The method of simulated moments
A solution, to properly characterise both the model output and the real data,
rests on considering longitudinal means of the selected statistics, in our ex-
ample the mean of the unemployment rate. Rather than seeking consistency
in sample size, consistency in time is achieved: by increasing the length of the
observation period, both for the real and the simulated data, the estimates
become more and more precise and they converge toward the ‘true’ value of
the parameters.
This is the method of simulated moments (MSM). With the usual nota-
13A common example is the exponent of the Pareto distribution of firm size.
14True, one has often to live with incorrectly specified models, for which consistency is
not even an issue. Still, focusing on cross-sectional statistics is sub-optimal.
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tion, the moment estimator is:
θ̂ = arg min
θ
[µ∗(θ)− µR]′W−1[µ∗(θ)− µR] (9.4)
where W is a positive definite matrix of weights.
More generally in the MSM, as in the simulated general method of mo-
ments, different order of moments of the time series of interest are used,
and then weighted to take into account their uncertainty.15 The intuition
behind this is to allow parameters estimated with a higher degree of uncer-
tainty to count less, in the final measure of distance between the real and
artificial data (Winker et al. 2007). Having different weights (or no weights
at all) impinges on the efficiency of the estimates, not on their consistency.
If the number of moments is equal to the number of structural parameters
to be estimated, the model is just-identified. The minimized distance, for
the estimated values of the parameters, is therefore 0 in the limit (as the
sample size grows bigger), supposing the model is correctly specified. If the
number of moments is higher than the number of parameters the model is
over-identified and the minimized distance is always positive. If it is lower it
is under-identified.
However, consistency in time is conceptually attainable only at a long
run equilibrium, where the regularities that we exploit for estimation remain
stable indefinitely. By contrast, in a transient equilibrium any regularity will
eventually dissolve, and looking for an asymptotic behavior as the observa-
tion period grows larger becomes meaningless. Consistency in sample size
can be achieved in a transient equilibrium if the individual observations are
15We stress again that while the uncertainty regarding the simulated moments can be
reduced by increasing the number of simulation runs, the uncertainty in the estimation of
the real, population moment on the basis of real sample data cannot be avoided.
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Figure 9.1: Example plot of Weibull hazard functions
independent, so that any autocorrelation structure wipes out in the aggre-
gate, for large sample sizes. Consistency in replications can also be achieved
in a transient equilibrium if reality itself offers many instances of the pro-
cess, so that the idiosyncrasies of some specific trajectories are balanced by
opposite idiosyncrasies of other trajectories.
As an example, let us focus for simplicity on a situation which can be
described analytically, and suppose the rwDGP is such that individuals exit
a given state (say, unemployment), at time t, at a rate
h(t) = pλtp−1 (9.5)
This is a Weibull duration model, and the survival function is
S = exp(−λtp) (9.6)
with λ as a scale factor. The hazard rate, for different values of the parameter
p, is depicted in figure 9.1.
Let us assume that the ‘true’ value of the parameter p is p? = 2.16 Suppose
16This implies positive duration dependence: the hazard rate (linearly) increases with
the elapsed duration. We assume for simplicity that we observe all durations.
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that we have a model for this process, that happens to be correct, i.e. well
specified. We want to estimate the parameter p of our model.17












Note that this simple model has only one long run equilibrium: sooner
or later, everybody exit the state. As such, the long run equilibrium carries
no information on which estimation can be performed. On the other hand,
the MTTF is computed in the adjustment process, and therefore defines a
transient equilibrium, that is an equilibrium that will eventually disappear
(the MTTF is not defined anymore once everybody has exited the state.) The
relationship between the value of the parameter and the summary measure
is stable (more formally, the MTTF is ergodic) and can be exploited for
estimation. Consistency can be obtained in our case both over time, as
individual hazards are independent of each other, and over replications, if
the process is commonly observed in the real data.
Equation 9.7 is a moment condition. As an estimate for E[Ti] we take
the average observed time to failure, T̄R. Since in general the expression for
the theoretical mean on the r.h.s. is not known, or it cannot be inverted in
order to get an estimate for p, the MSM prescribes to simulate it. Hence,
the moment condition becomes
E[Ti(p)− T̄R] = 0 (9.8)
17Here we consider for simplicity a model that leads to a (well known) closed form
solution. The model would therefore be better estimated by applying the appropriate
(Weibull) duration model technique. The ideas exemplified here however also apply, as
discussed in the text, to more complex models, possibly involving more parameters.
18Failure being, in our example, not a bad thing at all as it implies finding a job and
exiting unemployment.
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Figure 9.2: Mean time to failure for Weibull model, λ = 1. Simulation over 1,000 individ-
uals.
which implies
p̂ = argmin|T̄ (p)− T̄R| (9.9)
However, the choice of the MTTF as our summary statistics is not a good
one. The reason is that the moment used for estimation does not identify the
parameter: more than one value of p can lead to the same MTTF. Figure 9.2
exemplifies this. The intuition is that very high values of p (low values of 1/p
in the graph) imply a very small exit probability for small durations; however,
the hazard rate increases quickly, so that very long durations are also very
unlikely. On the other hand, somewhat lower values of p imply a higher
probability of observing very short durations, but also a higher probability
of observing very long durations. The two effects, for appropriate values of
p, counterbalance perfectly, so that the mean is the same.
The second order moment σ2T , on the other hand, is monotonic in p (figure
9.3).
The latter moment is then used for estimation. To give more weight to
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Figure 9.3: Standard deviation of time to failure for Weibull model, λ = 1. Simulation
over 1,000 individuals.
‘big’ mistakes, the following summary statistics is used:
p̂ = argmin[σ2T (p)− σ2T,R]2 (9.10)
The estimation procedure is tested by means of a Montecarlo experiment.
Pseudo-true data are extracted from a Weibull distribution with p? = 2,
and the variance of time to failure is recorded. Then, the Weibull model is
simulated for different values of the parameter p, until the distance between
the pseudo-true and the simulated variance of time to failure is minimized.19
The iterated call to the simulation model all share the same pseudo-random
numbers, which are different from those used to extract the pseudo-true
observations.
This procedure is repeated –with different pseudo-random numbers for
the pseudo-true and the simulated data– 100 times, in order to compute
the mean and the standard deviation of the estimates. The results, for a
simulated population of 10 to 10,000 individuals, are reported in table 9.1.
The fact that the estimates are always centred around the true value 0.5
19The Brent algorithm is used for minimization.
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Population size 10 50 100 500 1,000 5,000 10,000
Mean of estimated coeff. 0.543 0.507 0.500 0.499 0.498 0.499 0.499
Var of estimated coeff. 0.03870 0.00919 0.00397 0.00071 0.00034 0.00007 0.00003
Table 9.1: Montecarlo results for the estimation of a Weibull model by MSM. The correct
value of the parameter is 1/p? = 0.5.
shows that the estimation procedure is unbiased. This is because the moment
function (the standard deviation of the time to failure) is approximately
linear around the true value of the parameter 1/p = 09.520 Consistency (in
size) is shown by the reduction in the variability of the estimated coefficients,
as the sample size increases: when the population size doubles, the variance
halves.
The distribution of the estimator is asymptotically normal. Hence, confi-
dence intervals can be constructed from the standard deviation of the (boot-
strapped) estimated coefficients.
Finally, at the risk of being redundant, let us stress that obtaining con-
sistent estimates of the parameters in a transient equilibrium was possible
only because individual observations were independent, in our example (con-
sistency in size); moreover, reality offered potentially infinite number of oc-
casions in which the process could be observed (consistency in replications).
How would estimation in a long run equilibrium look like? In the example,
as we have already discussed, the long run equilibrium (everybody exits the
state) carries no information on the value of the parameter, so it cannot
be exploited for estimation. But suppose individuals can get fired, when
employed, at a rate δ. Independently from the initial conditions, after a few
periods the system reaches a steady state where the expected unemployment
20With non-linear moments we get a small sample bias, of predictable direction (which
depends on the curvature of the moment). The bias decreases as the sample size (number
of agents) increases. See Grazzini et al. (2012).
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rate is a function of p and δ.21 We now have two parameters to estimate, and
estimation can be performed exploiting both the moment condition in the
transitory equilibrium (the MTTF) and the moment condition in the long
run equilibrium (the unemployment rate).
Indirect inference
In the II method, the basic idea is to use the coefficients of an auxiliary
model, estimated both on the real and on the simulated data, to describe the
data, that is as summary statistics on the original model. Hence, the method
prescribes the following steps:
1. simulate the model for a candidate parameters vector θi and obtain
artificial data;
2. estimate the parameters β of a (possibly misspecified) auxiliary model
yt = f(β, zt), where mathbfz are the explanatory variables;
3. change the structural parameters θ of the original model until the dis-
tance between the estimates of the auxiliary model using real and ar-
tificial data is minimized:
θ̂ = arg min
θ
[β̂(θ)− β̂R]′W−1[β̂(θ)− β̂R] (9.11)
where W is a positive definite matrix of weights.
Note that MSM can be thought of as an instance of II, where the meta-
model is just a constant: yt = µ + ut. Indeed, the auxiliary model can be
overly simple and misspecified; however, the estimates are more efficient if
21For instance, with p = 2, δ = .1 and a scale factor λ = .2 the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate is about 15.3%.
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Population size 10 50 100 500 1,000 5,000 10,000
Mean of estimated coeff. 0.298 0.421 0.436 0.489 0.463 0.475 0.459
Var of estimated coeff. 0.07344 0.05805 0.05874 0.02262 0.01596 0.00877 0.00508
Table 9.2: Montecarlo results for the estimation of a Weibull model by II, with an expo-
nential auxiliary model. The correct value of the parameter is 1/p? = 0.5.
it is a good statistical description of the data, that is a ‘bona fide’ reduced
form version of the model.22
As in the method of simulated moments, if the number of the parameters
of the auxiliary model is equal to the number of parameters in the original
model the original model is just-identified, and the distance between the
estimated coefficients on the real and on the simulated data, if the model is
correctly specified, goes in the limit to zero. If the number of parameters in
the auxiliary model is bigger than the number of parameters in the original
model, the original model is over-identified, and the distance between the
estimated coefficients remain positive. If the number of parameters in the
auxiliary model is smaller than the number of parameters in the original
model, the original model is under-identified.
In the Weibull example of the previous section, it could be tempting to
opt for a very simple auxiliary model in the form of an exponential model.
Exponential models are particular cases of the Weibull models, with p = 1.
This implies a constant hazard rate. Inference in this case is theoretically
possible by comparing the scaling factor λ in the pseudo-true and in the
simulated data. However, a Montecarlo experiment similar to the one already
described shows that the exponential model is too poor a description of the
Weibull model, for p? = 2: the estimation procedure is not able to recover
the pseudo-true value (table 9.2).
22The properties of II methods, however, crucially depend on a correct specification of
the structural model. Some semiparametric methods have been proposed that make II
more robust to the structural model specification (Dridi and Renault, 2000).
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Figure 9.4: Example plot of Weibull hazard functions
The log-logistic specification appears to be a better choice for our auxil-






S(t) = [1 + (λt)1/γ]−1 (9.13)
Figure 9.4 depicts the shape of the hazard rate of the log-logistic model,
for different values of the parameter γ. As a proxy for the Weibull, it imme-
diately appears more apt than the exponential.
In the estimation procedure, the γ coefficients for the auxiliary model es-
timated on the (pseudo-)real and the simulated data are compared, and used
to infer the true value of the parameter b, in the (correctly specified) origi-
nal Weibull model. The Montecarlo experiment confirms that the choice is
correct: although the log-logistic model is misspecified, the estimated param-
eters for p are centered around the true value, with a variance that declines
at the usual rate with sample size (table 9.3).23
23Note that consistency in sample size is attainable, in this example, because obser-
vations are independent. Note also that the efficiency of the MSM estimates and the II
estimates, as measured by the variance of the estimates, is similar.
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Population size 10 50 100 500 1,000 5,000 10,000
Mean of estimated coeff. 0.523 0.497 0.495 0.502 0.499 0.499 0.500
Var of estimated coeff. 0.03901 0.00627 0.00367 0.00071 0.00038 0.00009 0.00004
Table 9.3: Montecarlo results for the estimation of a Weibull model by II, with a log-logistic
auxiliary model. The correct value of the parameter is 0.5.
While the usual strategy, as followed in the example above, is to choose
a simple auxiliary model, with a number of parameters comparable to that
of the structural model, and whose estimation is relatively straightforward,
another approach is to introduce an auxiliary model with a large number
of parameters, providing a good description of the real DGP. The idea is to
gain in asymptotic efficiency. However, with large auxiliary models indirect
inference can be very computationally demanding, as the summary statistics
β̃(θ) have to be evaluated for each value of θ appearing in the numerical
optimization algorithm. This has led to the development of a variant to
II, the so-called Efficient Method of Moments, which makes use of a score
generator to define the matching conditions.24
9.3.2 Ergodicity and an application to a simple AB
model
In the sections above we have used, to highlight the mechanics of the es-
timation procedure, a simple analytical model. We now apply the Method
of Simulated Moments to a simple AB model, Thomas Schelling’s Segrega-
tion model (Schelling, 1969).25 This application is also used to illustrate the
effects of non-ergodic behaviour, and suggest a way to take this into account.
The model considers an idealised interaction between individuals having
to choose where to live, on a finite grid. Individuals are initially located
24Gallant (1996).
25For further examples of estimation of AB models by Simulated Minimum Distance,
see Grazzini and Richiardi (2015).
310
at random on the grid, with one cell being occupied at most by one agent.
Because cell has eight adjacent cells, individuals can have at most eight imme-
diate neighbours.26 There are two types of individuals, say black and white.
Individuals are characterised by a tolerance level, that is the minimum frac-
tion of same-colour neighbours they can accept. If the composition of their
immediate neighbourhood does not satisfy this condition, individuals become
unsatisfied and they search for another location (empty cell) where the share
of same-colour neighbours is above the threshold. For simplicity, an homoge-
neous tolerance level is assumed. As an example, suppose the tolerance level
is 30%, that is, individuals want to have at least 30% of their neighbours of
the same colour as they are. A black individual with eight neighbours (no
empty cells around him) would move away if less than three of his neighbours
are black. Then model shows that even when the thresholds are pretty low
(corresponding to high levels of tolerance), the equilibrium outcome where
everybody is happy and nobody is willing to move is highly segregated, with
the formation of ‘ghettoes’ possibly surrounded by empty locations. This is
because of two externalities that are in place. When a black individual moves
out because there are too many white individuals around him, he affects the
composition of his original neighbourhood, making other black people more
likely to become unsatisfied (there is one black individual less around). At
the same time, when he settles down to a new location with a high enough
presence of black people, he makes white people in the area more likely to
become unsatisfied, as there is one more black individual around. Because
initial locations are random, even with homogeneous tolerance thresholds
—and even if the threshold is low (high tolerance)— there will be some in-
dividuals who happen to be unhappy of their location. They then move out,
26To avoid boundary effects, it is supposed that cells on one edge of the grid are adjacent
to cells on the other edge (so that the grid is effectively a torus).
311
and this triggers a chain reaction that leads to highly segregated outcomes.
The model is clearly very stylized, and nobody would think of taking it
seriously to the data. However, for the sake of our argument let us assume
that this is a good-enough description of some real world situation. We
observe the size of the city, the density of houses, and where individuals live,
and we want to make inference about their tolerance threshold. We assume
that the real world is in equilibrium, that is, every observed individual is
happy about his or her location and does not want to move. We also abstract
from demographic processes, job mobility, house prices and other factors that
might affect location choices: the population is fixed and only neighbourhood
composition matters. For each individual we compute the fraction of same-
colour neighbours, and we characterise the system with the average fraction
of same-colour neighbours, a measure of segregation.
Note that, given there are enough empty cells so that movers can find a
new suitable location, the model always settles down to a situation where
everybody is happy, and nobody wants to move. Such an equilibrium is an
absorbing state of the model. Because no further relocations take place in
the absorbing state, the level of segregation (average share of same-colour
neighbours, or similarity) does not vary.
Also, note that, with a finite grid size, the outcome depends on the initial
(random) location of agents. For the same tolerance threshold, different
levels of segregation can be obtained depending on the initial conditions,
which are in turn determined by the random seed. Because the final level
of segregation of each run is constant (it has a degenerate distribution with
0 variance), there is no chance that the outcomes of two different runs can
be thought to be drawn from the same theoretical distribution, unless they
exactly coincide. If we obtain a level of similarity of 68.2% in one run, and
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Figure 9.5: Evolution of segregation in the Schelling model, different random seeds. The
vertical axis measure the average share of neighbours of the same colour (similarity).
Tolerance threshold is 0.3. Grid size is 15x15. Density is 0.9.
of 69.8% in another run, we must treat those two numbers as irreducibly
different. Said differently, the model is non-ergodic, and no statistical test is
needed to confirm this. Figure 9.5 exemplifies.
Due to its non-ergodic nature, rather than having one long run equilib-
rium (absorbing state), the model has a distribution of long run equilibria
(figure 9.6).27
However, as the grid size grows, the different outcomes get closer and
closer: the effects of the initial conditions (random seed) matter less and
less, and the distribution of equilibrium segregation levels shrinks. In the
limit, the model becomes ergodic, with only one equilibrium, for given values
of the parameters.
Here, to illustrate the point about non-ergodicity, we consider a small
grid size. We assume that we observe data coming from one real ‘village’
composed of 15x15=225 houses, inhabited by approximately 200 individuals
(density is 0.9). The level of segregation in this hypothetical village is 0.7.
27In general, the distribution of long run equilibria needs not to be normal.
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Figure 9.6: Distribution of equilibrium segregation levels in the Schelling model, different
random seeds. The horizontal axis measure the average share of neighbours of the same
colour (similarity), in equilibium. Tolerance threshold is 0.3. Grid size is 15x15. Density
is 0.9. 10,000 runs are performed; those where an equilibrium is not reached after 250
interations are discarded. Normal density is superimposed.
We wish to estimate how tolerant its inhabitants are.
We first fix the random seed. Because of the limited number of neigh-
bours one individual can have, the individual responsiveness to changes in
the tolerance threshold is a step function (figure 9.7).
The accuracy of the estimates cannot go beyond the distance between
those steps. Optimisation is therefore easily achieved by a simple grid search:
the model is simulated for all values of the parameter in the range [0,1],
with an interval equal to 0.01 (which is big enough to discriminate between
different steps). Figure 9.8 shows how our summary statistics µ∗(θ) —or
moment function— responds to changes in the value of the parameter θ, the
tolerance threshold.28
The moment is monotonic in the parameter: as we have seen, with only
one parameter this is a sufficient condition for identification.29 Note that
28Because the level of segregation is constant in the stationary state, we do not actually
need to compute a longitudinal average to estimate the theoretical moment: we can simply
look at the level of segregation that occurs at the first point in simulated time where
everybody is happy.
29See also Grazzini and Richiardi (2015).
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Figure 9.7: Individual choices in the Schelling model: Minimum fraction of same-colour
neighbourhood wanted for different levels of tolerance. In the limit, for an infinitely large
neighbourhood, the function would be a straight 45o line.
Figure 9.8: The effects of tolerance on segregation in the Schelling model.
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so far we have only looked at the model, in order to construct the moment
function µ∗(θ). We now compare this moment function with the observed
value mD, which we assume to be 70%. By inverting the moment function
at the observed value, we get our estimate of the parameter. In our case, a
linear interpolation between the two values of the parameters, which give a
level of segregation respectively immediately below and immediately above
70%, gives our point estimate of 0.289. Because there is no variation in the
steady state (by assumption), there is no sampling error, and the theoretical
moment (given the random seed) is estimated with precision: consequently,
the standard error of the estimate is 0.
On the contrary, if there were some stochastic factor that exogenously
forced relocation, like birth and death, we would have obtained a stationary
state where the level of segregation fluctuates around the long term mean
µ∗. We would then need to estimate the moments, both in the real and
in the simulated data. Such an estimate is nothing else that the sample
mean m, computed in the stationary state. The Central Limit Theorem
tells us that the sample mean is asymptotically normally distributed with
mean E[m] = µ∗ and standard deviation σm =
σ√
n
, where σ is the standard
deviation of the underlying statistics (the level of segregation in our case),
and n is the number of periods of observation. The simulated moment µ∗(θ)
can then be computed, for any θ, to any desired degree of accuracy, given
that we can simulate an arbitrarily large number of periods in the steady
state. The real moment µD however can only be estimated in the available
data. Due to this sampling error, our estimates for θ are also subject to
uncertainty. To obtain the standard error of the estimates, we can simply
bootstrap the observed moment from its estimated distribution (a normal
distribution with mean mD and variance σ2m). The simulated moments are
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then inverted, giving a distribution of estimates. The standard deviation of
this distribution is the standard error of the estimates.
Until now, we have kept the random seed fixed. However, we have seen
that for finite city sizes, the model is non-ergodic, so that different levels of
segregation are obtained for the same value of the parameter, due to different
initial conditions. A simple way to take non-ergodicity into account is to re-
peat the estimation for different random seeds. This gives us a distribution of
estimates, even in the simple case of constant segregation in the steady state.
The amplitude of this distribution measures the uncertainty that originates
from the non-ergodic nature of the model: we do not know what random
seed God used to produce the real data, and whether the real data are a low
draw (like run #1 in figure 9.5) or a high draw (like run #3). Note that this
uncertainty is different from sampling error: even if we enlarge the period of
observation, we cannot learn about the random seed used to produce the real
data. Hence, the uncertainty coming from non-ergodicity does not vanishes
over time.
To illustrate the issue, we construct the theoretical moments for 10,000
different random seeds, and invert them at the observed level of segregation
to obtain a distribution of estimates. This is depicted in figure 9.9. The
distribution is multimodal, which might look at first surprising, given the
beautiful normal distribution of figure 9.6. However, figure 9.6 depicts the
distribution of segregation levels that can be obtained for a given level of
tolerance, while figure 9.9 relates to the inverse problem, the distribution of
tolerance levels that are consistent with a given level of segregation. The
reason for its multimodal nature can be understood by a closer inspection of
figure 9.7. The spikes in the distribution of estimates result from different
possible combinations of tolerance level and neighbourhood composition of
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Figure 9.9: Distribution of estimates in the Schelling model. 10,000 random seeds are
tested; the parameter space is regularly sampled on the interval [0,1] at 0.01 intervals.
The assumed observed level of segregation is 70%.
individuals with different number of neighbors.30 If we considered larger
neighborhoods (for instance by taking into account also second neighbors,
that is individuals living two cells away), the spikes would get closer, and for
large enough neighborhoods we would get a nice normal distribution.
What matters for our argument, however, is that in presence of non-
ergodicity, the distribution estimates for different random seeds is our best
assessment of the unknown level of tolerance in the population.31
30In the range of values of the tolerance threshold which are relevant for the exercise
(that is, leading to a segregation level around 70%), individuals with exactly 8 neighbours
change their behaviour only as the required number of same-colour neighbours passes
25% (below, they require two neighbors of the same colour; above, they require three
neighbours of the same colour) or 37.5% (below, three same-colour neighbours, above,
four same-colour neighbors). Individuals with exactly 7 neighbors change their behaviour
only at 28.6% (from two to three same-colour neighbors) or 42.9% (from three to four).
Individuals with exactly 6 neighbors change their behavior only at 33.3% (from two to
three same-colour neighbors). Individuals with exactly 5 neighbors change their behavior
only at 20% (from one to two same-colour neighbors) or 40% (from two to three). Given the
assumed density (0.9), there are very few individuals with 4 neighbours, and it practically
never happens that there are individuals with less than 4 neighbors.
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is the posterior distribution, that is
the updated distribution once the information coming from the observed data
is properly considered.
Bayesians give a prior distribution of the parameters as an input to the
estimation process, and get back a posterior distribution: knowledge gets
updated by the information contained in the data. The prior distribution
typically comes from other studies or subjective evaluations. A uniform dis-
tribution in the allowed range of the parameters is often used as a way to
introduce “uninformative” priors, though not such a thing as an uninfor-
mative prior actually exists (Bernardo, 1997). What matters, the prior is a
distribution, which through application of Bayes theorem produces another
distribution as an output.
The difference with SMD techniques can be evaluated by comparing the
Bayesian approach with Maximum Likelihood (ML), an instance of SMD





to θ: (i) in the Bayesian approach, there is no maximisation involved; (ii)
rather than obtaining a point estimate for the parameters (plus an estimate
for the standard error which, if the distribution of the estimator is known,
at least asymptotically, allows computation of confidence intervals) we get a
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distribution, (iii) prior knowledge can be incorporated.32





ally intensive steps: (i), for given values of θ, obtaining an estimate for the
likelihood L , (ii) iterating over different values of θ. In the next section we
elaborate on the first issue, while in section 9.4.2 we discuss the latter.
9.4.1 Estimating the likelihood
Estimation of the likelihood (the probability of observing the data, given the
current values of the parameters) can be done, when its analytical derivation
is not feasible, by repeatedly sampling from the model output. For instance,
in a long-run equilibrium, the outcome fluctuates around a stationary level
µ(θ)∗ = E[yt(θ)|t > T̄ ]. If we collect the artificial data produced by the
model in such a long-run equilibrium, we can construct a probability dis-
tribution around µ∗, and therefore evaluate the density at each observed
data point yRt . If the outcomes y(θ) were discrete, we would only have to
count the frequency of occurrence of each observed value yRt . With contin-
uous y(θ), the likelihood has to be estimated either non-parametrically or
parametrically, under appropriate distributional assumptions. A traditional
non-parametric method is kernel density estimation (KDE), which basically
produces histogram-smoothing: the artificial data are grouped in bins (the
histogram), and then a weighted moving average of the frequency of each bin
is computed.33 The approximation bias introduced by KDE can be reduced
by using a large number of very small bins, but then the variance in the es-
32We have not considered ML in our review of SMD methods as obtaining an estimate
of the likelihood can be computationally heavy, as we shall see. For the same reason, we
will not dwell into this problem here, and we will focus on likelihood-free approximate
Bayesian methods instead.
33More formally, kernel density estimation (KDE), given a simulated time series y(θ) ≡
{ys}, s = 1 · · ·S, approximates the density f(yRt ,θ), for each observed data point yRt ,
with:
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timate of the density grows. To see this, think of estimating the probability
density function (PDF) when the data comes from any standard distribution,
like an exponential or a Gaussian. We can approximate the true PDF f(x) to
arbitrary accuracy by a piecewise-constant density (that is, by constructing
an histogram), but, for a fixed set of bins, we can only come so close to the
true, continuous density.
The main problem with KDE is however its computational cost. A
(faster) alternative is to assume a parametric distribution for the density,
around µ∗(θ). Imposing additional information about the distribution of the
simulation output can help generate better estimates from a limited number
of simulation runs. On the other hand, those estimates may increase the bias
if the assumed distribution does not conform to the true density of the model
output. Such an assumption can of course be tested in the artificial data, for
specific values of θ, and should be tested in the relevant range (i.e. where
the estimated coefficients lie). Use of parametric methods leads to syntetic
likelihood or pseudo-likelihood estimation (Wood, 2010; Hartig et al., 2011).
For instance, Grazzini et al. (2015) estimate a stock market model with
one behavioural parameter determining how traders react to a difference be-
tween the target price and the current price pit, and assume a Gaussian
distribution of the price level around its long-run stationary level. Under
this assumption, they derive a close-form expression for the likelihood func-
tion. Figure 9.1 shows that the assumption is violated at the estimated value
















where K is a kernel function that places greater weight on values yks that are closer to
yRkt, is symmetric around zero and integrates to one, and h is the bandwidth. Algorithms
for KDE are available in most statistical packages.
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Figure 9.1: Price distribution in the long-run stationary state at the pseudo-true value of
the coefficient. Source: Grazzini and Richiardi (2015).
theoretical equilibrium value. However, the shape of the distribution is sym-
metric and not too far from Gaussian, except for the spike at the theoretical
equilibrium. Monte Carlo experimentation with the new posterior suggests
that it performs very well, saving significant computational time.
The parametric and non-parametric methods discussed above use the out-
put variability that is predicted by the model, and use this information for
inference. However, it is possible that the model shows much less variability
than the data. This is due to fundamental specification errors (the model
is only a poor approximation of the real process, so that the mean model
predictions do not fit to the data), simplification errors (the model is a good
approximation of the real process, but there are additional stochastic pro-
cesses that have acted on the data and are not included in the model) or
measurement errors (there is uncertainty about the data). While the first
type of errors calls for a re-specification of the model, the latter types could
in principle be dealt with by including additional processes that explain this
variability within the model. “However, particularly, when those processes
are not of interest for the scientific question asked, it is simpler and more
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parsimonious to express this unexplained variability outside the stochastic
simulation. One way to do this is adding an external error model with a
tractable likelihood on top of the results of the stochastic simulation.” (Har-
tig et al., 2011). Again, the validity of such a strategy depends on the quality
of the assumption about the distribution of these external errors, given the
model and the data. This assumption cannot be tested per se, as the vari-
ability in the real data comes both from the explained components (i.e. the
model) and from the unexplained ones (the external errors), the external
errors being defined as a residual.
The two parametric strategies (modelling the variability of model outcome
and modelling external errors that might affect the real data, in the stationary
state) are often explored separately. For instance, most studies that use the
augmentation by external errors approach then treat the model outcome
as deterministic, in the stationary state, whilst most studies that employ a
synthetic likelihood do not consider external errors. However, it is in principle
possible to combine the two approaches together, and explicit distributional
assumptions for both the model outcomes and the external errors. It is
also possible to be agnostic about the origin of the variability (whether the
model or the external errors) and consider a single parametric distribution of
the data around the steady state.34 Moreover, for most inferential purposes
the amplitude of the distribution does not matter, as the variance-covariance
matrix is integrated out of the approximated likelihood function (see Grazzini
et al., 2015).
34Given that the data does not allow to disentangle model errors from external errors,
these two approaches are equivalent.
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9.4.2 Sampling the posterior distribution
Application of the Bayes theorem, once the likelihood is known, allows to get
a density for the posterior distribution, at one given value of θ. However,
to recover the whole shape of the posterior distribution, many values have
to be sampled. In simple models, exploration of the parameters space can
be accomplished by ‘brute force’ grid exploration: the parameters space is
sampled at regular (small) intervals. For instance, if there are two parameters
that can potentially vary continuously between 0 and 1, and we set the value
of the step to .1, we have 11 values to consider for each parameter, and their
combination gives 121 points to sample: by discretising the parameters, we
have reduced the size of the parameters space from R2 to 121 points.
Such a systematic grid search, however, is highly inefficient, as it involves
evaluating the density of the posterior distribution at many points where it
is practically zero, while more likely values of θ, where a finer search might
be valuable, are sampled with the same probability. Multi-level grid search,
where the grid is explored at smaller intervals in ranges of the parameter
space on the bases of the results of previous, looser, grid explorations, can of
course be devised. However, as soon as the number of parameters increases,
the computational limits of this approach become evident.
There are four main classes of efficient sampling schemes, to obtain sam-
ples from a function of θ, the target distribution (the posterior, in our case),
which is unknown analytically but can be evaluated point-wise for each θ:
(i) rejection sampling, (ii) importance sampling, (iii) Markov chain Monte
Carlo, and (iv) Sequential Monte Carlo. Here we provide only an intuition
of how they work, drawing extensively from the excellent survey by Hartig
et al. (2011).35
35The entries marked with a ‘*’ are excerpt from Hartig et al. (2011), where we have
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Rejection sampling.∗ The simplest possibility of generating a distribu-
tion that approximates L (θ) is to sample random parameters θ and accept
those proportionally to their (point-wise approximated) value of L (θ). This
approach can be slightly improved by importance sampling or stratified sam-
pling methods such as the Latin hypercube design, but rejection approaches
encounter computational limitations when the dimensionality of the param-
eter space becomes larger than typically 10-15 parameters.
Importance sampling. The intuition behind importance sampling is to
to study the distribution L (θ) = p(θ|y) while sampling from another, sim-
pler distribution q(θ) (called importance distribution). This technique was
born as a variance reduction technique, aimed at increasing the likelihood
to sample from an ‘important’ but small region by sampling from a different
distribution that overweights the important region (hence the name). Having
oversampled the important region, we have to adjust our estimate somehow
to account for having sampled from this other distribution. This is done by
re-weighting the sampled values by the adjustment factor p(θ)(q(θ)). Impor-
tance sampling and rejection sampling are similar in as much both distort
a sample from one distribution in order to sample from another. They also
share the limitation that they do not work well in high dimensions.
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC).∗∗ MCMC sampling is a process
that filters proposed values for θ to arrive at a sample of values drawn from
the desired distribution. MCMC algorithms construct a Markov chain of pa-
rameter values (θ1,θn), where the next parameter combination θi+1 is chosen
by proposing a random move conditional on the last parameter combination
θi, and accepting conditional on the ratio of L (θi+1)/L (θi). There are
a number of MCMC samplers, the most popular of which is the Metropo-
replaced φ in their notation with θ, in order to maintain consistency. The entries marked
with a ‘**’ are based on Hartig et al. (2011), appropriately integrated.
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lis–Hastings algorithm. In its simplest form, the random-walk Metropolis-




is drawn, given the




in which case we set θ(s+1) = θc; else, we set θ(s+1) = θ(s) and we repeat the
previous candidate.
Given that certain conditions are met (see, e.g. Andrieu et al., 2003),
the Markov chain of parameter values will eventually converge to the target
distribution L (θ). The advantage of an MCMC is that the time needed to
obtain acceptable convergence is typically much shorter than for rejection
sampling, because the sampling effort is concentrated in the areas of high
likelihood or posterior density.
Sequential Monte Carlo methods (SMC).∗ Particle filters or sequential
Monte Carlo methods (SMCs) also try to concentrate the sampling effort in
the areas of high likelihood or posterior density based on previous samples.
Unlike MCMCs, however, each step of the algorithm contains not a single θ,
but N parameter combinations θi (particles), that are assigned weights ωi
proportional to their likelihood or posterior value L (θi) (see Arulampalam
et al., 2002). When starting with a random sample of parameters, many
particles may be assigned close to zero weights, meaning that they carry
little information for the inference (degeneracy). To avoid this, a resampling
step is usually added where a new set of particles is created based on the
current weight distribution [...]. The traditional motivation for a particle
filter is to include new data in each filter step, but the filter may also be used
to work on a fixed dataset or to subsequently add independent subsets of the
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data.
9.4.3 Approximate Bayesian computation
As we have seen in section 9.4.1, obtaining a non-parametric estimate of the
likelihood can be computationally heavy. Turning to parametric estimates,
under the assumption of a fixed distributional form of the variable of interest
around a long-term stationary state predicted by the model —where the
variability is produced either by model uncertainty or external errors— can
sometimes be too restrictive. Originating from population genetics (Tavaré
et al., 1997; Fu and Li, 1997), where the task of estimating the likelihood
of the observed changes in DNA is impervious, a new set of methods have
appeared in the last fifteen years to produce approximations of the posterior
distributions without relying on the likelihood. These methods are labelled
‘likelihood-free’ methods, and the best known class is approximate Bayesian
computation (ABC).36
In standard Bayesian methods, it is the likelihood function that provides
the fit of the model with the data —describing how plausible a particular pa-
rameter set θ. The likelihood is however often computationally impractical to
evaluate. The basic idea of ABC is to replace the evaluation of the likelihood
with a 0-1 indicator, describing whether the model outcome is close enough
to the observed data. To allow such an assessment, the model outcome and
the data must first be summarised. Then, a distance between the simulated
and the real data is computed. The model is assumed to be close enough to
the data if the distance falls within the admitted tolerance. As such, there
are three key ingredients in ABC: (i) the selection of summary statistics, (ii)
the definition of a distance measure, (iii) the definition of a tolerance thresh-
36See Marin et al. (2011); Turner and Zandt (2012).
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old. The choice of a distance measure is usually the least controversial point
(the Euclidean distance or weighted Euclidean distance, where the weights
are given by the inverse of the standard deviation of each summary statistics,
is generally used). The choice of a tolerance threshold, as we shall see, deter-
mines the trade-off between sampling error and approximation error, given
computing time. The choice of summary statistics is the most challenging,
and we will discuss it in greater details.
The basic ABC algorithm works as follows:
1. a candidate vector θi is drawn from a prior distribution;
2. a simulation is run with parameters vector θi, obtaining simulated data
from the model density p(y|θi);
3. the candidate vector is either retained or dismissed depending on whether
the distance between the summary statistics computed on the artificial
data S(y(θ)) and summary statistics computed on the real data S(yR)
is within or outside the admitted tolerance h: d(S,SR) ≤ h.
This is repeated N times; the retained values of the parameters define an
empirical approximated posterior distribution. KDE can then be applied to
smooth out the resulting histogram, and obtain an estimate of the theoretical
approximated posterior. Approximation error refers to the fact that the
posterior is approximated; sampling error refers to the fact that we learn
about the approximated posterior from a limited set of data.
It is easy to see where the approximation error comes from. While the
true posterior distribution is p(θ|y = yR), in ABC we get p(θ|S(y) ≈ S(yR)).
If we set the tolerance threshold h = 0, and our statistics were sufficient
summary statistics37, we would get back to standard Bayesian inference,
37A summary statistics is said to be sufficient if “no other statistic that can be calculated
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and sample from the exact posterior distribution. However —and this is
the whole point— because of the complexity of the underlying model the
likelihood of observing the real data is tiny everywhere, so that acceptances
are impossible, or at least very rare. When h is too small, the distribution
of accepted values of θ is closer to the true posterior, and the approximation
error is smaller; however, the number of acceptances is usually too small
to obtain a precise estimate of the (approximated) posterior distribution:
the sampling error increases. On the other hand, when h is too large, the
precision of the estimate improves because we have more accepted values
(the sampling error goes down), but the approximation error gets bigger. In
other words, we obtain a better estimate of a worse object.
An alternative to choosing h in advance is to specify the number of ac-
ceptances k required (e.g. k = 500): then, h is chosen (after the distance for
every draw is computed) in order to achieve that number of acceptances. Fi-
nally, note that the tradeoff between sampling error and approximation error
is for a given number of draws (hence, a given computing time). Drawing
more candidates allows to reduce the approximation error (by decreasing h)
without increasing the sampling error. Stated more formally, ABC converges
to true posterior as h→ 0, N →∞.
The choice of summary statistics is at the same time the weak point of
ABC and a great source of flexibility. For instance, by choosing as summary
statistics the moments µ(y), or the coefficients β of an appropriate auxiliary
model, it allows to embed the method of simulated moments and indirect
inference in a Bayesian setting, incorporating prior information. Also, an
appropriate choice of the summary statistics allows to make conditional fore-
casts about the evolution of the real world. Suppose an extreme case where
from the same sample provides any additional information as to the value of the parameter”
(Fisher, 1922). Sufficient statistics satisfy p(θ|S(yR)) = p(θ|yR).
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we only condition on the state of the system at time t: we wish to project
the likely evolution of a system given yt. We can then simply set our sum-
mary statistics S(y) = yR,t: the ABC algorithm will retain any simulated
trajectory that passes for yt, producing not only a (quite poor, in this case)
approximation of the posterior, but also conditional projections about future
states.38
Any condition can in principle be used as a summary statistics: of course,
the lower the informational content of the condition, the poorer the approx-
imation (and the bigger the dispersion of the projections). However, there
is also a drawback in increasing the informational content of the summary
statistics, and it comes again from the trade-off between sampling error and
approximation error. As Beaumont et al. (2002, p. 2026) put it, “A cru-
cial limitation of the [...] method is that only a small number of summary
statistics can usually be handled. Otherwise, either acceptance rates become
prohibitively low or the tolerance [...] must be increased, which can distort
the approximation.” This is because the asymptotic rate of converge of ABC
to the true posterior distribution, as h → 0, N → ∞, worsens with dim(S).
The problem of choosing appropriate low dimensional summary statistics
that are informative about θ is an open issue in ABC. “The insidious is-
sue is that it is rarely possible to verify either sufficiency or insufficiency.
Furthermore, if they are insufficient, it is usually not possible to determine
how badly they have distorted results. Said another way, you know you are
probably making errors, but you don’t know how large they are” (Holmes,
38The case when it is possible to kill two birds (inference and conditional statements)
with one stone is of course quite a lucky one. More in general, when the condition in
the conditional statement is too poor to allow for good inference, we should keep the
two problems separate: first, get a good approximation of the posterior (by selecting
appropriate summary statistics); then, sample from the estimated posterior and select the
trajectories that fulfil the condition.
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2015).
The topic is an active area of research. Recent years have seen the devel-
opment of techniques that provide guidance in the selection of the summary
statistics (Fearnhead and Prangle, 2012, see e.g.). Also, post-processing of
the results can improve the quality of the approximation by correcting the
distribution of θ by the difference between the observed and simulated sum-
mary statistics (Beaumont et al., 2002). Finally, new methods have appeared
that require no summary statistics, external error terms, or tolerance thresh-
olds, at a computational cost (Turner and Sederberg, 2013).
Two final notes on ABC concern efficiency.
The standard scheme for ABC is, as we have seen, rejection sampling.
Candidates are drawn from the prior distribution, and only those that ‘per-
form well’ are retained. This is not very efficient, especially if the prior
distribution differs significantly from the posterior. However, it is possible to
employ ABC with more efficient sampling schemes (see Sisson et al., 2016).
For instance, rather than sampling from the prior one could sample from an
importance distribution q(θ). Candidate are then accepted if d(S, SR) ≤ h),
with a weight p(θ)(q(θ)). SMC methods can then be employed to adaptively
refine both the threshold and the importance distribution. MCMC methods
can also be employed, where new candidates depend on the current value of
θ and are accepted with a modified Metropolis-Hastings rule.
Efficiency can also be improved in an ABC setting by assigning a con-
tinuation probability to each simulation. The idea is to stop prematurely
simulations that are likely to end up in a rejection, and has originated the
lazy ABC approach (Prangle, 2014).
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9.4.4 ABC estimation of the Segregation model
As an illustration of the ABC approach, we estimate the Schelling model.
As in section 9.3.2, we assume to observe a segregation level of 70% (the
average share of same-colour neighbours). The parameter to estimate is the
individual (homogeneous) tolerance level, that is the minimum share of same-
colour neighbours that a person is willing to accept before deciding to move
out of the current location. Our prior is a uniform distribution between 0 and
1. We then follow the simple rejection algorithm discussed in section 9.4.3:
we perform random sampling from the prior distribution, run the simulation
with the sampled value of the parameter until an equilibrium configuration
is obtained where nobody wants to move, compute the distance d between
the observed level of segregation (70%) and the simulated one, and retain
only the values of the parameters where d ≤ h, with different thresholds h.
When sampling from the prior distribution, we do not need to keep the
random seed constant. Note that we could indeed fix the random seed: we
would then obtain a posterior distribution reflecting the uncertainty net of
non-ergodicity.39 Then we could repeat, as with SMD, the estimation ex-
ercise many times for different random seeds, and obtain a distribution of
distributions. Comparing the variance of the posterior distributions obtained
with fixed seeds, with the variance of the overall posterior distribution would
permit to disentangle the uncertainty coming from the limited information
contained in the data, plus the imprecise information underpinning our pri-
ors, from the uncertainty coming from non-ergodicity.
But disentangling these sources of uncertainty is not really relevant for
39In the Schelling model, because the long-run stationary state is just a constant value
for the segregation level, for h low enough we would simply get a uniform posterior be-
tween the two values which give a level of segregation respectively immediately below and
immediately above the observed level of 70% —see figure 9.7.
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Bayesians. This is because the main object of interest for Bayesians —the
posterior— is already a distribution, which reflects the intrinsic uncertainty
about the value of the parameter; for subjective Bayesians, such things as
‘true’ values of the parameters simply do not exist. Non-ergodicity however
still matters for interpreting and using the estimates: when simulating a non-
ergodic model, we should realize that multiple statistical equilibria exist, for
the same values of the parameters. This might be important for prediction
and for policy analysis, as discussed in section 9.2.
Figure 9.2 depicts the posteriors obtained in the Schelling model, for
different levels of h. The prior for the individual tolerance threshold is a
uniform distribution between 0 and 0.45. Over 2 million draws are taken
from the prior. With h = 10 percentage points, the shape of the posterior
is detectable, but the distribution stretches over a wide range of values. De-
creasing the value of h to 5 percentage points reduces the range of admitted
values, a sign that the approximation improves. However, decreasing h fur-
ther seems to provide no additional benefits, at the cost of reducing sample
size.
9.5 Conclusions
Estimation of AB models has been so far confined to a few, relatively simple,
cases. This is for sure bound to change, as the field gets more mature, and
the challenge of empirical validation is taken seriously. Basically, the main
difference between estimation of AB models and more standard applications
lies in the higher computational complexity of AB models. This means that
likelihood-based methods are in general impractical, unless very few parame-
ters are involved. Likelihood-free methods like approximate Bayesian compu-
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h = 10 ppt. (706,675 obs.) h = 5 ppt. (375810 obs.)
Simulated segregation level between 60% and 80% Simulated segregation level between 65% and 75%
h = 1 ppt. (75,847 obs.) h = .1 ppt. (7543 obs.)
Simulated segregation level between 69% and 71% Simulated segregation level between 69.9% and 70.1%
Figure 9.2: Posterior distributions in the Schelling model. 2,300,000 draws from a Uniform
prior in (0,0.45).
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tation, which embed simulated minimum distance techniques in a Bayesian






The economic crisis the world has experienced since 2007, which is still on-
going in some parts of the globe, has been also a crisis of the economic
profession. ”Over the past three decades, economists have largely developed
and come to rely on models that disregard key factors—including hetero-
geneity of decision rules, revisions of forecasting strategies, and changes in
the social context—that drive outcomes in asset and other markets. It is
obvious, even to the casual observer that these models fail to account for the
actual evolution of the real-world economy.... In our hour of greatest need,
societies around the world are left to grope in the dark without a theory”
(Colander, 2009).
This predicament was not new. Back in 1995 Frank Hahn and Robert
Solow fiercefully argued against the New Classical basic methodological prin-
ciple according to which ”the only appropriate micro model is Walrasian...
based exclusively on inter-temporal utility maximization subject to budget
and technological constraints....[This model] proposes that the actual econ-
omy can be read as it is... approximating the infinite time discounted utility
maximizing program of a single immortal representative agent.... There is
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simply no possibility of coordination failures....Of course that is the economy
of Dr. Pangloss and it bears little relation to the world” (Hahn, 1995, p.2).
Since then, some developments of economic thought have gone in the right di-
rection but overall, their criticisms have gone largely unnoticed. The straight
jacket of axiomatic Walrasian microfoundations has limited the scope of the
research for alternatives.
Walrasian micro-foundations should be considered as a wrong answer to
a right research question, the most stimulating question since the very be-
ginning of economic thought: How does a completely decentralized economy
composed of myriads of self-interested agents manages to coordinate individ-
ual actions?
Agent Based Models provide a promising tentative answer to this ques-
tion. There is still a long way to go but the path has been traced. These
Elements present and discuss the basic toolkit for researchers interested in
building ABM.
If the reader arrives so far in this book, we will be happy. If, from now
on, it is we who will follow the reader’s progress, we will be blissfully happy.
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